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ABSTRACT

JOHN HENRY NEWMAN AND GEORGES FLOROVSKY:
AN ORTHODOX-CATHOLIC DIALOGUE ON
THE DEVELOPMENT OF DOCTRINE

By
Daniel J. Lattier
December 2012

Dissertation supervised by Dr. Radu Bordeianu
This dissertation examines the idea of doctrinal development in the writings of
John Henry Newman and Georges Florovsky, who are both representative thinkers in
their respective Roman Catholic and Eastern Orthodox traditions. Newman‘s theory of
doctrinal development proposes that divine revelation has been given once and for all, but
that the Church is still growing in its understanding of this revelation. This growth
sometimes results in new doctrinal definitions, which require confirmation of their truth
by an infallible authority. The essence of Newman‘s theory has been received as
compatible with Roman Catholic theology, and constitutes a hermeneutical lens through
which Roman Catholics view the categories of revelation, Tradition, and authority. On
the contrary, many leading Orthodox theologians of the twentieth and twenty-first
centuries have expressed serious reservations about the idea of doctrinal development,
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leading one to wonder if there are some unexamined hermeneutical disagreements
between Roman Catholics and Orthodox on these categories.
In order to respond to these Orthodox reservations, I constructed the dissertation
as a dialogue between Newman and Florovsky on doctrinal development. More
specifically, I arranged the dissertation as a dialogue between Newman and Florovsky on
their understandings of revelation, Tradition, and authority—categories implied in the
idea of doctrinal development. The first goal of the dissertation is to show that
Newman‘s theory of doctrinal development is in fact compatible with Orthodox
understandings of revelation and Tradition. The understanding of authority in Newman‘s
theory does not currently share this compatibility, but dialogue does offer the opportunity
for mutual enrichment of Newman‘s and Florovsky‘s thought on this category. A second
goal is to expose Newman‘s theory to Orthodox categories of thought in the hopes of
further developing Newman‘s theory itself. One of the principal developments that
results from this exposure is the clarification that Newman‘s theory is a function of the
incarnational character of his theology. Showing that the affirmation of doctrinal
development follows from an incarnational, or Christocentric, theology represents the
third and final goal of this dissertation.
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INTRODUCTION
In the title of his important 2003 lecture, Orthodox scholar Andrew Louth asks the
question: ―Is Development of Doctrine a Valid Category for Orthodox Theology?‖ Louth
particularly singles out John Henry Newman‘s theory of the development of doctrine,
which posited that the Church grows in its understanding of divine revelation over the
course of time. Louth rightly recognizes that there has not been a great deal of explicit
Orthodox reflection on doctrinal development, and that he is thus ―venturing on to virgin
territory as an Orthodox theologian choosing to discuss this topic.‖ He eventually
answers the question posed in his title in the negative, concluding that ―the idea of
development is not an acceptable category in Orthodox theology.‖ 1
Other modern Orthodox authors have also rejected the idea of doctrinal
development, leading one to wonder whether there is an Orthodox consensus against this
category. In his essay ―Tradition and Traditions,‖ Vladimir Lossky cautions those who
would ―dare to speak, against all the evidence, of a collective progress in the knowledge
of the Christian mystery, a progress which would be due to a ‗dogmatic development.‘‖ 2
John Behr writes that ―From an Orthodox perspective there is therefore no such thing as
dogmatic development.‖3 In one of the only Roman Catholic treatments of Orthodoxy
and doctrinal development, Aidan Nichols writes, ―A majority, it may be, of Orthodox
writers register serious reservations about what they take to be the Catholic theory of

1

Andrew Louth, ―Is Development of Doctrine a Valid Category for Orthodox Theology?‖ in Orthodoxy
and Western Culture: A Collection of Essays Honoring Jaroslav Pelikan on His Eightieth Birthday, ed.
Valerie Hotchkiss and Patrick Henry (Crestwood, NY: SVS Press, 2005), 45-63.
2
Vladimir Lossky, ―Tradition and Traditions,‖ in In the Image and Likeness of God, ed. John Erickson and
Thomas Bird (Crestwood, NY: SVS Press, 1974), 162.
3
John Behr, ―Scripture, the Gospel, and Orthodoxy,‖ St. Vladimir‘s Theological Quarterly 43 (1999): 248.
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doctrinal development.‖4 These writers typically direct their objections at the
understanding of revelation and Tradition they believe is implied in the idea of doctrinal
development.
The above-named Orthodox authors who reject doctrinal development either
belong to, or are the heirs of, what has been dubbed the ―Neo-patristic‖ school of thought.
This designation originated in Georges Florovsky‘s repeated call for Orthodox theology
to undertake a ―Neo-patristic synthesis.‖ The precise meaning of this call continues to be
debated, but it is generally understood as a call for a renewed return to, and appropriation
of, the Fathers of the Church. ―Neo-patristic‖ was first applied as a moniker for a
particular school of Orthodox thought by Alexander Schmemann, who differentiated it
from the ―Russian‖ school represented by such thinkers as Sergei Bulgakov, Vladimir
Soloviev, Pavel Florensky, and Nicholas Berdyaev, among others. 5 It is the Neo-patristic
school that gained ascendancy in Orthodox thought in the twentieth century, a fact that
has led many contemporary authors to call for a re-reception of the Russian school.6
Paul Valliere (who is Episcopalian) is among those voices calling for such a rereception. In Modern Russian Theology—Bukharev, Soloviev, Bulgakov: Orthodox
Theology in a New Key, Valliere argues that the differing attitudes toward doctrinal
development constitutes a major distinguishing characteristic of the Neo-patristic and
Russian schools of thought. He portrays the Russian school as standing for a creative and

4

Aidan Nichols, O.P., From Newman to Congar: The Idea of Doctrinal Development from the Victorians
to the Second Vatican Council (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1990), 282.
5
Alexander Schmemann, ―Russian Theology: 1920-1972, An Introductory Survey,‖ St. Vladimir‘s
Theological Quarterly 16 (1972): 178; ―Role of Honour,‖ SVTQ 2 (1954): 6.
6
See, for instance, Pantelis Kalaitzidis, ―From the ‗Return to the Fathers‘ to the Need for a Modern
Orthodox Theology,‖ SVTQ 54:1 (2010): 5-36; Brandon Gallaher, ―‗Waiting for the Barbarians‘: Identity
and Polemicism in the Neo-Patristic Synthesis of Georges Florovsky,‖ Modern Theology 27:4 (October
2011): 659-691; Aristotle Papanikolaou, ―Orthodoxy, Post-Modernism, and Ecumenism: The Difference
that Divine-Human Communion Makes,‖ Journal of Ecumenical Studies 42:4 (Fall 2007): 527-46.
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living understanding of tradition that allows for dogmatic development. Soloviev‘s essay
―Dogmaticheskoe razvitie tserkvi v sviazi s voprosom o soedinenii tserkvei‖ (―The
Development of Dogma in the Church in Connection with the Question of Church
Union‖) represents the Russian school‘s lengthiest advocacy of the idea of doctrinal
development.7 Bulgakov, in his seminal essay ―Dogmat i dogmatika‖ (―Dogma and
Dogmatic Theology‖), also supports development as the task of theology. 8 Valliere
accuses the Neo-patristic school of thought, on the other hand, of operating with a
―hegemonic concept of tradition [that] entails as its corollary the rejection of the
historical development of dogma except in the formal sense.‖9
One of my goals in this dissertation is to argue against the notion that there exists
a Neo-patristic, or Orthodox, consensus against doctrinal development. As Louth
intimated, Orthodox reflection on this issue has been scant, and a more thorough
engagement with doctrinal development seems a prerequisite of determining whether or
not there exists an Orthodox consensus for or against development. Moreover, influential
Neo-patristic theologians of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries have endorsed some
form of the idea of doctrinal development. This list includes Dumitru Staniloae, John
Meyendorff, Thomas Hopko, and none other than the primogenitor of the so-called Neopatristic school, Georges Florovsky.
More importantly, I believe that the idea of doctrinal development accords with
the Orthodox understanding of revelation and Tradition. Without question, the theory of
7

In Sobranie sochinenii Vladimira Sergeevicha Solov‘eva, supplementary vol. 2 (Brussels: Izdatel‘stvo
Zhinzn‘s Bogom, Foyer Oriental Chrétien, 1969), 1-67.
8
In Zhivoe predanie: pravoslavie v sovremennosti (Paris: YMCA Press, 1937). Peter Bouteneff has
translated this essay into English in Tradition Alive: On the Church and the Christian Life in Our Time—
Readings from the Eastern Church, ed. Michael Plekon (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), 67–
80.
9
Paul Valliere, Modern Russian Theology—Bukharev, Soloviev, Bulgakov: Orthodox Theology
in a New Key (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000), 373-403. The quotation is taken from 377.
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doctrinal development that has had the most influence upon modern thought is that of
John Henry Newman. He most famously formulated it in his 1845 Essay on the
Development of Christian Doctrine—which Yves Congar judged as ―the locus classicus
for the question [of doctrinal development]‖10—though one can find the principles of this
theory in his earlier works, and refined in later works. Since the second half of the
twentieth-century, Newman‘s theory has become the received understanding of doctrinal
development in Roman Catholic theology. Bishop Basil Christopher Butler even made
the claim that section 8 of Vatican II‘s Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation—Dei
Verbum—―is practically a précis of Newman‘s theory of the development of doctrine.‖ 11
The starting point of Newman‘s theory is that revelation is similar to other ―ideas‖
that develop, or attain greater complexity, in the minds of men and women over the
course of time. In his own words,
the increase and expansion of the Christian Creed and Ritual, and the variations
which have attended the process in the case of individual writers and Churches,
are the necessary attendants on any philosophy or polity which takes possession
of the intellect and heart, and has had any wide or extended dominion; that, from
the nature of the human mind, time is necessary for the full comprehension and
perfection of great ideas; and that the highest and most wonderful truths, though
communicated to the world once for all by inspired teachers, could not be
comprehended all at once by the recipients, but, as being received and transmitted
by minds not inspired and through media which were human, have required only
the longer time and deeper thought for their full elucidation. 12

10

Yves Congar, Tradition and Traditions: An Historical and a Theological Essay, trans. Michael Naseby
and Thomas Rainborough (London: Burns & Oates, 1966), 211. Jaroslav Pelikan and Avery Dulles, among
others, have expressed similar sentiments. Pelikan judges that ―Newman‘s Essay [is] the almost inevitable
starting point for an investigation of development of doctrine‖ (Development of Christian Doctrine: Some
Historical Prolegomena [New Haven, CT: Yale University Press], 1969, 3). And Avery Dulles writes,
―Although much has been written on the subject since Newman‘s time, it would be difficult to name any
rival treatise that measures up to his in depth and thoroughness‖ (John Henry Newman [London:
Continuum, 2002], 79).
11
Basil Christopher Butler, The Theology of Vatican II (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1967), 40.
12
Dev., 29-30.
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Newman‘s description of the theory of development contains the following principles
pertaining to revelation and Tradition: divine revelation has been given once and for all;
it has been communicated through human media; the understanding of revelation grows,
or develops, in human minds as time passes; and this development does not imply a
substantial addition to revelation itself. These principles, I contend, constitute the
essence of Newman‘s theory.
In order to both respond to the supposed Orthodox rejection of doctrinal
development and provide a fuller Orthodox engagement with doctrinal development, I
have constructed this dissertation as a dialogue between Newman and Florovsky.
Florovsky is a representative thinker in modern Orthodox thought, especially on the
subjects of revelation and Tradition that are central to the concept of development. The
philosopher Nicholas Lossky deemed Florovsky ―the most Orthodox of modern Russian
theologians: he is anxious strictly to adhere to the Holy Writ and patristic tradition.‖ 13
His son, Vladimir Lossky, similarly regarded Florovsky as ―le plus grand [théologien
orthodoxe] peut etre de cet époque.‖14 And Rowan Williams has referred to Florovsky as
―the most lucid and systematic‖ of the Russian émigré theologians.15 I will attempt to
show numerous points of agreement between Newman and Florovsky on the concept of
doctrinal development. Because of their eminent place within their respective
traditions—Newman in the Roman Catholic tradition, and Florovsky in the Orthodox—a

13

Nicholas Lossky, History of Russian Philosophy (New York: International University Press, 1972), 391392.
14
Transcripts of Lectures of Lossky, 13/12/56, p.10; cited in Rowan Williams, The Theology of Vladimir
Nikolaievich Lossky, D. Phil. Thesis, University Of Oxford, 1975, 281.
15
Rowan Williams, ―Eastern Orthodox Theology,‖ in The Modern Theologians: An Introduction to
Christian Theology in the Twentieth Century, vol. 2, ed. David F. Ford (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1997),
166.
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dialogue between these two thinkers on the subject of doctrinal development has
ecumenical significance.
Not only is Florovsky a representative Orthodox thinker, but his position on
doctrinal development is also particularly interesting among modern Orthodox authors.
In many essays, Florovsky registered rejections of development for what he believed it
implied about revelation and the theology of history. Yet, in his famous 1937 work Ways
of Russian Theology, one finds Florovsky defending Soloviev‘s understanding of
development as ―a method for dogmatic theology,‖ though this sentiment did not negate
his other reservations.16 Moreover, contrary to Lewis Shaw‘s contention that ―Florovsky
refused to grant Newman‘s idea of the development of doctrine,‖ Florovsky appeared to
endorse it in print in a German encyclopedia article on ―Tradition‖ in 1960. 17 It seems,
then, that Florovsky himself engaged in an ecumenical dialogue about doctrinal
development in his writings. I will explain how Florovsky could both reject and affirm
the idea of doctrinal development during the course of this dissertation.
The fundamental agreement I posit between Newman and Florovsky on doctrinal
development perhaps stops short on the issue of authority. In his Essay on Development,
Newman maintained that ―an infallible developing authority [is] to be expected‖ who
could distinguish, with certainty, between true developments and false accretions. 18
Louth seems to be unique among Orthodox authors in including this aspect of Newman‘s
theory in his rejection of doctrinal development. 19 As will become clear, Newman and

16

V6, 159.
Florovsky, ―Tradition,‖ in Welkirchenlexicon, ed. F.H. Littell and Hans H. Walz (Stuttgart: KreuzVerlag, 1960), cols. 1469-1475. I would like to thank Matthew Baker for allowing me to consult his
English translation of this article.
18
Dev., 75-92.
19
Louth, ―Is Development of Doctrine a Valid Category?‖ 51-52.
17

xvii

Florovsky do indeed disagree on the particular doctrinal role of authority. Nevertheless,
putting Newman and Florovsky in dialogue on the question of authority in relation to
doctrinal development has the potential to bear ecumenical fruit, for it brings to light
some aspects of this ―Church-dividing‖ issue of authority that are infrequently discussed.
The rejection of doctrinal development by many Orthodox authors provides the
catalyst for a second goal of this dissertation, namely, the development of Newman‘s
theory of development. Newman held that an idea develops through exposure to other
ideas, which draw out ―the aspects of an idea… [bringing] them into consistency and
form.‖20 Newman‘s theology was marked by the influence of the Eastern Fathers of the
Church, and even upon his conversion to the Roman Catholic Church, his theology
retained many Eastern characteristics throughout his life. By putting Newman‘s theory
of development in dialogue with Florovsky and Eastern categories of thought, I hope to
elucidate its Eastern character. Furthermore, exposing Newman‘s theory to Eastern
Orthodox theology will help bring greater clarity to its underlying theological principles,
will shed light on some of the questions that still surround it, and will provide fodder for
critiquing some of its lacunae.
Many similarities between Newman and Florovsky will emerge as this
dissertation progresses. Monsignor Michel D‘Herbigny made the claim in the title of his
1918 work that Soloviev was ―a Russian Newman.‖21 However, Florovsky is a much
closer parallel to Newman than Soloviev. Florovsky, like Newman, was a much more
ecclesial thinker, and also like Newman, has been received as such by his communion.
Scripture and the Tradition as primarily communicated through the Fathers of the
20

Dev., 38.
Michel D‘Herbigny, Vladimir Soloviev: A Russian Newman, trans. A.M. Buchanan (London: R&T
Washbourne, 1918).
21
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Church—both East and West—were the shared starting points, objects, and bounds of
their theologies. And as a Roman Catholic reviewer of Ways of Russian Theology noted,
there is an obvious analogy between the re-appropriation of the Fathers called for by
Newman‘s Oxford Movement and Florovsky‘s ―Neo-patristic synthesis.‖22
Their common rootedness in the ecumenical patristic witness is undoubtedly the
principal source of their shared theological emphases. Newman would not have been
privy to the Russian theological inheritance, or, the ―ways of Russian theology,‖ that had
formed the hermeneutic of Florovsky. He was also not well versed in Orthodox thought
contemporary to him. His reflections on the ―Greek Church‖ are confined to his
introduction to William Palmer‘s Notes of a Visit to the Russian Church and a few
scattered references throughout his writings and letters and diaries.23
Florovsky, on the other hand, operated with an almost unparalleled ecumenical
knowledge base that included familiarity with the writings of Newman. The exact
influence of Newman on Florovsky is worthy of further examination than this dissertation
can undertake. George Williams has remarked on Florovsky‘s ―appreciation of English
belles lettres,‖ which included ―a special interest in Walter Scott… certain Victorian
novelists… [and] the Caroline Divines.‖ 24 Florovsky appears to also have had an interest
in Newman, whom James Joyce referred to as the ―greatest‖ prose stylist of the Victorian
age. Between 1929 and 1939, Florovsky‘s involvement with the Anglican-Orthodox
Fellowship of St. Alban and St. Sergius frequently took him to England, where he
22

Stanislas Tyszkiewicz, S.J., review of Puti Russkogo Bogosloviia, by Georges Florovsky, Orientalia
Christiana Periodica 4 (1938): 288-291, at 290-291.
23
William Palmer, Notes of a Visit to the Russian Church, ed. John Henry Cardinal Newman (London:
Kegan Paul & Co., 1882), v-xvii. For Newman‘s references to Eastern Orthodoxy, see Ian Ker, Newman
and the Fullness of Christianity (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1993), 100-102.
24
George Williams, ―Georges Vasilievich Florovsky: His American Career (1948-1965),‖ Greek Orthodox
Theological Review 11:1 (Summer 1965): 12.
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perhaps further cultivated his knowledge of Newman. 25 I have only found positive
references to ―the great Newman,‖ as Florovsky calls him, in the latter‘s writings. 26
The common patristic inheritance marked Newman‘s and Florovsky‘s writings
with their most significant shared emphasis, namely, the incarnational, or Christocentric,
character of their theologies. Recognition of this emphasis leads to the third goal of this
dissertation: to show that affirmation of the idea of doctrinal development flows from
such an incarnational theology. ―The main theme of Patristic theology was always the
Mystery of Christ‘s Person… this Christological concern permeated the whole
theological thinking of the Ancient Church,‖ writes Florovsky. 27 Certain traits and
themes emerged from the patristic reflection on Christ as codified in the judgments of the
first seven ecumenical councils. These traits and themes were thought to be affirmed by
the Incarnation, and thus, were thought to belong to the character of Christianity. They
included the idea that God‘s assumption of human flesh affirmed both divine and human
personhood, that freedom and action flow from personhood, that history is the growth of
the Body of Christ and is thus real and meaningful, and that reason and life contribute to
this growth.
These traits also mark the theologies of Newman and Florovsky, who both affirm
doctrinal development. I will attempt to show that the idea of doctrinal development also
bears these marks of the Incarnation: it affirms that God‘s personal and free revelation of
Himself calls for the free response of human persons in word and deed; that His
revelation was a series of historical events in particular times and places, recounted using

25

Andrew Blane, ed., Georges Florovsky: Russian Intellectual and Orthodox Churchman (Crestwood, NY:
SVS Press, 1997), 69.
26
V13, 157.
27
V4, 24.
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particular language and concepts, and that human history constitutes a witness to these
events using men‘s and women‘s own particularity, historicity, and conceptual
framework; that God‘s salvific activity was aimed at the progressive deification of men
and women in the Church; and that reflection on this activity contributes to this
deification, and is a testament to the growth of the Church.
STATE OF RESEARCH
This dissertation represents one of the few lengthy works concentrating
specifically on Newman‘s theory of development in recent years. Research on Newman
and his theory of doctrinal development flourished in the period between 1950-1980,
when Newman began to receive a more favorable reception among Christians, and
especially among Roman Catholics. The best systematic treatments of Newman‘s
understanding of doctrinal development remain Owen Chadwick‘s From Bossuet to
Newman: The Idea of Doctrinal Development (1957), Jan Walgrave‘s Newman the
Theologian (1960), and Nicholas Lash‘s Newman on Development: The Search for an
Explanation in History (1975). Terrence Merrigan‘s Clear Heads and Holy Hearts: The
Religious and Theological Ideal of John Henry Newman (1992) does not focus
specifically on Newman‘s theory of development, but is noteworthy as the best
systematic exposition of Newman‘s thought in the past twenty years.
This dissertation also represents the lengthiest correlation of Newman‘s theory of
doctrinal development with Orthodox categories of thought. Louth‘s essay directly
engages aspects of Newman‘s understanding of development, but Louth does not develop
the Orthodox challenges to Newman at any great length. Dumitru Staniloae‘s very
interesting essay published in Sobornost in 1969—―The Orthodox Conception of
xxi

Tradition and the Development of Doctrine‖—brings to light some distinctive
contributions Orthodox theology could potentially make to the understanding of doctrinal
development, but Staniloae does not specifically reference Newman in the essay.
Jaroslav Pelikan has written of doctrinal development, and even specifically critiqued
Newman‘s theory in his Development of Christian Doctrine: Some Historical
Prolegomena. But Pelikan wrote this work as a Lutheran, and thus, did not make a
conscious effort to employ Orthodox categories of thought in his critique.
In spite of Florovsky‘s influence on Orthodox thought in the twentieth and
twenty-first centuries, not many direct treatments of his thought exist—a phenomenon
that is beginning to be rectified. The best comprehensive works on Florovsky‘s thought
are Lewis Shaw‘s unpublished dissertation An Introduction to the Study of Georges
Florovsky, Christoph Künkel‘s Totus Christus: Die Theologie Georges V. Florovskys,
George Williams‘ lengthy article ―Georges Vasilievich Florovsky: His American Career
(1948-1965),‖ and Matthew Baker‘s recent Masters‘ thesis, ―Neo-Patristic Synthesis‖:
An Examination of a Key Hermeneutical Paradigm in the Thought of Georges V.
Florovsky. This dissertation represents the first lengthy Roman Catholic treatment of
Florovsky on the questions of revelation and Tradition that permeated his oeuvre, and the
only lengthy Roman Catholic treatment of Florovsky in the English language. The
lengthiest Catholic works on Florovsky—both on his ecclesiology—are Yves-Noël
Lelouvier‘s 1968 Perspectives russes sur l'Église. Un theologien contemporain: Georges
Florovsky, and Miguel de Salis Amaral‘s more recent Dos Visiones Ortodoxas de la
Iglesia: Bulgakov y Florovsky (2003). Other recent dissertations on Florovsky include
Andrew Parlee‘s The Epistemology of George V. Florovsky (2006), which argues from a
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Calvinist perspective that Florovsky‘s epistemology reduces to fideism, and Sergei
Nikolaev‘s 2008 Church and Reunion in the Theology of Sergii Bulgakov and Georges
Florovsky, 1918-1940, which examines Bulgakov‘s and Florovsky‘s divergent views of
ecumenism from a liberal Protestant perspective.
LIMITATIONS OF THIS STUDY
The dialogical nature of this dissertation necessitates the imposition of some
constraints upon the scope of treatment of each author. I do not engage in any extensive
dialogue between each author‘s understanding of development and his respective
ecclesial tradition. Thus, I do not devote a great deal of space to comparing and
contrasting Newman‘s theory of development with theories of development proposed by
other Catholic and Protestant authors. I also do not devote a great deal of space to putting
Florovsky in dialogue with other contemporary Orthodox authors. Where I do mention
other Orthodox authors, it is in order to more fully elucidate Florovsky‘s understanding
of development and his consonance with Newman. In a future work, I hope to provide a
general overview of the Orthodox response to doctrinal development in the modern era.
In general, my treatment of Newman and Florovsky is more synthetic than
chronological. The main concern of my dissertation is to highlight the abiding themes—
or ―first principles,‖ as Newman refers to them—in Newman‘s and Florovsky‘s
understandings of doctrinal development, rather than the changing application of them.
Nevertheless, when my work of synthesis necessitates it, I will point out shifts that
occurred in Newman‘s and Florovsky‘s positions on revelation, Tradition, or authority.
Florovsky is a polarizing figure in Orthodox theology today, and I will attempt to nuance
his thought in order to avoid some of the hasty generalizations about him that are in part
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the result of bracketing certain statements and isolating them from his entire written
corpus. Nevertheless, there is a great need for more detailed chronological work on
Florovsky than I will be able to undertake here.
A more thorough treatment of the development of Florovsky‘s thought would
consult a broader array of texts than I will here consider. My dissertation will engage
writings that are rarely taken into account in evaluations of Florovsky. Nevertheless, I do
not have facility with German, and thus, I will not be able to engage with Künkel‘s book.
Because I do not have facility with Russian, I will not be able to consult some of
Florovsky‘s essays from his Eurasian period of the 1920s, nor some of the letters that are
currently being reprinted in Russia. I will also not be able to plumb the depths of
Florovsky‘s unpublished papers and correspondence housed at the Princeton Library for
this dissertation, though I hope to do so for the purposes of future works.
My engagement with Florovsky will principally rely on his writings contained in
the fourteen-volume English Collected Works. This reliance is somewhat justified given
the synthetic concerns of my work. Plus, as Shaw points out, ―after 1935 Florovsky took
up English as his academic vehicle of expression,‖ and ―wished the translations of his
works… to supersede the Russian originals.‖ 28 Nevertheless, there are numerous
difficulties with the Collected Works that should be kept in mind, including the fact that
they are organized thematically rather than chronologically. More troubling is that the
editor (Richard Haugh) performed surgery on some of Florovsky‘s essays—some were
re-titled, broken up, and even re-attached to other works.29 There is a great need for a
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new edition of Florovsky‘s collected works, or better, a true complete works. Until that
time, it is best to refer to Florovsky‘s original, though sometimes less accessible,
publications.
CHAPTERS
Chapter One: Newman and Florovsky on the Mode and Character of Revelation
In Chapter One I expound upon Newman‘s and Florovsky‘s understanding of the
concept of revelation, which is foundational for their understandings of doctrinal
development. How doctrine develops, I argue, depends upon the way in which God
communicates this doctrine, or, revelation. Newman and Florovsky describe revelation
using their own idiosyncratic language: Newman has recourse to the British empiricist
terms of ―idea‖ and ―impression‖; Florovsky refers to revelation as ―event‖ and
―experience.‖ Nevertheless, both authors‘ understandings of revelation are marked by a
Christocentric character inasmuch as they portray the Incarnation as the central and
determining historical event in a series of divine, personal, and free events—aimed at
men‘s and women‘s deification—in which God calls for an active human reception and
response in thought and deed. These characteristics they ascribe to the event of
revelation will also mark the character of the Church‘s response to this revelation, i.e., the
Church‘s development of doctrine. I will also seek to dispel the charge that Newman‘s
understanding of development promotes the idea of new revelation. In addition, I will
discuss the implications of Newman and Florovsky‘s shared contention that the entirety
of revelation dwells in the ―mind of the Church.‖

published by Büchervertriebsanstalt after Nordland went bankrupt. An intended volume of Florovsky‘s
sermons and homiletical writings was never published.

xxv

Chapter Two: Newman and Florovsky on Tradition and Doctrinal Development
Chapter Two deals more directly with the idea of doctrinal development, which is
often considered synonymous with the concept of Tradition. I will show that Newman
and Florovsky both view the history of the Church as one of doctrinal development in
which the members of the Church actively respond to revelation through their reason and
life. The Christological character of Tradition is more explicit in Florovsky, who
portrays the witness of reason and life to revelation (i.e., doctrinal development) as
contributing to the growth of the Body of Christ in history. My treatment of Newman
and Florovsky on Tradition will raise some of the more interesting and debated questions
surrounding doctrinal development, such as the following: the ability of human language
to convey the mystery of revelation, the appropriateness of using the organic metaphor to
describe the life of the Church, and whether or not doctrinal development corresponds to
the growth of the Church in holiness. In the Dialogue section of this chapter, I will
compare and contrast Newman‘s and Florovsky‘s answers to these questions. In
addition, I will attempt to reconcile Florovsky‘s apparently contradictory views on
doctrinal development.

Chapter Three: Newman and Florovsky on Doctrinal Development and Authority
In this final chapter, I will explain Newman‘s and Florovsky‘s positions on the
role of Church authority in the process of doctrinal development. Newman believed that
recognition of doctrinal development in the Church‘s history necessitated the recognition
of an infallible authority who could definitively distinguish true developments from false.
He maintained that this authority—vested in the Magisterium whose head is the pope,
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and deriving from the presence and guidance of the Spirit in the Church—served as an
aid to the certitude of the members of the Church, who are not capable of achieving this
certitude about the truth of every doctrinal formula on their own. Newman‘s descriptions
of authority are permeated by his incarnational emphasis. Florovsky, on the other hand,
did not ascribe as clear a role to formal authority in doctrinal development. He
acknowledges that the bishops rightfully give voice to the mind of the Church, but he
does not believe that this act of voicing the Church‘s teaching serves as a formal
guarantee of its truth. Yet, Florovsky also frames his understanding of authority within
his Christological hermeneutic. In the Dialogue section, I will examine whether or not
one can judge Newman‘s and Florovsky‘s understandings of authority on their
Christological merits, and will also highlight the interesting ecumenical questions raised
by a consideration of authority‘s role in doctrinal development.

Conclusion
In the Conclusion, I will offer a brief overview of each chapter and describe how
it contributed to addressing the three goals of this dissertation that I outlined in the
Introduction. I will also briefly discuss the potential intra-Orthodox and ecumenical
implications of my study.
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CHAPTER ONE: NEWMAN AND FLOROVSKY ON THE
MODE AND CHARACTER OF REVELATION
The category of divine revelation is fundamental to the concept of the
development of doctrine. Other authors have recognized this point. Henri de Lubac, in
his groundbreaking 1948 essay ―The Problem of the Development of Dogma,‖ states that
having an accurate idea of the ―fact of revelation‖ constitutes the ―core of the problem‖
of doctrinal development.30 Herbert Hammans, in a 1967 essay on doctrinal
development, similarly writes, ―Any theory about the development of dogma rests
essentially on the idea of revelation.‖ 31 It is unsurprising, then, to find that Newman‘s
theory of doctrinal development follows from particular claims he made about divine
revelation. More specifically, I believe that Newman‘s understanding of doctrinal
development follows from his understanding of the mode in which God reveals Himself,
and the character of this revelation.
In this dissertation, I am arguing that Newman‘s theory of doctrinal development
is congruent with Florovsky‘s theology. In order to successfully argue this thesis, I need
to first establish that Florovsky‘s understanding of revelation is congruent with that
operative in Newman‘s theory of development. As I will show, both Newman and
Florovsky portray revelation as consisting of God‘s personal, and thus free, acts in
history for the purpose of men‘s and women‘s deification. I will also show that both
Newman and Florovsky perceive a need for an active human response to divine
revelation. What is more, they believe this activity follows from the activity evident in
30

Henri de Lubac, ―The Problem of the Development of Dogma,‖ in Theology in History, trans. Anne
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Herbert Hammans, ―Recent Catholic Views on the Development of Dogma,‖ Concilium 1:3 (1967): 54;
see also Nicholas Lash, Change in Focus: A Study of Doctrinal Change and Continuity (London: Sheed &
Ward, 1973), 10-18.
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God‘s revelation of Himself. They therefore understand this activity to consist of men‘s
and women‘s free and personal response to revelation in history through their life and
thought, or, their faith and reason. As I will show, Newman and Florovsky understand
this activity to mark even the human person‘s, and the Church‘s, initial reception of
revelation. As I will argue in Chapter Two, doctrinal development constitutes the
continuation of this active response.
Along with these similarities, certain differences will emerge in Newman‘s and
Florovsky‘s respective understandings of revelation. However, I will argue in the
Dialogue section of Chapter One that none of these differences constitutes a fundamental
disagreement about the mode and character of revelation, and thus, they do not mitigate
my attempt to argue for the consonance between Newman‘s theory of doctrinal
development and Florovsky‘s theology. Rather, I believe that Florovsky‘s understanding
of revelation provides opportunities for the development of the understanding of
revelation operative in Newman‘s theory of doctrinal development.

1.1: NEWMAN ON THE MODE AND CHARACTER OF REVELATION
By the term ―mode of revelation,‖ I refer to the manner in which God
communicates Himself to humanity. In writing of Newman‘s understanding of the mode
of revelation, I begin with a necessary caveat, namely, that Newman was clear that the
way in which God communicates Himself to human beings is forever shrouded in
mystery in this life. He understood that the language he used to write about the mode of
revelation was merely analogical. In the face of a mystery such as God‘s communication
of himself to human beings, Newman knew that reasonings ultimately fall short: ―not
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even the Catholic reasonings and conclusions…are worthy of the Divine Verities which
they represent, but are the truth only in as full a measure as our minds can admit it; the
truth as far as they go, and under the conditions of thought which human feebleness
imposes.‖32 Yet reason we must, as Newman recognized, and some of our reasonings are
nearer approximations to the truth than others. 33
As others have noted, Newman‘s understanding of the mode of revelation has its
roots in the empiricist schema of ―object—impression—idea.‖34 Applied to knowledge
derived from sense perception in general, this schema means that when the senses
perceive an object that is external to them, that object makes an impression on them that
is coterminously the source of ideas, or reflections, on the part of the beholder. Applied
to revelation, James Cameron explains the schema of object-impression-idea as follows:
Revelation, then, is of an object that is given, known in us by an impression which
is self-authenticating in the way the impressions of normal sense perception
authenticate the reality of the objects to which they correspond. Such impressions
prompt us to analyse and describe their objects, and the validity of such analysis
and description rests upon the authenticity of the original perception. 35
I understand Cameron‘s interpretation of Newman‘s application of the schema to
revelation as follows: 1) God is the object of revelation; 2) the impression is both the
action of God in communicating Himself, and the initial reception of that communication
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by human beings; and 3) the idea is the human reflection on the object as mediated by the
impression.
In the following paragraphs, I will examine Newman‘s designation of revelation
as ―object‖ and ―impression‖ in order to elucidate what Newman is trying to
communicate about the mode and character of revelation. I will leave the discussion of
revelation as ―idea‖ to the second chapter. It has been frequently noted that Newman was
not stringently consistent with his religious vocabulary. An example of this
inconsistency is his sometimes interchangeable use of the terms ―impression‖ and
―idea.‖36 It is also true that Newman believed the impression made by an object on the
human mind simultaneously becomes a source of reflection, or, an idea. However, I will
argue in Chapter Two that, more often than not, Newman‘s use of the term ―idea‖ seems
to correspond to the human response to, or reception of, revelation in thought and word.
In others words, Newman‘s ―idea‖ seems to correspond to the traditioning of revelation,
or, to doctrinal development. ―Impression,‖ on the other hand, seems to specially pertain
to the initial revelatory moment.

A. GOD AS THE “OBJECT” OF REVELATION
I include within Newman‘s understanding of God as ―object‖ three emphases of
Newman‘s theology of revelation: 1) revelation‘s origin is external to human beings; 2)
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the object of revelation is one; and 3) this object is not an abstraction, but a concrete
person.
Newman‘s designation of God as the object of revelation conveys the simple truth
that revelation is an existential given that originates outside of its (human) recipients.
―By objective truth,‖ writes Newman, ―is meant the Religious System considered as
existing in itself, external to this or that particular mind.‖37 Newman considers divine
revelation in particular to consist in the objective ―manifestation of the Invisible Divine
Power…‖38 In his first lengthy treatment of doctrinal development—his fifteenth Oxford
University Sermon entitled ―The Theory of Developments in Religious Doctrine‖
(1843)—Newman maintains that religious objects are analogous to the objects perceived
by the senses, whose corresponding reflections generated in the human mind ―[force] on
us a persuasion of their reality from the spontaneous congruity and coincidence of these
accompaniments, as if they could not be creations of our minds, but were the images of
external and independent beings.‖39 Newman did not regard God‘s invisibility as a
detriment to the persuasiveness of His reality, for he always regarded the invisible world
as more real than the visible world. Hence his position that ―Almighty God, we know,
exists more really and absolutely than any of those fellow-men whose existence is
conveyed to us through the senses…‖ 40
Newman‘s focus on the externality of the object of revelation should be
considered in relation to his historical context. His life spanned most of the nineteenth
century—that ―wonderful age‖ in which ―the enlargement of the circle of secular
37
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knowledge just now is simply a bewilderment…‖ He believed that the rapid increase of
secular knowledge, and the ―confident tone of [its] schools,‖ had bred in the Western
world ―nothing else than [a] deep, plausible skepticism…‖ that engendered an atheistic
materialism. 41 He elsewhere includes this skepticism and materialism under the umbrella
term ―Liberalism.‖ In his ―Biglietto Speech‖ delivered upon receiving the cardinal‘s hat
in 1879, Newman reflected that, ―For thirty, forty, fifty years I have resisted to the best of
my powers the spirit of liberalism in religion.‖42 He defined this Liberalism as
the doctrine that there is no positive truth in religion, but that one creed is as good
as another… It is inconsistent with any recognition of any religion, as true. It
teaches that all are to be tolerated, for all are matters of opinion. Revealed religion
is not a truth, but a sentiment and a taste; not an objective fact, not miraculous;
and it is the right of each individual to make it say just what strikes his fancy. 43
Perhaps spurred on by the proliferation of Liberalism in religion during his lifetime,
Newman increased his use of the term ―objective‖ in reference to the human reception of
revelation from the 1845 to the 1878 edition of the Essay on Development.44 His
apparent concern was to emphasize that Christianity and its ―object‖ was not something
that originated in the human mind.
An instance of the aforementioned inconsistency of Newman‘s religious
vocabulary arises in the fifteenth Oxford University Sermon in regard to the term
―object.‖ There Newman vacillates between references to the ―Object of Faith‖ and the
―Objects of Faith.‖ He deems God the ―great Object of Faith‖ and the separate dogmas
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of Christianity, such as the Trinity and the Incarnation, as the ―Objects of Faith.‖ 45
Suffice it to say that Newman‘s use of both the singular and plural for the object of
revelation results in unnecessary confusion. 46 Within the sermon, however, it is clear that
Newman understands the dogmas mentioned not as separable objects of revelation
alongside God, but as propositions formulated as a result of the Church‘s reflection on
the one object of revelation.
Indeed, one of the principal tenets of Newman‘s theory of doctrinal development
is that the entirety of revelation constitutes a unity or a whole. As I will discuss below, it
is Newman‘s position that the mind of the Church can implicitly possess the idea of
revelation as a whole that allows him to label new doctrines as ―developments‖ rather
than new revelations. Newman assigns the characteristic of unity to revelation because of
its source in the one God: ―Surely, if Almighty God is ever one and the same, and is
revealed to us as one and the same, the true inward impression of Him, made on the
recipient of the revelation, must be one and the same…‖ 47 Newman sees this doctrine of
God‘s oneness as not only a foundation of the theory of doctrinal development, but ―the
foundation of all religion‖ as well, as it is a conclusion reachable through human
reason.48
Newman appears to arrive at the conclusion that revelation is one because its
divine source is one through metaphysical reasoning. Such metaphysical reasoning is
also behind his Platonic contention that any object is a unity in spite of the variety of the
aspects through which men and women view it. After all, men and women cannot reflect
45
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on these aspects all-at-once, and thus, the conclusion that they all belong to the same
object cannot be arrived at purely through experience; it involves in part a metaphysical
leap. Jan Walgrave and Terrence Merrigan are correct in claiming that Newman‘s
reasoning is principally carried out by what the former refers to as his ―practical
psychologism,‖ and the latter as his ―philosophical realism.‖ 49 But, as Walgrave clarifies,
―every great system of philosophy must have a basis in metaphysics... [and Newman‘s]
metaphysical intuition, therefore, is the highly conscious background of all his
intellectual procedures.‖50
Newman emphasized that this unity that is the object of the Christian‘s faith is no
mere monad, or abstraction, but a concrete person. In fact, he held that one purpose of
divine revelation was to give knowledge of God‘s person: ―how great an addition of
fulness and exactness is made to our mental image of the Divine Personality and
Attributes, by the light of Christianity. And, indeed, to give us a clear and sufficient
object for our faith, is one main purpose of the supernatural Dispensations of Religion.‖ 51
Divine revelation provides ―an addition of fulness and exactness‖ to what Newman refers
to as ―natural revelation.‖ Here a brief explanation of Newman‘s estimation of natural
revelation is necessary in order to more fully understand the role he ascribes to divine
revelation.
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According to Newman, natural revelation and the forms of religion derived from
it ―mean the knowledge of God, of His Will, and of our duties towards Him…‖52 The
primary and most authoritative source of this natural knowledge that pertains to God is
conscience. Newman operates with the Thomistic definition of conscience as ―the
practical judgment or dictate of reason, by which we judge what hic et nunc is to be done
as being good, or to be avoided as evil.‖ 53 He also describes conscience as the human
apprehension of the natural law, which reflects the divine law. 54 However, Newman also
assigns a revelatory function to conscience. When a human person does right or wrong,
and feels a consequent sense of either ―approbation‖ or ―blame,‖ Newman holds that
conscience ―impress[es] the imagination with the picture of a Supreme Governor, a
Judge, holy, just, powerful, all-seeing, retributive.‖55 Because conscience so clearly
impresses these characteristics of God on men and women, Newman famously referred to
it as the ―aboriginal Vicar of Christ.‖56
Other sources of natural knowledge about God include ―the voice of mankind‖
and ―the course of the world,‖ by which Newman means, respectively, what the
commonalities of human religion and human experience reveal about the character of
God and our relation to Him. 57 Thus, for instance, all major world religions contain some
form of a doctrine of sin, mutatis mutandis, and rituals of atonement, which, according to
Newman, implies that there is someone whose mercy or forgiveness we need to seek.
Newman also holds that a reasoned reflection on human experience can yield such truths
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as human beings‘ inability to autonomously better themselves, or the natural desire for
religion and eternal life—truths that can further lead one to surmise the existence of a
good God.58 In postulating that human knowledge and experience can both tell us of the
existence of God and also yield truths about God, Newman exhibits a very generous
attitude toward natural revelation.
Newman divides natural revelation into two categories: ―natural religion‖ and
what he refers to variously as the ―religion of the philosophers,‖ the ―Religion of
Reason,‖ or the ―Religion of Civilization.‖ By ―natural religion,‖ Newman means the
pagan religions prevalent in the time before Christ that were typically polytheistic and
employed a number of rituals and customs in rendering worship to the gods. By ―the
religion of the philosophers,‖ Newman means the reasoned reflection on the world and
human nature that yields truths about God and humankind, but is not explicitly connected
with a traditional religious structure consisting of creed and worship. 59
Part of Newman‘s apologetic for the development of Christian doctrine is the
argument that development is a principle of life and history. As such, Newman perceived
a process of development in natural revelation that served a preparatory role for divine
revelation. This process of development involved men‘s and women‘s growth in both the
understanding and living out of those truths about God that they could glean through their
reflection on the world.60 Francis McGrath argues that Newman‘s view of development
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in natural religion was in part attributable to his appropriation of Justin Martyr‘s doctrine
of the Logos spermatikos and Clement of Alexandria‘s view of Greek philosophy as a
preparation for Christianity. 61 McGrath‘s argument is plausible, though only indirectly
supported in Newman‘s works.62 A more certain influence was Newman‘s doctrine of
Divine Providence, which held that both natural and divine revelation were
―appointments of one and the same being, working at sundry times and in diverse
manners, but on consistent principles.‖63
In spite of his optimistic view of natural revelation as manifested in both natural
and philosophical religion, Newman is clear that it remains incomplete and thus
inadequate without divine revelation. He believes that natural revelation testifies to its
own inadequacy inasmuch as the desire for, and expectation of, a divine revelation is ―an
integral part‖ of it.64 In describing why natural revelation is inadequate, Newman
employs epistemological distinctions between the ―concrete‖ versus the ―abstract,‖ and
relatedly, the ―real‖ versus the ―notional.‖ These distinctions, as elaborated in the
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61
Francis McGrath, John Henry Newman: Universal Revelation (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press,
1997), 45-50; Justin Martyr, First Apology; Clement of Alexandria, Stromateis.
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Such apparent statements with affinities to Justin Martyr include the following: ―… the Almighty
scattered through the world, before His Son came, vestiges and gleams of His true Religion, and collected
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moon, to govern the night‖ (D.A., 210-211); and ―from the beginning the Moral Governor of the world has
scattered the seeds of truth far and wide over its extent; that these have variously taken root, and grown up
as in the wilderness, wild plants indeed but living‖ (Ess. 1: 231); quoted in McGrath, 75, 79.
63
A.S., 1: 214; quoted in McGrath, 42.
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Grammar of Assent, act as the lens through which Newman views not only natural
revelation, but divine revelation, as well. They thus require explanation.
The ―concrete‖ refers to those things or objects of which men and women have an
experience, either sensual, intellectual, or both. It refers to individuals or particular
instances of things, versus universals or general instances of things. Newman calls our
knowledge of the concrete ―real,‖ because it is a knowledge whose reference points are
res (―things‖ or ―objects‖). Thus, one can be said to have real knowledge of objects such
as a flower, or the sun, or one‘s mother, through having actually experienced these
realities with one‘s senses. But, according to Newman, one‘s real knowledge is not
confined to those phenomena with which one has sensual familiarity. For instance, even
though a man has never fought in a war, he can be said to have a real knowledge of it
through the descriptions he has read of the Jewish War by Josephus, or the Napoleonic
wars in Tolstoy‘s War and Peace. These, too, constitute experiences inasmuch as men
and women are actively engaged in interpreting the experience of the authors.65

65

Newman elaborates on how we can have real knowledge of things without having sensually experienced
them as follows: ―Further, we are able by an inventive faculty, or, as I may call it, the faculty of
composition, to follow the descriptions of things which have never come before us, and to form, out of such
passive impressions as experience has heretofore left on our minds, new images, which, though mental
creations, are in no sense abstractions, and though ideal, are not notional. They are concrete units in the
minds both of the party describing and the party informed of them. Thus I may never have seen a palm or a
banana, but I have conversed with those who have, or I have read graphic accounts of it, and, from my own
previous knowledge of other trees, have been able with so ready an intelligence to interpret their language,
and to light up such an image of it in my thoughts, that, were it not that I never was in the countries where
the tree is found, I should fancy that I had actually seen it. Hence again it is the very praise we give to the
characters of some great poet or historian that he is so individual. I am able as it were to gaze on Tiberius,
as Tacitus draws him, and to figure to myself our James the First, as he is painted in Scott's Romance. The
assassination of Caesar, his ‗Et tu, Brute?‘ his collecting his robes about him, and his fall under Pompey's
statue, all this becomes a fact to me and an object of real apprehension. Thus it is that we live in the past
and in the distant; by means of our capacity of interpreting the statements of others about former ages or
foreign climes by the lights of our own experience. The picture, which historians are able to bring before
us, of Caesar's death, derives its vividness and effect from its virtual appeal to the various images of our
memory‖ (G.A., 42).
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The ―abstract,‖ on the other hand, refers to the realm of the universal and the
general. Whereas the concrete is represented by propositions whose terms are singular
(―Philip was the father of Alexander,‖ ―the earth goes round the sun‖), the abstract is
represented by propositions whose terms are general. Newman provides the following
examples of abstract propositions: ―Man is an animal, some men are learned, an Apostle
is a creation of Christianity.‖ 66 The abstract is the product of the human mind, which can
only grow in knowledge through situating objects in relation to other objects. Since the
abstract refers to ideas or notions originating in the human mind, Newman calls our
knowledge of the abstract ―notional.‖ Notional knowledge is thus the work of ―regarding
things…as they stand in relation to each other,‖ of comparing and contrasting, of
defining, that is natural to human beings. 67 In other words, it is the product of human
reason.
According to Newman, the concrete and the abstract, the real and the notional, are
complementary to one another. He held that ―life is for action,‖ and the concrete and the
real is that which stirs our emotions and impels us to action. 68 ―It is in human nature,‖
writes Newman, ―to be more affected by the concrete than by the abstract.‖ 69 Newman
did not believe that human beings are moved to action by that of which they only have an
abstract or notional knowledge. Someone may have learned and understood the maxim
dulce et decorum est pro patria mori (―It is sweet and good to die for one‘s country‖), but
unless one is able to apply this maxim to particular experiences, one will not desire to
sacrifice himself or herself on the battlefield.
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G.A., 50.
67

13

However, Newman assigns the notional a significant role in human knowledge.
Whereas men and women anchor themselves in knowledge of an object through real
knowledge, they grow in knowledge of that object through notional knowledge:
Each use of propositions has its own excellence and serviceableness, and each has
its own imperfection. To apprehend notionally is to have breadth of mind, but to
be shallow; to apprehend really is to be deep, but to be narrow-minded. The latter
is the conservative principle of knowledge, and the former the principle of its
advancement. Without the apprehension of notions, we should for ever pace
round one small circle of knowledge; without a firm hold upon things, we shall
waste ourselves in vague speculations. 70
Applying this distinction to religious epistemology, (which is Newman‘s ultimate
concern in the Grammar of Assent,) faith corresponds to real knowledge, whereas
theology corresponds to notional knowledge. Faith is rooted in one‘s experience of God;
it is a belief in, or assent to, the God whom one knows as an individual, as a person.
Theology, on the other hand, is fides quaerens intellectum; it is the development of one‘s
knowledge of that God in whom he or she has faith. As I will discuss further in Chapter
Two, Newman understands doctrinal development to primarily refer to the development
of the Church‘s notional knowledge of God and His revelation, though this notional
knowledge must remain rooted in the real knowledge of God.
According to Newman, the role of divine revelation is to perfect both the abstract
and concrete elements of natural revelation. Natural religion‘s particular strength,
Newman holds, was its exhibition of the concrete and real through personal conceptions
of gods who were worshipped in ritual actions. ―But it failed,‖ assesses Newman, ―as
degrading His invisible majesty by unworthy, multiplied and inconsistent images, and as
shattering the moral scheme of the world into partial and discordant systems.‖ 71
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G.A., 47.
U.S., 24.
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Philosophical religion testified more to the abstract and the notional element through the
development of its reasonings on God and human nature. But because these reasonings
were rooted neither in faith in a concrete and personal deity, nor in a sense of sin and
corporeality, they did not inspire action. Newman thus concludes, ―The God of
philosophy was infinitely great, but an abstraction; the God of paganism was intelligible,
but degraded by human conception… it was left for an express Revelation to propose the
Object in which they should both be reconciled…‖ 72 Divine revelation thus performs the
dual function of uniting and completing the concrete and abstract, the real and the
notional, as they exist in natural and philosophical religion.
Newman especially highlights divine revelation‘s function of communicating the
personal character of the one object of faith. He allows that men and women can arrive at
the truth that God is a person through natural revelation. In fact, he maintains, ―No one is
to be called a Theist, who does not believe in a Personal God, whatever difficulty there
may be in defining the word ‗Personal.‘‖ 73 Newman believes that the personhood of God
is especially communicated in natural revelation via conscience. 74 But he regards the
picture of the divine person that emerges from natural revelation as so limited and vague
that it cannot sustain the religious longings of men and women: ―Natural Religion
teaches, it is true, the infinite power and majesty, the wisdom and goodness, the presence,
the moral governance, and, in one sense, the unity of the Deity; but it gives little or no
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U.S., 24. See also Mix., 295: ―and the great consolatory disclosures of Him, which Nature begins,
Revelation brings to perfection‖; and G.A., 375: ―Revelation begins where Natural Religion fails. The
Religion of Nature is a mere inchoation, and needs a complement,—it can have but one complement, and
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G.A., 111.
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information respecting what may be called His Personality.‖75 ―The philosopher,‖ writes
Newman, ―aspires towards a divine principle; the Christian, towards a Divine Agent.‖76
Newman holds that divine revelation primarily fills this lack in natural revelation
by impressing upon human beings the personal character of God. This is the theme of his
1830 Oxford University Sermon entitled ―The Influence of Natural and Revealed
Religion Respectively,‖ wherein one finds many crucial elements of Newman‘s theology
of revelation. 77 Divine revelation, according to Newman, is ―especially calculated… to
impress upon our minds the personal character of the Object of our worship.‖ 78
Underlying this point is Newman‘s principle that human beings are moved to action (the
purpose of life) more by the concrete than the abstract, and that the personal constitutes
the concretissimum. The personal, he maintains, is ―that most efficient incentive to all
action, a starting or rallying point,—an object on which the affections could be placed,
and the energies concentrated.‖79 Walgrave points out that Newman does not anywhere
provide an analysis of why it is that men and women are more affected by personal rather
than impersonal objects. But nevertheless, writes Walgrave, ―[Newman] felt it strongly
and refers to it frequently.‖ 80

75

U.S., 22. Newman qualifies in a note that he believes this statement ―seems to me too strongly said‖
(36), but his qualification only serves to temper his estimate of how much of the divine personality is
knowable through natural revelation. It does not negate his position that divine revelation further reveals
the personality of God. This passage also demonstrates that Newman did not consistently maintain his
distinction between ―natural religion‖ and ―philosophical religion,‖ since the latter here appears to be
denoted by the former.
76
U.S., 28.
77
The entire sermon is found in U.S., 16-36.
78
U.S., 26.
79
U.S., 23. See also Newman‘s fifth Oxford University Sermon, ―Personal Influence, the Means of
Propagating the Truth‖ (U.S., 75-98), in addition to G.A., 101: ―Inanimate things cannot stir our affections;
these are correlative with persons.‖
80
Walgrave, Newman the Theologian, 112. The full passage is as follows: ―Nowhere, for example, did
[Newman] give a phenomenological description of the great difference between real apprehension of a
‗thing‘ or an ‗object,‘ and that of a ‗person‘ or ‗subject.‘ These are two irreducible kinds of experience; the
one, of a world which is at my disposal, like an extension of my body; the other, of a presence standing
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Thus, in divine revelation one sees carried out what Newman refers to as the
―method of personation.‖ By ―method of personation,‖ Newman means that God,
evidently concerned with impelling men and women to action, frequently reveals truths
through persons. Newman elaborates on the ―method of personation‖ as evidenced in
Scripture:
The doctrine of original sin is centred in the person of Adam, and in this way is
made impressive and intelligible to the mass of mankind. The Evil Principle is
revealed to us in the person of its author, Satan. Nay, not only thus, in the case of
really existing beings, as the first man and the Evil Spirit, but even when a figure
must be used, is the same system continued. The body of faithful men, or Church,
considered as the dwelling-place of the One Holy Spirit, is invested with a
metaphorical personality, and is bound to act as one, in order to those practical
ends of influencing and directing human conduct in which the entire system may
be considered as originating. 81
Newman assumed this method of personation in his Anglican sermons. To his listeners
at St. Mary‘s of Oxford and the chapel at Littlemore, he portrayed Abraham an example
of faith and self-denial, and Lot as a contrast to these virtues. 82 He regarded Balaam as
an instance of ―obedience without love,‖ Josiah as ―a pattern for the ignorant,‖ and
Jeremiah as ―a lesson for the disappointed.‖83 And in his famous sermon, ―The Parting of
Friends‖ (1843), he invoked Jacob, Naomi, and David as examples of those who have
endured the painful necessity of leaving behind of loved ones in order to do God‘s will. 84
Newman regards the ―method of personation‖ of the revealed system as reaching
its culmination in the Incarnation. It is only in a ―real and manifested incarnation of the
Deity,‖ writes Newman, that the ―desires‖ of both natural and philosophical religion are
over against me. All the same, he was fully aware of the difference; in fact, he felt it strongly and refers to
it frequently, but I know of no description of it in his writings.‖
81
U.S., 29-30.
82
P.S., 3: 1-15 (―Abraham and Lot‖).
83
P.S., 4: 18-36; 8: 91-109, 124-140.
84
S.D., 395-409. Newman delivered this sermon on September 25, 1843, in the church at Littlemore. It
was the last sermon he preached as an Anglican.
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―satisfied.‖85 To the person of Christ are attributed ―all those abstract titles of moral
excellence bestowed upon Him which philosophers have invented. He is the Word, the
Light, the Life, the Truth, Wisdom, the Divine Glory.‖ 86 As the ultimate concretization
of the abstract, and the enhypostatization of all notional truths, the Incarnation represents
for Newman the pinnacle of divine revelation, and the ―central aspect of Christianity.‖ 87
In presenting Newman‘s contention that the Incarnation is the ultimate revelation
of the concrete person of God, I introduce what Merrigan has referred to as the ―radically
incarnational‖ character of Newman‘s theology. 88 Newman considered the Incarnation of
the Second Person of the Trinity to be the central identifying mark of Christianity, and
the lens through which the Church judges all other aspects of Christianity: ―It is the
Incarnation of the Son of God rather than any doctrine drawn from a partial view of
Scripture (however true and momentous it may be) which is the article of a standing or a
falling Church.‖89 As Ian Ker points out, Newman‘s incarnational theology could also be
termed ―radical‖ if contrasted with the (at the time) contemporary Protestant and Catholic
focus on, respectively, the doctrines of the atonement and the crucifixion. Ker attributes
Newman‘s focus on the Incarnation to his reading of the Greek Fathers of the Church,
whose writings are permeated with the idea that the Incarnation is the axis of the whole of
salvation history, and the gateway to the knowledge of, and participation in, God. 90
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U.S., 24.
U.S., 28.
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Dev., 36.
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Merrigan, ―Revelation,‖ in The Cambridge Companion to John Henry Newman, ed. Ian Ker and
Terrence Merrigan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 56.
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U.S., 35.
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Ker, introduction to Selected Sermons, by John Henry Newman, Classics of Western Spirituality (New
York: Paulist Press, 1993), 29. For Newman‘s critique of the subordination of the doctrine of the
Incarnation to that of the Atonement, see Ess. 1: 47-8. See also McGrath, 60-63.
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Nicholas Lash, like Merrigan, also sees the Incarnation functioning as a
hermeneutical principle in Newman‘s works ―throughout the greater part of his life.‖ 91
Lash claims that the Incarnation was the ultimate realization of the sacramental principle
that was first inculcated in Newman by Bishop Joseph Butler‘s Analogy of Religion and
John Keble‘s Christian Year.92 He quotes Newman, who writes that ―The doctrine of the
Incarnation… establishes in the very idea of Christianity the sacramental principle as its
characteristic.‖93 It is, writes Newman, ―the central truth of the gospel, and the source
whence we are to draw out its principles.‖94 As such, I argue throughout this dissertation
that the Incarnation is a crucial hermeneutical key for understanding Newman‘s theory of
doctrinal development.
The above aspects I have included under Newman‘s label of God as the ―object‖
of revelation have implications for his theory of doctrinal development. In referring to
God as the object of revelation, Newman implies that revelation is an existential given
whose origin is external to human beings. Accordingly, the development of doctrine
involves a development in the Church‘s understanding of this existential given. The
Church‘s development in its understanding of the object of revelation is conditioned by
the character of this object. Newman emphasizes that the object of revelation, God, is
one, concrete, and personal. Accordingly, as I will demonstrate below, these
characteristics of oneness, concreteness, and personhood, are at the heart of Newman‘s
91

Lash, Newman on Development, 140.
―… the two main intellectual truths which [the Christian Year] brought home to me, were the same two,
which I had learned from Butler, though recast in the creative mind of my new master. The first of these
was what may be called, in a large sense of the word, the Sacramental system; that is, the doctrine that
material phenomena are both the types and the instruments of real things unseen,—a doctrine, which
embraces in its fulness, not only what Anglicans, as well as Catholics, believe about Sacraments properly
so called; but also the article of ‗the Communion of Saints;‘ and likewise the Mysteries of the faith‖ (Apo.,
37).
93
Lash, Newman on Development, 140-141; Dev., 325.
94
Dev., 324.
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understanding of revelation and doctrinal development. Finally, in this section I have
introduced Newman‘s distinctions between the concrete and the abstract, and the real and
the notional. These distinctions are operative in his theology of revelation, as he
expresses one purpose of divine revelation as the completion of the concretizations and
abstractions, the real and the notional knowledge, of natural revelation through God‘s
self-manifestation. In Chapter Two I will show how these distinctions are also operative
in Newman‘s theory of doctrinal development, where such development is understood as
a development in the notional knowledge of the ―real‖ object of revelation.

B. REVELATION AS “IMPRESSION”: GOD’S IMPRESSION OF HIMSELF
In Newman‘s application of the empiricist schema of object-impression-idea to
revelation, I interpret his use of the term ―impression‖ as referring to both God‘s
communication of Himself and the initial human reception of this communication. In
implying both divine and human action, the term ―impression‖ thus embodies what I see
as the relational character of Newman‘s theology of revelation. My focus on the
theological implications of the term ―impression‖ here involves taking a divergent path
from much of Newman scholarship—which tends to briefly define the term ―impression‖
in order to devote the majority of the attention to the term ―idea‖—and also involves a
development of Newman‘s own thought.
I maintain that a number of important themes in Newman‘s theology of revelation
emerge from a stricter interpretation of the term ―impression‖ within the empiricist
schema. The impression is the initial relational moment when God reveals Himself
through impressing an image of Himself upon the human person. God‘s otherness
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necessitates the use of economic media for impressing His revelation on men and women.
Among these economic media, Newman particularly emphasizes that God at first
impressed Himself on men and women through historical facts and actions, and has done
so since the apostolic age through the instrumentality of the Church. Though the media
of God‘s impression are various, Newman holds that this impression is essentially one.
According to Newman, this impression is made upon both individual members of the
Church and what he refers to as ―the mind of the Church.‖ As was the case with the
above section on revelation as ―object,‖ the principles established in this section have
important implications for Newman‘s understanding of doctrinal development.
The relational character of Newman‘s theology of revelation is implied in the
purpose he ascribes to divine revelation. Newman described the revelation of God‘s
personality as one of the purposes of divine revelation. But he understood this purpose as
subservient to the ultimate purpose of human beings‘ deification, or, their ―partaking of
the divine nature‖ (2 Pt 1:4).95 As C. Stephen Dessain has shown, deification was a
persistent theme of Newman‘s writings. 96 It permeates Newman‘s Parochial and Plain
Sermons. 97 Andrew Louth, himself a Newman scholar, has remarked that one can also
consider the doctrine of deification to be the ―central theme‖ of Newman‘s Lectures on
Justification and the ―central conviction of the Oxford Movement.‖98
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Newman rarely used the term ―deification,‖ speaking instead of the ―indwelling of the Holy Spirit.‖
When he did use it, he qualified that it was his translation of Athanasius‘ term ―theopoiesis‖ (L.D., 22: 160161; L.D., 28: 197). In the latter reference Newman writes, ―St Athanasius dwells much on the deification
of man.‖
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(1962): 207-225, 269-288. See also Dessain, ―Cardinal Newman and the Eastern Tradition,‖ Downside
Review 94 (1976): 95-96.
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John Connolly, ―Newman‘s Notion of the Indwelling of the Holy Spirit in the Parochial and Plain
Sermons,‖ Newman Studies Journal 5:1 (Spring 2008): 5-18.
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Andrew Louth, ―Manhood into God: The Oxford Movement, the Fathers and the Deification of Man,‖ in
Essays Catholic and Radical, ed. Kenneth Leech and Rowan D. Williams (London: Bowerdean Press,
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Ker attributes Newman‘s use of the soteriological model of deification to the
influence of the Eastern Church Fathers and the incarnational character of their theology.
Indeed, Newman used the oft-referenced Athanasian (and Irenaean) formula to
characterize the purpose of the Incarnation: ―by God's becoming man, men, through
brotherhood with Him, might in the end become as gods.‖99 Ker also points out that
Newman endorsed the predominantly Eastern view that the Incarnation would have taken
place in spite of the original sin of Adam and Eve: ―In his Catholic sermons Newman
does not hesitate to ally himself with the view of Duns Scotus (as against St. Thomas
Aquinas) that even had mankind never sinned, the Son of God would still have ‗had it in
mind to come on earth among innocent creatures…to fill them with grace, to receive their
worship, to enjoy their company, and to prepare them for…heaven.‘‖ 100 John Connolly
makes the important observation that Newman ―present[s] an outline of salvation history
from the perspective of the indwelling of the Holy Spirit‖ in his Anglican sermon ―The
Law of the Spirit.‖101 In this sermon, Newman describes the righteousness that Adam
possessed due to the indwelling of the Spirit, his loss of this indwelling after original sin,
and the regaining of the indwelling after the redemption brought about by Christ. Thus,

1983), 74-5. Ian Ker has gone one step further in claiming, ―In Lectures on the Doctrine of Justification
Newman solves the problem of justification, which of course was at the heart of the Reformation, by
invoking the great scriptural and patristic doctrine of the divine indwelling, so long forgotten and neglected
in the West by both Protestants and Roman Catholics‖ (The Fullness of Christianity [Edinburgh: T&T
Clark, 1993], 95). Allusions to the doctrine of deification are less frequent in Newman‘s Catholic writings
because, as Dessain writes, ―the atmosphere was not propitious, and as a convert he did not wish to set up
as a dogmatic and mystical teacher‖ (―Cardinal Newman and the Doctrine of Uncreated Grace,‖ 285).
Dessain neglects to mention that Newman‘s adoption of the Catholic practice of delivering sermons from
memory or brief notes, rather than a written text, probably also contributed to the paucity of Newman‘s
mentions of deification as a Catholic.
99
P.S., 5: 118. For Newman‘s understanding of the doctrine of deification as found in the Fathers, see his
articles in Ath., 2 on ―Deification‖ (88-90), ―The Divine In-Dwelling‖ (193-195), and ―Metousia‖ (424425).
100
Ker, introduction to Selected Sermons, 29; Mix., 321-322.
101
Connolly, 8; P.S., 5: 143-163, at 148.
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the Incarnation and deification are interconnected lenses through which Newman views
Christianity. 102
Newman understands deification to be the dwelling of God‘s very self in the
Christian. I have thus far been describing Newman‘s understanding of revelation as
God‘s impression of Himself on the Christian. Indeed, Newman at times seems to
attribute a divinizing character to the impression, such as when he describes Christians
―(as if) inhabited by that sacred impression…which acts as a regulating principle, ever
present, upon the reasoning…‖ 103 However, Paul Misner has expressed dissatisfaction
with qualifications like ―as if,‖ and has criticized Newman for having an inadequate
notion of revelation inasmuch as ―he nevertheless never expressed this insight required
by his theory of development, namely that God‘s revealing Word confers not merely an
idea of himself, nor a vision of himself, but his very Self.‖ 104 Lash and Merrigan have
both cryptically remarked that Misner‘s preferred concept of revelation as God‘s
communication of His self ―is not without its difficulties.‖ 105 I wish to flesh out Lash‘s
and Merrigan‘s brief remarks by pointing out what I believe to be the major difficulty of
Misner‘s desired understanding of revelation as he expresses it, namely, that it fails to
account for Newman‘s principle of mediation, which in turn is so significant for
Newman‘s understanding of doctrinal development.
102

Dessain perceptively remarks, ―One of the reasons why the Greek Fathers of the fourth century
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In order to accomplish the deification of men and women, God revealed Himself
to them through what Newman refers to as a ―system of continual mediation.‖ 106
Newman understands that the need for mediation arises from ―the great revealed principle
[of] the incommunicable character and individuality of the Divine Essence,‖107 combined
with the finite, limited nature of human understanding. He uses the Alexandrian term of
―Economy‖ to refer to God‘s mediating, revelatory actions.
Newman‘s most thorough description of ―Economy‖ occurs in Arians of the
Fourth Century. Like the Alexandrian Church Fathers, Newman understands ―Economy‖
in a broad sense to mean ―any Divine procedure, greater or less, which consists of means
and an end‖—the end being the deification of men and women. 108 Thus, Newman
explains that ―Economy‖ refers to ―the work of creation itself, as opposed to the absolute
perfection of the Eternal God, that internal concentration of His Attributes in selfcontemplation…‖ ―Again,‖ he writes, ―it might with equal fitness be used for the general
system of providence by which the world‘s course is carried on.‖ It also refers to the
truths communicated through natural revelation and the sacramental character of the
world. And, it of course refers to divine revelation as present within ―the Jewish and
patriarchal dispensations,‖ and the life of Christ, ―as exhibited in the doctrines of His
incarnation, ministry, atonement, exaltation, and mediatorial sovereignty.‖ 109 Newman
considers all such examples of God‘s Economy, ―which display His character in actions,
[as] but condescensions to the infirmity and peculiarity of our minds, shadowy
representations of realities which are incomprehensible to creatures such as ourselves,
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who estimate everything by the rule of association and arrangement, by the notion of a
purpose and plan, object and means, parts and whole.‖ 110
If Newman failed to so bluntly describe revelation as God‘s communication of
His very self, it was because he recognized the need to respect the principle of Economy
in one‘s theological reasonings. Misner‘s attribution of his ―more comprehensive
present-day concept of revelation‖ to Karl Rahner is perhaps predictable, since Rahner
has been famously criticized for blurring the distinction between God‘s immanence and
economy. 111 Misner also fails to proffer a distinction between God‘s communication of
Himself in revelation and God‘s communication of Himself through the Sacraments. It is
through the latter, not the former, Newman maintains, that God comes to ―inhabit us
personally.‖112 Nevertheless, Newman repeatedly affirms that there is no division in
God, and that the impression God makes on human recipients is also without division in
spite of the various means by which it is communicated. If one holds these affirmations
in tension with the principle of mediation, it follows that one could claim Newman
regarded the communication of divine truths as God‘s communication of Himself.
A difference in the way God impresses Himself in natural and divine revelation
emerges from Newman‘s understanding of Economy. In natural revelation, men and
women discern, through the use of reason, principles or ―scattered fragments‖ of truth in
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―the phenomena of the external world‖ and human behavior and conscience. 113 One
might say, then, Newman understands natural revelation as God impressing His truth on
men and women by means of His creation.
Newman understands divine revelation, however, as God impressing Himself
through His actions in history. He determines, ―Such, then, is the Revealed system
compared with the Natural—teaching religious truths historically, not by investigation;
revealing the Divine Nature, not in works, but in action; not in His moral laws, but in His
spoken commands…‖114 The historical character Newman ascribes to divine revelation,
Merrigan explains, also fulfills the underlying desire of men and women that what they
know in abstract principles be manifested in the concrete: ―It is, above all, the radically
‗historical‘ character of Christian teaching, its rootedness in concrete facts and historical
events which, according to Newman, accounts for its appeal to the beleaguered
practitioner of natural religion.‖ 115 Out of the desire that men and women may come to
know and participate in Him, God enters into human history through economic means.
As such, the historical character of divine revelation further testifies to its relational
character. ―Its home,‖ writes Newman, ―is in the world,‖116 as its purpose is the salvation
of those who dwell in the world.
Newman understands divine revelation to encompass the historical actions and
events of both the Jewish and the Christian ―dispensations.‖ Newman refers to Judaism
in the Grammar as ―this grand drama, so impressed with the characters of supernatural
agency…[with] all those tokens of the Divine Presence, which distinguish [its]
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history…‖117 At the same time, Newman‘s writings scarcely make mention of the
particular actions and events that make up the Jewish history, which constitutes a
weakness of his account of divine revelation. 118 His tendency is to focus on the
preparatory role of Judaism, illustrated by his frequent association of Judaism with
prophecy and typology.119 The effect of this tendency is the subsuming of the distinctive
historical and revelatory character of the acts and events of the Old Covenant; they
become subservient to the perceivably greater principles of development and fulfillment.
While not denying the preparatory role of Judaism, a more complete Christian theology
of revelation would give due attention to the concrete acts of God‘s communication of
Himself during the time of the Jewish covenants, rather than remain at the level of
abstract generalizations of the history of this communication. 120 Nevertheless, one could
claim that Newman affirms the action and event character of Jewish revelation in
differentiating it and Christianity from natural revelation. He also affirms this character
by his inclusion of Judaism within Christianity, the latter of which, Newman claims, is
―Judaism itself, developed and transformed.‖121
When describing the Christian dispensation, Newman more clearly characterizes
it as comprised of concrete actions and events. ―Christianity,‖ writes Newman, ―is a
history supernatural, and almost scenic: it tells us what its Author is, by telling us what
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He has done…‖122 With the Incarnation ―revelation meets us with simple and distinct
facts and actions, not with painful inductions from existing phenomena, not with
generalized laws or metaphysical conjectures, but with Jesus and the Resurrection…‖123
Indeed, Newman holds that it is not only the principal actions of Christ that are
revelatory, but ―the [entire] life of Christ [that] brings together and concentrates truths
concerning the chief good and the laws of our being, which wander idle and forlorn over
the surface of the moral world, and often appear to diverge from each other.‖124
Newman regards the Incarnation, understood as the entire life of Christ, as the
ultimate historical fact and action of God. I have already mentioned Merrigan‘s
characterizations of Newman‘s theology as ―radically incarnational‖ and ―radically
historical.‖125 I would perhaps take Merrigan‘s characterizations one step further and
claim that it is because Newman‘s theology is radically incarnational that it is also
radically historical. In the Incarnation, God most fully enters into history, where He
―pitches His tent‖ among men and women in order that they may come to know, love,
and participate in Him. The Incarnation, as what revelation was leading up to, becomes
in Newman‘s mind the standard by which all previous modes of historical revelation are
judged; it is ―the principle of a new life.‖126 Thus, Newman holds that God incarnates
Himself in an analogous way during the Jewish dispensation, when God dwelt in His
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prophets, and continues to dwell in their utterances; when He filled the Temple with His
presence; and when He appeared to men in those visions known as theophanies.
However, these historical manifestations are contrasted to ―that infinitely higher and
mysterious union which is called the Incarnation…‖127 In the Incarnation, Newman
claims, ―All is superseded by Him, and transmuted into Him.‖ 128
Newman‘s characterization of revelation as action and event seems contrary to
the propositional understanding of revelation that had dominated post-Tridentine Roman
Catholic theology.129 However, Newman‘s descriptions of revelation were not entirely
consistent, and scholars have argued that at times he appeared to fall back into a
predominantly propositional understanding of revelation. Misner implies this
inconsistency in his characterization of Newman‘s view of revelation as
―intellectualist.‖130 Lash sees it evidenced by Newman‘s resort to the formula—made de
fide in 1907 by Pope Pius X‘s Lamentabili Sane—that divine revelation ended with the
death of the last Apostle.131 Writes Lash,
Unfortunately, this claim, thus formulated, seems to imply that revelation consists
in the divine provision of items of information. Certainly Newman‘s treatment of
revelation in the Essay would have gained in coherence if he had more clearly
perceived that the categories within which the christian claim to the finality of the
Christ-event was, at the time, expressed, were inadequate to their intention. 132
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Lash‘s lament derives from his assumption that the ―death of the last Apostle‖ formula
implies that since the salvific actions and events of revelation had been completed with
the descent of the Holy Spirit at Pentecost, the interim between Pentecost and this death
was solely filled with the further conveyance or transmission of divine truths.
At first glance, Newman‘s dynamic emphasis on revelation as action and event
certainly appears to conflict with his repeated invocation of the formula that revelation
closed with the death of the last Apostle. Many today consider this formula to be an
expression of the more static, propositional understanding of revelation that Newman and
post-Neoscholastic Roman Catholic theology have opposed. Perhaps Newman‘s resort to
the formula is in part attributable to the unresolved tensions that persisted, after his
conversion to Roman Catholicism, between his Anglican and patristically-influenced
theology and the predominant Roman Catholic theology of the time. Thus, Lash would
be right in pointing out that Newman‘s affirmation of the formula was not entirely
consistent with his religious epistemology.
However, it must be born in mind that Newman‘s main concern in invoking the
―death of the last Apostle‖ formula was likely to affirm that developments of doctrine do
not constitute new revelations, but instead represent a growth in the Church‘s
understanding of that divine revelation definitively given to it in the time of the Apostles.
His invocation of the formula thus establishes his orthodoxy on the closure of divine
revelation. It is difficult to judge the strength of Newman‘s assent to all that the formula
may imply about the mode of revelation. But given the suspicious attitude that his Essay
on Development engendered among many within the Roman Catholic Church of the time,
his affirmation of the formula would have been a relatively small concession.
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Had Newman reflected on this question further, however, it is certain that he
would not have brushed aside the formula as ―inadequate‖ to his theory of revelation and
development. The formula was not made de fide until after Newman‘s lifetime, and thus,
he technically could have regarded it as a theological opinion and proffered another way
of expressing the truth that divine revelation is in some sense ―closed.‖ But Newman was
no doctrinal minimalist, and he believed that a Catholic‘s duty was to ―accept what is
taught him with what is called the pietas fidei…‖133 His instinct would have been to
accept the formula and seek to bring his theory of development and its attendant
understanding of revelation into harmony with it. I will attempt to do just that in the
Dialogue portion of this chapter.
Newman more fully includes the verbal mode of God‘s impression of Himself
when he writes of the conveyance of revelation in the post-Apostolic Church. In the time
of the Old Testament and the Apostolic Church, Newman‘s emphasis is primarily on God
impressing Himself on men and women through the media of actions and events. In postApostolic times this impression is made ―through the instrumentality of His Church.‖ 134
Newman allows that this impression may be made through extraordinary means, such as
―inspiration‖ or ―the illuminating grace of Baptism.‖ However, he lists the ordinary
means by which Christians receive the impression as ―the habitual and devout perusal of
Scripture… the gradual influence of intercourse with those who are in themselves in
possession of the sacred ideas… the study of Dogmatic Theology… [or] a continual
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round of devotion…‖135 Of these means, Newman is clear that Scripture enjoys pride of
place. 136
Newman holds that God‘s impression of Himself through the instrumentality of
the Church is still very much a historical impression through acts and events. In
accordance with His Providence, God still ―is acting through, with, and beneath those
physical, social, and moral laws, of which our experience informs us,‖ and ―is secretly
concurring and co-operating with that system which meets the eye, and which is
commonly recognized among men as existing,‖ maintains Newman. 137 Newman
especially affirms that God continues to act in history through the Church. ―The long
history of the Church,‖ writes Newman, demonstrates ―fresh exhibitions of Divine
Agency….‖138 His affirmation is rooted in his consistent ecclesiological emphasis on the
Church as the Body of Christ: ―what His material Body was when He was visible on
earth, such is the Church now. It is the instrument of His Divine Power…‖ 139 Newman
clarifies that Christ now acts in his Church through the Holy Spirit: ―[the Church‘s]
outward rites and forms are nourished and animated by the living power which dwells
within it.‖140 In the next section I will explain Newman‘s position that God‘s continuing
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actions in history through the Church are received by corresponding actions on the part of
men and women.

C. REVELATION AS “IMPRESSION”: THE RECEIVED IMPRESSION OF REVELATION
I wrote above that Newman‘s concept of the impression implies the relational
character of his theology of revelation. According to Newman, God not only impresses
Himself on men and women through historical actions and events, but men and women
personally receive this impression in their ―imaginations,‖ and immediately seek to
rationally understand and conceptualize this impression. Their reception of God‘s
impression of Himself thus implies an active role on their part in the very process of
revelation, which has important implications for Newman‘s theory of doctrinal
development. Moreover, I will also discuss the active role of the entire Church in
receiving this impression, which, Newman claims, God also makes on the ―mind of the
Church.‖
Newman holds that human beings exhibit both passivity and activity in their
reception of God‘s impression of Himself through historical actions and events. Indeed,
in the human reception of an object, there is the initial moment of passivity when the
object imprints itself on both the physical and mental senses. However, the human mind
immediately begins an active categorization of this impression according to physical
traits such as color, shape, and size, and moral traits such as beauty, goodness, and truth,
so that one might claim that the passive impression of an object is inseparable from the
active apprehension of it. Newman deems the ―imagination‖ as the special sphere of this
activity. The imagination, writes Walgrave, is ―our entire faculty of knowing the
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concrete,‖ and involves ―an act of synthesis, namely, the active apprehension, through the
impressions received, of existing reality.‖ 141
Newman thus emphasizes that human beings play an active role in the process of
receiving revelation. God impresses Himself on men and women, and they receive this
impression through apprehending it with the aid of the imagination. Their active
reception of revelation derives from their status as persons. Newman understands
revelation to consist of the establishment of a relation between God and an individual
person through God‘s impression of Himself and the person‘s reception of that
impression. God ―is found through His preachers [here understood as all those
―secondary means‖ of communicating revelation in the post-Apostolic age], to have
imprinted the Image or idea of Himself in the minds of His subjects individually…‖ 142
Facilitating the human reception of this impression is God‘s grace, which accounts for the
difference Newman sees as existing between the impressions of material objects and
religious objects. ―… [N]o such faculties have been given us, as far as we know, for
realizing the Objects of Faith,‖ writes Newman. Between all those historical actions and
events that are the media of God‘s impression of Himself, ―man sees no necessary
bond.‖143 Thus, Newman maintains that men and women need grace in order to attribute
the impression of these actions and events to God. This is the grace of faith, ―for faith
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impresses the mind with supernatural truths, as if it were sight, and the faith of this man,
and the faith of that, is one and the same, and creates one and the same impression.‖ 144
The individual person then receives this graced impression according to his or her
particularity. Newman claims that the human reception of the impression is in part
conditioned by what he refers to as ―first principles.‖ By ―first principles,‖ Newman
means both the conscious and unconscious starting points of our knowledge; those truths
we have accepted as ―givens‖ and through which we view the world and judge our
encounters with it. They are
the recondite sources of all knowledge, as to which logic provides no common
measure of minds—which are accepted by some, rejected by others,—in which,
and not in the syllogistic exhibitions, lies the whole problem of attaining to
truth,—and which are called self-evident by their respective advocates because
they are evident in no other way. 145
These principles are formed in part by our shared human nature, and in part by our
individual traits and context. As Merrigan explains,
The former flow spontaneously from certain experiences which belong to us by
nature. Those experiences can never be completely absent. The latter are the
direct issue of decidedly individual doings and undergoings, and involve a
graduated scale of personal responsibility. 146
Thus, men‘s and women‘s first principles are of a personal nature not only
because they are based upon their particular experiences, but also because they are in part
products of their free will. 147 Though men and women are for the most part unconscious
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of these principles and their operation in their assents, Newman holds that they are
responsible for some of them: ―Certainly [first principles] are not necessarily true; and,
again, certainly there are ways of unlearning them when they are false: moreover, as
regards moral and religious First Principles which are false, of course a Catholic
considers that no one holds them except by his own fault…‖ 148 Because men and women
arrive form these first principles through their free response to experience, they factor
into the active role exercised by human persons in their response to revelation.
According to Newman, the impression of revelation exists not only in the minds
of individual Christians, but also in what he refers to as the ―mind of the Church.‖ As an
Anglican, Newman alluded to revelation existing in the ―bosom of the Church itself.‖ 149
Beginning with the fifteenth Oxford University Sermon, Newman gives a more
epistemological tone to his metaphor by deeming revelation to exist within the ―mind of
the Church.‖ He discovered, however, that Roman Catholic theology of the time was
uncomfortable with the idea of a common mind that was shared by all the faithful. He
had referred to the ―Catholic mind‖ in his 1847 ―Newman-Perrone Paper on
Development,‖ but had written in a parenthetical note to W.G. Ward a couple of years
later that ―Perrone does not seem to allow me to speak of the consciousness or intellect of
the Church.‖150 Newman‘s silence on the ―mind of the Church‖ in ―On Consulting the
Faithful in Matters of Doctrine‖ (1859)—where the phrase would have been particularly
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suitable to the subject—further illustrates his desire to avoid any unnecessary controversy
with Rome. As a result of the boundaries of his milieu, Newman‘s concept of the ―mind
of the Church‖ remained undeveloped during his lifetime.
Toward the end of the 1868 ―Letter to Flanagan,‖ which contains Newman‘s most
direct treatment of the concept, Newman poses the question: ―What is meant by the mind
of the Church?‖ Newman attempts an answer to his question, but his answer is
circumscribed by the parameters of the discussion that prompted the letter, namely, the
question of the infallibility of the Church. 151 The letter ultimately accounts for only one
aspect of the mind of the Church, namely, its ability to pronounce on matters of faith
when called upon to do so. Newman‘s question therefore deserves a better answer than
he was able to give at the time.
Assuredly, Newman sees the mind of the Church as a function of the corporate
identity of the Church as the Body of Christ. Yet, he also recognizes that a mind or
intellect belongs properly to a person, and that the Church is not a person. 152 He writes in
the Grammar about ―that Image, apprehended and worshipped in individual minds, [that]
becomes a principle of association, and a real bond of those subjects one with another,
who are thus united to the body by being united to that Image…‖ 153 In part, then, he
understands the mind of the Church to consist of that collective apprehension of God‘s
impression of Himself as it exists in the minds of individual members, or persons, of the
Church. This aspect of the mind of the Church corresponds to the consensus fidelium,
151
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which Newman defines as ―a sort of instinct, or phronema, deep in the bosom of the
mystical body of Christ.‖154 But, in ―Flanagan,‖ he also claims this mind existed in its
fullness in the Apostles, and then was handed on in its fullness to the Church, but does
not now exist ―habitually‖ in its fullness in any of its members, even the pope. Thus,
Newman describes the mind of the Church as at the same time internal and external to its
members.
There is a need to posit the existence of a mediating principle in order to explain
Newman‘s contention that the mind of the Church is both internal and external to its
members. Newman appears to claim that the Holy Spirit serves as this mediating
principle. In the Via Media he attributes a Pauline origin to this link between the mind of
the Church and the Spirit when he describes the Church‘s understanding of revelation
(Tradition) as ―what St. Paul calls ‗the mind of the Spirit,‘ the thought and principle
which breathed in the Church, her accustomed and unconscious mode of viewing things,
and the body of her received notions, than any definite and systematic collection of
dogmas elaborated by the intellect.‖155 In ―Flanagan‖ Newman wonderfully links
Christology and Pneumatology in describing the Church‘s possession of revelation in its
fullness as ―a living, present treasury of the Mind of the Spirit of Christ.‖156
The close link Newman posits between the mind of the Church and the mind of
the Spirit helps explain some of the characteristics of the former alluded to above.
Newman maintains that the mind of the Church existed in its fullness in the Apostles
precisely because they were inspired, that is, precisely because the Holy Spirit was
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specially working through the Apostles during their lives. 157 The Apostles communicated
this ―mind‖ to the Church through Scripture, the Creed, and other manifestations of the
Christian idea, but also through the sacraments. The Church understood as comprised of
its members does indeed have a collective consciousness inasmuch as the members share
a common bond of God‘s impression of Himself. But, according to Newman, this
consciousness alone does not amount to the fullness of revelation. This fullness only
exists in the mind of the Spirit, without whom ―no one can say, ‗Jesus is Lord‘‖ (1 Cor
12:3). It is the Spirit who acts as the ―common bond‖ of the members of the Church, and
who is the ―person‖ in which the mind of the Church can truly be said to dwell. Thus, I
hold that the mind of the Church is a participatory concept for Newman: it is a
participation of the minds of the Church‘s members in the mind of the Spirit who dwells
within them individually and the Church collectively.
Newman‘s references to the ―mind of the Church‖ were ultimately directed
toward explaining his theory of doctrinal development, which has recourse to an analogy
between the individual and the corporate manner of apprehension. According to
Newman, when an individual receives an impression of an object on his or her mind, he
or she can be said to have an implicit knowledge of that object as a whole, as a unity.
The reasoning process is the making explicit of this implicit knowledge of an object; it is
the ―tracing out of our ideas and impressions,‖ 158 the latter of which come to us with an
initial vagueness. Newman maintains that just as an individual Christian mind possesses
an implicit knowledge of revelation as a whole, so too does the mind of the Church, and
―the absence, or partial absence, or incompleteness of dogmatic statements is no proof of
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the absence of impressions or implicit judgments, in the mind of the Church.‖ 159
Doctrinal development, for Newman, is the process whereby the mind of the Church
makes explicit what it knows implicitly through the impression God has made of Himself
on it. It is the reflection by various minds who ―analyze, verify, methodize, and exhibit‖
what is essentially contained in the impression that has been communicated to the Church
per modum unius.160
Newman emphasizes in his fifteenth Oxford University Sermon the ―reality and
permanence of inward [or implicit] knowledge, as distinct from explicit confession.‖ 161
This emphasis is important given the nature of Owen Chadwick‘s suggestion that
Newman‘s particular theory of development implies that new doctrinal definitions are
new revelations. Chadwick writes,
…we are in difficulties about the language in which these ―new‖ doctrines are
expressed. This language is new language. As language it is not part of the
original revelation. Nor is it a restatement of part of the revelation already
expressed in propositions. Nor is it logically deducible from the original
revelation, since you cannot ―infer‖ propositions from a wordless experience or
feeling or (in Newman‘s sense) ―idea‖… Newman‘s theory, like that of Suarez, is
dependent upon the contention that definition by the Church is ―equivalent‖ to
revelation. If it were established (for example) in Catholic theology that
―revelation ended at the death of the last apostle,‖ Newman‘s theory could hardly
survive without a restatement so drastic as to leave it almost unrecognizable. 162
As Ker rightly points out, Chadwick‘s suggestion is based on the erroneous conclusion
―that what is ‗wordless‘ must therefore be ‗feeling.‘‖ 163 Ker thus repeats Newman‘s
assertion that the implicit knowledge contained within the human reception of God‘s
impression of Himself is, in fact, a true knowledge. Chadwick had acknowledged that
159
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this impression was ―in part a proposition-bearing impression.‖164 Ker counters, ―But
Newman‘s point is that original ideas are essentially simple intuitions, all of which are
ultimately and in theory susceptible to comprehension in propositional form… they
cannot be divided up into propositional and feeling or experiential parts.‖ 165 In other
words, Ker opposes Chadwick by claiming that Newman considered experience to be a
form of knowledge.
The pneumatological character of Newman‘s understanding of the ―mind of the
Church‖ also further illustrates the relational, or dialogical, character of doctrinal
development. In the Essay on Development, Newman conceives development as a
dialogue where men and women grow in their understanding of the Christian idea
through interacting with other minds and ideas: ―it is carried on through and by means of
communities of men… and it employs their minds as its instruments… it developes by
establishing relations between itself and them…‖ 166 I have argued that Newman‘s
concept of the ―mind of the Church‖ includes not only the collective instinct of the
individual members, but also the ―mind of the Spirit,‖ in which Christians participate.
The fullness of understanding exists only in the Spirit, and the development of doctrine is
thus a process where the mind of the Church grows in its understanding of revelation in
dialogue with the mind of the Spirit.
The Church‘s growth in the understanding of revelation is the fulfillment of a call
contained within its initial reception of revelation. As Newman shows, the persons who
constitute the Church begin a free and active process of reception the moment God
impresses Himself on them. Doctrinal development is but the Church‘s continuation of
164
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this active process of reception. It is the history of the Church‘s active reception of what
God has impressed on them in and through history.

1.2: FLOROVSKY ON THE MODE AND CHARACTER OF REVELATION
In his patrologies Florovsky begins his analysis of the work of St. Maximus the
Confessor by claiming that his ―whole system can be understood most easily from the
idea of Revelation."167 Florovsky could have appropriately applied this statement to
himself, for much of his writings are either directly or indirectly concerned with
elaborating and defending an orthodox, Christian understanding of revelation. 168 His
theology of revelation serves as an introduction to the emphases that permeate his
understanding of the entire Christian theological system; it ―is that proto-fact to which
any theological reflection goes back.‖169 After presenting these emphases of Florovsky‘s
theology of revelation, I will show how they are further illustrated in his opposition to the
forms of de-Christianized Hellenism he perceived in both the patristic age and his own
era. Furthermore, I will show in Chapters Two and Three, respectively, that they
undergird his understandings of Tradition and ecclesiastical authority.

A. REVELATION AS DIVINE “EVENT”
Consistent with the radically Christocentric tenor of Florovsky‘s theology, his
theology of revelation begins with the Incarnation. ―Christ,‖ writes Florovsky, ―is both
the alpha and omega, the ‗first‘ and ‗last,‘ as well as the center. In another sense, Christ
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is precisely Beginning.‖170 Florovsky holds that the Incarnation serves as both the axis of
history and the hermeneutical key for interpreting what the Bible demonstrates is ―a
comprehensive vision of history, a perspective of an unfolding time, running from a
‗beginning‘ to an ‗end,‘ and guided by the sovereign will of God toward the
accomplishment of His ultimate purpose.‖171
Florovsky‘s emphasis on the Incarnation includes the corresponding emphasis
that the entire meaning of history is centered upon a person, namely, the person of Christ.
He attributes this Christocentric personalism to the Church Fathers: ―The main theme of
Patristic theology was always the Mystery of Christ‘s Person.‖ In particular, Florovsky
regards the Christological dogma formulated at Chalcedon as itself a midpoint and
hermeneutical key for Christian theology. He maintains that ―one can evolve the whole
body of Orthodox belief out of the Dogma of Chalcedon.‖172 Florovsky sees Chalcedon
as the starting point of the Church‘s attempt to achieve a Christological synthesis when it
dogmatically defined the enhypostasized divine and human natures of Christ. 173 As I will
show, Florovsky wonderfully illustrates the centrality of Chalcedon in his own theology
of revelation by portraying revelation as a synergy of divine and human actions. 174
Florovsky‘s synthetic view of history from the perspective of the Incarnation
illustrates balance by not diminishing the significance of history either preceding or
following the Incarnation. He recognizes that the Christian views history as a whole
170
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―definitely linear from the beginning to the end‖ in which the parts plays a role in
bringing about that end.175 Though Florovsky acknowledged that ―no more than a
‗hypothetical‘ (or ‗convenient‘) answer can be given‖ to the Anselmian question of Cur
Deus Homo?, his preference was to assume with Maximus the Confessor that it was
inscribed in the very ―logos and skopos‖ of creation.176 Behind this preference, as
Jaroslav Pelikan has perceptively noted, is Florovsky‘s concern with proposing ―a
doctrine of the Incarnation that does not negate, but in fact requires, ‗the context of the
general doctrine of Creation.‘‖ 177 As such, Florovsky‘s Christocentrism can also claim
that ―the very fact of Creation constitutes the basic paradox of the Christian faith, to
which all other mysteries of God can be traced back, or rather in which they are
implied.‖178 Indeed, as I will now illustrate, one discovers the principal truths of
Florovsky‘s theology of revelation within his elaboration of the Christian understanding
of creation.
In common with the patristic tradition as represented by Maximus, Florovsky
identifies the ―logos and skopos‖ of creation as the deification, or theosis, of men and
women. In ―Creation and Creaturehood‖ (1928) he writes, ―The limit and goal of
creaturely striving and becoming is divinization [θἐωσις] or deification [θεοποίησις].‖179
―[This] telos,‖ he writes, ―is implied in the very design of Creation.‖180 With Maximus,
Florovsky acknowledges that this telos of theosis could not be accomplished without the
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Incarnation. ―For St. Maximus,‖ writes Florovsky, ―the Incarnation is the focus of the
world‘s existence—and not only in the plan of redemption but also in the primordial plan
for the creation of the world… Man is created so that God may become man and through
the Incarnation man is deified.‖ 181
In some essays Florovsky exhibits a certain reticence regarding the term theosis.
It is, he writes, a ―daring word‖ that is ―rather offensive for the modern ear‖ and ―quite
embarrassing, if we would think in ‗ontological categories.‘‖182 Yet, Florovsky at the
same time recognizes that the doctrine of theosis ―was the common conviction of the
Greek Fathers,‖183 and he affirms the implications of the term throughout his oeuvre.
Florovsky understands the essence of theosis to be ―a personal encounter. It is that
intimate intercourse of man with God, in which the whole of human existence is, as it
were, permeated by the Divine Presence.‖ 184 Florovsky also emphasizes that the telos of
creation includes the transformation of all creation: ―the ‗whole creation‘ was expected to
share or to participate in that ultimate ‗re-novation,‘…‖185 But he makes clear that this
aspect of the telos is subordinated to, and contingent upon, the deification of men and
women, the ―microcosmoi,‖ and their personal relationship with God. 186
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Florovsky interprets the term ―creation‖ as synonymous with the distinctive
Judeo-Christian concept of creatio ex nihilo.187 ―The world is created,‖ he writes. ―That
means: the world came out of nothing.‖ 188 Florovsky understood the Christian doctrine
of creation to be the fruit of the early Christological controversies, especially the Arian
crisis: ―The Fathers of the fourth century, in their struggle against Arian heresy, were
specially concerned with a clear definition of Creation.‖ 189 For Athanasius, writes
Florovsky, the doctrine of creation ―was intimately related to the crucial message of the
Christian faith: the redemptive Incarnation of the Divine Word.‖190 Florovsky
particularly emphasizes two interrelated truths that emerged from the patristic reflection
on creation, namely, freedom and personhood. These truths are crucial elements of his
theology of revelation.
Florovsky‘s theology of revelation is punctuated by his raising of a number of
antinomies that the Christian must hold in tension. Accordingly, he describes the idea of
creation as ―basically antinomical,‖ and its attendant concept of freedom as ―always
essentially antinomical,‖ too.191 God is a necessary, immutable being who has always
existed. In creating something out of nothing, however, God acts in bringing into being a
contingent reality, that is, something that did not have to exist. Writes Florovsky, ―To
say: the world is created is, first of all, to emphasize its radical continengcy… a created
187
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world is a world which might not have existed at all.‖192 Thus, the idea of creation
discloses the antinomy of a necessary, immutable being who acts by creating something
essentially non-necessary. The Fathers wished to respect this antinomy while at the same
time affirming the divinity of the Son and Spirit. In order to do so, they differentiated
between the creation of the world and the respective generation and procession of the Son
and the Spirit from the Father. With Athanasius, Florovsky maintains that ―creating is an
act of will [ἐκ βοσλήματος], and therefore is sharply distinguished from the Divine
generation, which is an act of nature [γεννᾶ κατὰ υύσιν].‖193
Inasmuch as creation is an act of the divine will, it testifies to God‘s freedom—a
point that Florovsky considered well expressed by the ―Subtle Doctor‖ Duns Scotus:
―The creation of things is executed by God not out of any necessity, whether of essence
or of knowledge or of will, but out of a sheer freedom which is not moved—much less
constrained—by anything external that it should have to be a cause.‖194 Once it has been
established that creation is a free act of God‘s will, Florovsky recognizes that one must
admit a distinction in God that the Eastern tradition has formulated as the distinction
between God‘s ―essence and His energies.‖ If creation was an act of God‘s essence or
nature, it would mean that creation was always in existence, and indeed, is God.
Furthermore, it would not be a free act, since willing involves giving existence to that
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which previously did not exist. Therefore, Florovsky describes creation as an act of
God‘s energies—―the powers and operations of God‖ that proceed from His will. 195
In the Florovskian schema, God‘s free will, as illustrated in His creation of the
world, is a function of His personhood. More accurately, it is a function of the
Trinitarian personhood: ―Creation is a deed of the Divine will, and this will is common to
and identical in all Three Persons of the One God.‖196 According to Florovsky, ―The idea
of personality itself was probably the greatest Christian contribution to philosophy.‖ 197
This statement has been born out in the work of Florovsky‘s student, John Zizioulas, who
has developed an ontology of personhood based upon what he views as the patristic
understanding of the person as fundamentally one who is in relation. 198 Unlike Zizioulas,
however, Florovsky does not attempt to locate specific texts that testify to the Fathers‘
personalism. Rather, he sees it implied in their theology of creation and their personalist
Christocentrism. One should also note that Florovsky‘s personalism owes a debt not only
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to the Fathers, but also to the work of the modern French philosopher Charles Renouvier
(1815-1903).199
As a free act of the Trinitarian Persons, Florovsky assigns to creation a term that
is all-important in his theology of revelation, namely, ―event.‖ In ―The Predicament of
the Christian Historian‖ (1959)—which Rowan Williams has called ―a philosophically
systematic defense‖ of Florovsky‘s Neo-patristic program—Florovsky quotes the English
historian Robin Collinwood (1889-1943) who defines ―event‖ at the same time he
critiques the term: ―What is miscalled an ‗event‘ is really an action, and expresses some
thought (intention, purpose) of its agent…‖200 Collingwood‘s definition of event as an
action, a free action, serves in its simplicity as a fitting summary of Florovsky‘s
understanding of the term. In his writings Florovsky repeatedly uses the terms ―facts,‖
―deeds,‖ and ―actions‖ interchangeably with the term ―events.‖
Unfortunately, the simplicity of Florovsky‘s few descriptions of the term ―event‖
reveals a lack of philosophical analysis of the concept in his writings. He is so emphatic
about the free and personal character of events that he borders on the tautological when
he attempts analysis. For example, in ―In the World of Quests and Wanderings‖ (1923),
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Florovsky seemingly introduces a significant addition to the definition of ―event‖ by
writing that it ―turns out to be a ‗meaning‘ and a ‗value,‘ a manifestation of ‗other
worlds.‘‖ However, in the very next paragraph he makes a statement that simply equates
the new term ―value‖ with ―event‖: ―The birth of any value is free; it is accomplished
through the creative deed of the personality.‖ 201
As an aside, I wish to also note that Florovsky‘s understanding of ―event‖ reveals
a certain allergy to form. This allergy is in part attributable to his desire to stress the
uniqueness and contingency of the event. Also, as I will explain below, Florovsky
considered experience and interpretation to be constitutive of the event, and to represent
the ―‗formedness‘ that is of true value.‖ 202 Furthermore, Florovsky opposed his
understanding of history as events to the Idealist view of history, where ―the notion of
form remains here always the final and highest value.‖203 It is important to remember
this allergy to form evident in Florovsky‘s understanding of event, for it plays a negative
role in other aspects of his theology—most significantly, his theology of ecclesiastical
authority.
Creation‘s character as an event serves for Florovsky as a pattern for the rest of
history. ―History,‖ he writes, ―is a field of action‖; it is comprised primarily of ―actions,
or complexes of actions,‖ both divine and human. 204 Thus, Florovsky primarily describes
divine revelation as ―the system of divine deeds; one might say, revelation was the path
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of God in history.‖205 ―The revelation of God,‖ he writes, ―consists of a series of events
rather than a chain of symbols.‖ 206 The Scriptures recount the history of these divine
deeds: ―They tell us still the story of salvation, Magnalia Dei.‖207 Christianity, which
Florovsky consistently deems the fulfillment of the Old Testament and Israel, ―consists of
nothing but events.‖208 According to Florovsky, Christianity is history. 209 He writes, ―It
comprises the whole of existence in a single historical scheme as one ‗History of
Salvation,‘ from Creation to Consummation, to the Last Judgment and the End of history.
Emphasis is put on the ultimate cruciality of certain historic events, namely, of the
Incarnation, of the Coming of the Messiah, and of his Cross and Resurrection.‖ 210
Florovsky holds that the event-character of Christianity was especially affirmed by the
Fathers, whose theology he refers to as a ―theology of facts,‖ and he claims that such a
theology is ―the only sound Orthodox theology.‖ 211
Florovsky thus expresses the category of ―event‖ as the thread linking all of
salvation history, punctuated by the beginning event of creation, the middle event of the
Incarnation, and the final event of the parousia. Using the patristic vocabulary, he
designates all divinely-enacted events as part of God‘s οἰκονομία, as distinct from the
inner-Trinitarian θεολογία.212 To use Florovsky‘s term, the ―cruciality‖ of these events
for him consists not only in their revelatory character—that they reveal truths about God
to men and women—but in the fact that they actually accomplish something. As
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Florovsky maintains, the Scripture narrative ―is more than merely a narrative; it relates
not only something that took place, but something that was realized and completed.‖213
In his writings on revelation, Florovsky tends to make an unfortunate distinction
between divine ―events‖ and divine ―words.‖ Thus, in ―Revelation, Philosophy and
Theology‖ he writes that ―Revelation is not only a system of divine words but also a
system of divine acts…‖214 A similar qualification appears in ―The Work of the Holy
Spirit in Revelation,‖ the only difference being that Florovsky substitutes the word
―works‖ for ―acts.‖215 Lest one think this distinction is only a mark of his essays on
revelation from the 1930s, Florovsky writes in a later essay, ―Revelation and
Interpretation‖ (1951), that ―Historic events are the source and the basis of all Christian
faith and hope. The basis of the New Testament is facts, events, deeds—not only
teaching, commandments or words.‖216 His repeated qualification that revelation consists
of events, and not only words, is undoubtedly directed toward a Protestant identification
of revelation with the Scriptural text. However, Florovsky should have clarified that
divine words are also divine events inasmuch as they are the product of God‘s free
activity.
Consistent with his Christocentrism, Florovsky regards the Incarnation as ―the
event of all events.‖217 ―This point is the center of history, of the ‗history of salvation,‘
die Heilgeschichte,‖ he writes.218 The event of the Incarnation refers back to the original
event of creation inasmuch as it is both the fulfillment of creation and the beginning of
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the new creation. In defending the newness of the Incarnation, Florovsky lauds the words
of Kierkegaard: ―God enters the world… Something new happens. This new reality is
the beginning of eternity!‖ 219 With the Incarnation Christianity has an ―‗experience of
novelty,‘ a ‗Neuheitserlebnis‘‖ that provided ―the solution of an existential predicament
in which mankind was hopelessly imprisoned.‖ 220 In ―Predicament,‖ Florovsky wrote
that one could conceive of an event as either an action or ―complexes of action.‖ 221 He
clearly intends the latter when referring to the Incarnation, which term he uses to
designate ―the Incarnate life of the Son, ‗with all that for our sakes was brought to pass,
the Cross and tomb, the Resurrection the third day, the Ascension into Heaven, the sitting
on the right hand‘ (Liturgy of St. John Chrysostom, Prayer of Consecration).‖222
What is more, Florovsky considers that the actions and events inaugurated by the
Incarnation are continued in and through the Church. Florovsky‘s ecclesiology is above
all marked by his conception of the Church as the Body of Christ—that Pauline image
whose renewed emphasis in contemporary theology he considered essential to his
program of Neo-patristic synthesis. 223 In his frequently repeated homage to St.
Augustine, Florovsky refers to the Church as ―the Whole Christ – totus Christus, caput et
corpus.‖224 Through the Church, which is the ―continuation and the fulfillment of the
theanthropic union,‖ ―God‘s Revelation continues coming down to us.‖225 Writes
Florovsky, ―Christ appeared and still appears before us not only in the Scriptures; He
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unchangeably and unceasingly reveals Himself in the Church, in His own Body.‖ 226 In
the Church, ―the Heilsgeschichte is effectively continued‖ through the Liturgy, the
sacraments, dogma—indeed, the entire matrix of the Church‘s life. 227 Thus, Florovsky
affirms that Christ continues to act in history through His Church, ―knit together‖ by the
Holy Spirit. Indeed, he goes so far as to claim that the Church ―is a part of revelation—
the story of the Holy Ghost.‖228
Florovsky also refers to the events surrounding Christ‘s Incarnation—―[his]
coming into the world, his Incarnation, his Cross and Resurrection, and the Descent of
the Holy Spirit‖—as ―eschatological events.‖229 In part Florovsky deems these events
eschatological because they accomplished the redemption of the world, which is the sine
qua non of the eschaton. It is also ―because [these events] are situated in a sequence of
the antecedent events, and thereby validate retrospectively the whole series.‖230
However, there is a third reason why Florovsky designates these events as eschatological.
Through Christ‘s coming, Florovsky maintains that ―time was validated… It was
‗consecrated‘ and given meaning, the new meaning. In the light of Christ‘s coming
history now appears as a ‗pro-gress,‘ inwardly ordered toward ‗the end,‘ to which it
unfailingly precipitates.‖231 The ―meaning‖ of the time since Christ‘s coming consists of
the fact that the historical actions and events preceding the eschaton are in actuality
constitutive of it. These include both the actions of Christ through his Body, the Church,
and the actions of men and women who contribute to the building up of this Body.
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Florovsky refers to these actions as ―prophetic‖ and ―sacramental,‖ and thus,
revelatory.232
The understanding of revelation as event described above leads Florovsky to
reject the formula that revelation ended with the death of the last Apostle. In a lesser
known publication of 1968, ―The Patterns of Historical Interpretation,‖ Florovsky
laments,
And unfortunately even first-class historians are sometimes using these strange
phrases: ―with the death of the last apostle.‖ It is an absolutely impossible
historical date—because nobody can verify it—and it is unclear which Apostles
were meant, the twelve or some wider group. What is the use of this phrase when
it is said that ―the normative period continues till the death of the last apostle,‖
when nobody knows when it was… Actually, it is just a romance of fiction.233
In this passage, Florovsky ostensibly rejects the formula as an arbitrary historical
construction that is impossible to verify. However, other texts reveal that Florovsky‘s
rejection is not solely based on historiographical considerations. Elsewhere, Florovsky
designates the event of Pentecost as the end of divine revelation: ―On the day of
Pentecost Revelation was completed, and will admit of no further completion till the Day
of Judgment and its last fulfillment.‖234 The only possible reason for this designation is
that Florovsky understood the ―end‖ of revelation to mean that there will be no new
revelatory events that accomplish or bring about our redemption. According to
Florovsky, Pentecost represents the last redemptive event until the Last Judgment: ―The
descent of the Spirit was a supreme revelation. Once and for ever, in the ‗dreadful and
inscrutable mystery‘ of Pentecost, the Spirit-Comforter enters the world in which He was
232
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not yet present in such manner as now He begins to dwell and to abide.‖ 235 However,
one must hold in tension Florovsky‘s belief that revelation ended with Pentecost with his
affirmation that this event continues in the Church through the abiding of the Holy Spirit
and the sacramental life of the Church. 236 To use the antinomical language to which
Florovsky frequently had recourse, he believed that revelation is at the same time
completed and continuing.
Florovsky‘s understanding of both creation and revelation as ―events‖ begs the
question about his understanding of the difference between natural and divine revelation.
In spite of Rowan Williams‘ description of Florovsky‘s essays on revelation from the
1930s as ―strongly Barthian in tone,‖ they appear to demonstrate a fairly traditional
understanding of natural revelation. 237 For instance, Florovsky writes that ―in a certain
sense the whole world is the Revelation of God. The creation of the world is a
revelation… The whole world testifies of God, of His Wisdom, Mercy and Love. This is
generally named: ‗Revelation through Nature.‘‖ Indeed, the Maximian influence on
Florovsky would seem to demand an acknowledgement of the sacramental character of
the world, though his opposition to German Idealism probably prevented him from
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emphasizing it. Florovsky also allows that God is somehow manifested within the human
person himself or herself, created as he or she is in the image of God.238
However, Florovsky is ultimately concerned with stressing the difference and
otherness of divine revelation. ―So-called ‗natural theology,‘‖ he writes, ―is no theology
in the true sense of the word. It is rather a philosophy, a word about the ‗Unknown God,‘
towards whom the restless human soul reaches out but has not yet found…‖ 239 He
characterizes the difference between natural and divine revelation as the difference
between ―manifestation‖ and ―Revelation,‖ where only the latter represents ―a direct
vision of God granted to man…the path of God towards man…the Voice of God
speaking to man.‖240 Somewhat more helpful is his description of the difference as
between ―a realm of rupture and interruptions‖ and ―the continuous stream of the world‘s
natural order.‖241
These distinctions are not wholly illuminating, and perhaps serve as a reminder
that Florovsky was primarily a theologian and not an apologist. They also serve to
illustrate a point that Florovsky knew well, namely, that an apt phenomenological
description of the difference between natural revelation and divine revelation is
impossible. Nevertheless, and most importantly, Florovsky‘s distinctions between
natural revelation and divine revelation serve to uphold God‘s freedom, for they entail
that God can act in different ways and at different times in history. This affirmation
seems to be a particular difficulty for those who conflate natural revelation and divine
revelation. However, because Florovsky posits a distinction between God‘s essence and
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energies, he is not forced to conclude that creation and revelation proceed according to a
common mode, and originate in a singular act.
As I have demonstrated, Florovsky understood the Christian doctrine of creation
to exhibit many of the same truths present in other Christian doctrines, including the
Christian doctrine of revelation. He portrays both creation and revelation as enacted
events of the free and personal God for the purpose of the deification of humanity. Some
of these same truths are also evident in Florovsky‘s portrayal of the reception of
revelation by men and women, who are in the image of God. As I will show in the next
section, Florovsky stresses that the human reception of revelation is a personal, and thus
free and active, process in which they strive toward theosis through their knowledge and
living out of revelation. I will for the most part limit myself to describing Florovsky‘s
understanding of the initial human reception of revelation, which acts as a model for the
Church‘s continued reception of revelation in history.

B. REVELATION AS HUMAN “EXPERIENCE”
In order to counter a modern, predominantly Western tendency toward
Nestorianism, Florovsky proposed what he called an ―asymmetric Christology‖ that
prioritized the divine nature and person over the human in Christ. 242 Applied to his
theology of revelation, Florovsky‘s ―asymmetric Christology‖ manifests itself in his
emphasis upon the contingent nature of God‘s revelation of Himself. In other words,
Florovsky recognizes the initial priority of the divine over the human inasmuch as God
must first reveal Himself to men and women before they can respond to Him. However,
this asymmetry in Florovsky‘s theology of revelation hardly extends beyond this initial
242
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priority, as he portrays revelation as a wonderful synergy of both divine and human
activity. Indeed, as I will show, Florovsky considers the human response to revelation as
integral to the substance of divine revelation. According to Florovsky, this human
response is personal, free, active, and thus, creative, and characterizes not only men‘s and
women‘s initial response to revelation, but the continuing response of the Church in
history.
In this section, I will outline the main features of the anthropological character
that Florovsky assigns to revelation. He regards revelation as comprised of not only
divinely-initiated events, but the active human reception of these events. Revelation, for
Florovsky, is thus a relational phenomenon where the personal God communicates with
human persons in order that they may participate in His divine life. Florovsky expresses
the initial human reception of revelation as an ―experience‖ to which the Christian person
attempts to be a witness through his or her askesis in life and thought. The Christian
experiences revelation in and through the Church, and strives to express this experience
in its fullness according to the ―mind of the Church.‖
Florovsky illustrates the relational character of revelation by maintaining that it is
not only a revelation about God, but also a revelation about humankind. He writes,
―Revelation is the Word of God and the Word about God. But, at the same time, in
addition to this, Revelation is always a Word addressed to man, a summons and an appeal
to man. And in Revelation the destiny of man is also revealed.‖ 243 As already
established, Florovsky understands this ―destiny‖ as theosis, which means that men‘s and
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women‘s very destiny is to be in relation with God. Again, for Florovsky, theosis
primarily means ―a personal encounter,‖ and is the fulfillment of the true relation that is
only possible between persons.244 In revelation, he writes, ―‗the God of the living‘…
speaks to living persons‖ and establishes a personal relationship with them that reaches
its culmination in their participation in His nature.245 Florovsky‘s relational
understanding of revelation extends so far as to claim that ―without man Revelation
would be impossible—because no one would be there to hear and God would not
speak.‖246 Thus, both divine and human persons play a role in revelation.
In spite of his emphasis on personhood, Florovsky does not provide a
consideration of its etiology in human beings. It is fair to assume, however, that
Florovsky located human beings‘ personhood in their creation in the imago Dei—an
attribution that Florovsky‘s student Zizioulas has developed. Like Irenaeus, Florovsky
maintains that ―the ‗image‘ is in the total structure of man,‖ which includes men‘s and
women‘s personalities. 247 Also like Irenaeus, Florovsky‘s understanding of the imago
Dei is Christocentric, for ―the ‗image‘ is the Son of God, in whose image man was
made.‖248 And in line with the Alexandrian Fathers of the Church, he associates the
―image‖ with rationality and freedom, which are qualities possessed in a supreme manner
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by the persons of the Trinity. 249 Florovsky also insists that men‘s and women‘s creation
in the image of God makes them ―capable of perceiving God, of receiving God‘s Word
and of preserving it.‖250 As I will explain in Chapter Two, Florovsky understands this
capability to mean that men and women are able to ―adequately express‖ revelation in
dogmatic formulations.
As I showed in the previous section, one of the principal traits Florovsky assigned
to personhood was free and creative activity. In Florovsky‘s theology of revelation, the
most important consequence of men‘s and women‘s personhood is that it entails an active
reception of revelation. Precisely because they are persons, Florovsky believed that men
and women ―are called to be more than just spectators, but actors in this drama of
salvation. For Christians history is not just a stage on which a symbolical play is
performed and certain eternal values are exhibited.‖251 As Florovsky was wont to
emphasize, men and women are called not only to listen to God‘s speech, but to answer,
as well. Indeed, Florovsky points out that men‘s and women‘s answer itself forms part of
the content of revelation! ―In Scripture,‖ he writes, ―we not only hear the Voice of God,
but also the voice of man answering Him…‖ 252 It is an obvious, yet often overlooked
point in presentations of the Christian understanding of revelation.
Florovsky frequently used the Russian word podvig and the Greek word askesis to
express the activity to which human persons are called. Western Christianity has
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typically understood ―askesis‖ to refer to acts of self-denial, whereas Eastern Christianity
has understood it in a wider sense to refer to any spiritual practice that promotes one‘s
communion with God. Florovsky used the term in an even wider sense to refer to any
free and creative response to revelation by human beings. 253 One could thus rightly
characterize Florovsky as having an ―ascetical theology of revelation.‖ Men‘s and
women‘s active response to revelation—their ―ascetic achievement,‖ as George Williams
translates ―podvig‖—constitutes the substance of their life in the time before the
eschaton.254 Writes Florovsky, ―The meaning of history consists in this—that the
freedom of creation should respond by accepting the pre-temporal counsel of God, that it
should respond both in word and in deed.‖ 255 Florovsky identifies this response with the
Christian‘s participation in the life of the Church, or, Tradition. It is concretely
manifested in Scripture, the Liturgy, the sacraments, and the dogmas formulated
throughout the history of the Church.
Florovsky portrays this active reception of revelation, this askesis, as manifest
even in the initial revelatory moment. His preferred term for this moment is ―experience‖
which, with revelation as ―event,‖ represents one of the ―two aspects of religious
knowledge‖ for Florovsky. 256 He defines experience in general as ―encompass[ing]

253

See also Baker‘s comment, drawn in part from Rowan Williams‘ observation, that ―both Bulgakov and
Florovsky employ the traditional language of podvig in an expansive manner to denote the significance of
creative cultural activity‖ (―‗Neo-Patristic Synthesis,‘‖ 186). Baker here references Rowan Williams‘
introduction to Sergei Bulgakov: Towards a Russian Political Theology (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1999),
65n33.
254
The concept of podvig is a particular focus of George Williams‘ presentation of Florovsky‘s thought
(―Georges Vasilievich Florovsky,‖ 61-66, 79).
255
V3, 77. See also V3, 26: ―The highest objectivity in the hearing and understanding of Revelation is
achieved through the greatest exertion of the creative personality, through spiritual growth, through the
transfiguration of the personality, which overcomes in itself ‗the wisdom of flesh,‘ ascending to ‗the
measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ‘…‖
256
V3, 21.

62

everything that is simply and directly ‗given‘ to us.‖257 In regard to revelation, which is
the concern of this chapter, Florovsky understands experience to consist of the initial
human appropriation of the divinely-enacted events of salvation history. To describe the
initial human reception of these given events, Florovsky also frequently has recourse to
the term ―vision.‖ Thus, he describes revelation as ―theophany,‖ and writes that
―Revelation discloses itself and is received in the silence of faith, in silent vision—this is
the first and apophatic step of the knowledge of God.‖258
However, one must be careful not to take Florovsky‘s description of the
―apophatic‖ character of experience to mean that it is devoid of concepts. Such is
Brandon Gallaher‘s mistake in his recent article—―‗Waiting for the Barbarians‘: Identity
and Polemicism in the Neo-Patristic Synthesis of Georges Florovsky‖—where he
attempts to link Florovsky‘s concept of experience or vision with what the Romantics
described as an ―intellectual intuition‖ or ―feeling.‖259 Contrary to the Romantic, preconceptual understanding of experience or vision, Florovsky writes that ―Experience is
given not in an atomically chaotic state of perceptionlessness but as ‗regulated variety‘:
relations are initially given.‖ It is regulated by those relations that the human mind seems
to immediately apply to an object that it encounters, ―singling it out from among a group
of other objects, generally not only not being aware of our grounds for doing so but also
257

V12, 161.
V3, 21, 30. Florovsky uses the term ―theophany‖ in analogous fashion to refer to any revelation of God
to men and women. However, congruent with his Christocentrism, he is careful to qualify, ―Yet all these
theophanies of old should never be put on the same level or in the same dimension as the incarnation of the
Word, lest the crucial event of redemption is dissolved into an allegorical shadow. A ‗type‘ is no more than
a ‗shadow‘ or image‖ (V1, 35).
259
Gallaher, 670. A larger problem of Gallaher‘s essay is its attempt to undermine Florovsky‘s call for a
Neo-patristic synthesis that opposes the pseudomorphosis of Western thought by throwing light upon the
seeming dependence of Florovsky on the very Western categories he opposed. However, Florovsky never
imagined that his own thought was devoid of Western influence, nor did he believe the path forward
consisted of ignoring this influence. The ultimate goal of his synthesis was the re-integration of the
Christian mind in both its Eastern and Western aspects.
258

63

not being in a position to be aware of them.‖ Florovsky holds that this ―‗direct‘
‗intuitive‘ stability‖ provided by the mind is ―a primary fact,‖ and testifies that no object
is received by the human person ―entirely without form.‖ 260
But Florovsky holds that ―Givens necessitate interpretation,‖ and thus, experience
must move quickly beyond this ―direct intuitive stability‖ to become cognition. 261
Experience is not primarily a passive reality in Florovsky‘s writings. In fact, one could
very well critique Florovsky‘s religious epistemology for not sufficiently accounting for
the concept of passivity in his understanding of reception, interpretation, and
relationship. 262 He consistently portrays the interpretation of experience, i.e., cognition,
as an active endeavor on the part of men and women: ―Cognition, as a historical
phenomenon created by the systematic and interrelated efforts of successive generations,
is a heroic act.‖263 He maintains that a concept (which is the product of cognition) ―lives
in judgments,‖ namely, the active reasonings of the human mind. He thus echoes
Friedrich Trendelenburg‘s statement that ―Understanding is Interpretation,‖ as he
believes that experience demands an active response from human rationality. 264
Florovsky presciently recognized that hermeneutics conditions any individual‘s
attempt to understand experience, but also emphasized that ―in this willful initial choice
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we are not inescapably restricted by either innate character, inherited predispositions or
everyday circumstances.‖265 He thus portrays the thought process as free in its activity,
for ―man remains a free agent even in bonds.‖266 Through the active interpretation of
experience, Florovsky claims that men and women give ―existence,‖ ―meaning,‖ and
―form‖ to events.267 Through cognition, or rational thought, men and women become
―witnesses‖ to events, which the Russian historian Vassily Bolotov characterized as the
goal of history.268
Florovsky defines faith as this active witness to the events of revelation. He
writes, ―… [F]aith is vision and perception. God appears to man and man beholds God.
The truths of faith are truths of experience, truths of a fact… Faith is a descriptive
confirmation of certain facts… faith is the evidence of experience.‖ 269 According to
Florovsky, it is faith that acknowledges divine events ―as truly eventful,‖ meaning that
they were willed by God for the salvation of men and women. 270 As Matthew Baker has
so well emphasized, Florovsky did not perceive a sharp dichotomy between the
experience of faith and reason. 271 Indeed, Florovsky viewed faith‘s acknowledgement of
divine events as itself a rational undertaking, for it is ―only in the process of cognition‖
that ―‗things‘ become ‗sources,‘‖ or, that divine events are ―recognized as utterly
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momentous.‖272 Furthermore, he viewed the life of faith as a crucial element of
rationality, as ―revelation becomes clearly heard by us in all its fullness only in spiritual
experience.‖273 He thus portrayed rational reflection as constitutive of the very
experience of the events of revelation. Faith—understood as the active interpretation of
revelation in both thought and life—is formative of the Christian‘s experience, which is
why Florovsky frequently conjoined the two realities in the phrase ―experience of faith.‖
According to Florovsky, then, experience is itself a synergy between divine and human
action, between divinely-willed events and the human reception of them in thought.
After the moment of faith, this active Christian reflection on experience continues and
forms part of the Tradition of the Church.
Florovsky characterizes the witness of faith as a personal act on the part of each
Christian individual. 274 But he understands that the experience that comprises faith is not
available to Christians today in the form that it was available to its first witnesses.
Revelation now ―is given, and is accessible, only in the Church; that is, only through life
in the Church, through a living and actual belonging to the mystical organism of the Body
of Christ.‖275 Thus, one‘s experience of revelation is inevitably an ecclesial experience.
As Florovsky points out, ―‗the past‘ as such cannot be ‗observed‘ directly. It has actually
passed away and therefore is never given directly in any ‗possible experience‘… The
knowledge of the past is necessarily indirect and inferential.‖276 The Christian‘s
experience of faith is thus mediated by the Church‘s reflection on revelation as
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manifested in Scripture, dogma, and Liturgy—its entire life—a fact that also serves to
demonstrate that Christian experience is intimately tied to thought.277
Furthermore, the Christian‘s experience of faith is colored by his or her
commitment ―to a particular interpretation of certain events of history, and also to a
definite interpretation of the historic process itself, taken as a whole. In this sense,
[Christians] are inevitably prejudiced.‖ 278 On this point Florovsky quotes the Russian
historian B.M. Melioransky, who described the Church‘s particular interpretation of
history as a ―key‖ by which Christians may enter God‘s City and enjoy the experience of
faith.279 Without this key, the events of salvation history remain ―unclear, unconvincing‖
to men and women.280
However, it is not only a hermeneutics of history, but grace that the Church gives
to the Christian person who participates in its life. Florovsky recognizes that men and
women ―need a special method of seeing to be able to recognize [revelation]… reason
itself must be transfigured, and this transfiguration of our consciousness can be
accomplished only in the Church, in its spiritual charismatic completeness.‖ 281 One
could call this ―special method‖ divine grace, as I have, but one should also note that
Florovsky identifies grace with ―a personal communion with the personal God.‖ 282
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But human thought cannot exhaust all of the aspects of the experience of faith,
which, according to Florovsky, contains the whole of divine revelation. Rational thought
gives this experience form from the beginning, but the experience will always be ―more
comprehensive and fuller‖ than this form. 283 Florovsky locates the ―fullness‖ of the
experience of revelation in the Church; indeed, he describes it as ―living‖ in the
Church. 284 What is the character of this fullness of the experience of revelation?
Florovsky undoubtedly regards it as a fullness of the knowledge of God, or, a ―noetic
vision,‖ that constitutes ―a system of religious philosophy.‖ 285 This fullness of the
knowledge of God was made possible by Christ, who ―made religious knowledge
possible for the first time‖ through his redemption. 286
But one must remember that, for Florovsky, this fullness of knowledge is
inseparable from the fullness of union that comes through Christ‘s redemptive work, and
is a condition of this union.287 He emphasizes that ―the Truth is not an idea, but a person,
even the Incarnate Lord.‖288 The theanthropic union that Christ effected is continued in
the Church understood as the Body of Christ in which the Spirit abides. Christ and the
Spirit are the ―fullness,‖ and it is their continued presence in the Church that enables
Florovsky to claim that ―the Church is fulness, τό πλήρωμα that is, fulfilment,
completion.‖289 Fullness, for Florovsky, is the equivalent of ―catholicity,‖ and is thus a
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mark of the Church. 290 The (true) knowledge of God is only possible in the Church
because it is within the Church that the Christian person can participate in Christ‘s life
through incorporation into his body. In sum, Florovsky regards ―fullness‖ as a
gnoseological concept because it is tied to theosis.
Florovsky recognizes an antinomy in regard to the notion of the fullness of
revelation: the Church possesses the fullness, but at the same time, this fullness is not yet
complete because the Body of Christ is not yet complete. On this point, Florovsky quotes
St. John Chrysostom, who writes, ―[Christ] Himself is complete and all-perfect, but not
yet has He drawn mankind to Himself in final completeness. It is only gradually that
mankind enters into Communion with Him and so gives a new fulness to His work,
which thereby attains its full accomplishment.‖291 Florovsky also portrays the individual
member of the Church as participating in the fullness of revelation in an ―already, but not
yet‖ manner. The Christian person is united to Christ through the Spirit, but does not yet
enjoy the fullness of this union. Thus, Florovsky writes, ―I maintain that each person can
realize the catholic standard in himself. I do not say that each person does realize it.
That depends upon the measure of one‘s spiritual maturity.‖ 292
Florovsky sometimes describes the particular ecclesial location of the fullness of
the experience of revelation as the ―mind of the Church.‖ What Florovsky writes of the
concept of the Church also applies to his concept of the ―mind of the Church,‖ namely,

Florovsky witnesses to between ―body‖ and ―fullness‖ leads him to describe the Eucharist as ―the primary
witness to the mystery of Redemption, in all its fulness‖ (V1, 85). See also ―The Eucharist and
Catholicity‖ (V13, 46-57).
290
V1, 41.
291
V1, 39. See also V1, 55.
292
V3, 40.

69

that it ―can be rather depicted and described than properly defined.‖293 As with the idea
of fullness, there is an epistemological component to Florovsky‘s understanding of the
mind of the Church. This is evidenced not only by his references to it as ―mind,‖ but also
as the ―sensus catholicus‖ and the ―υρόνημα ἐκκλησιαστικόν.‖294 He attributes a
patristic provenance to this concept of the ―mind of the Church,‖ and regards it as
encompassed by neither Scripture nor dogma; rather, it was, ―in the Early Church, first of
all, an hermeneutical principle and method‖ that allowed the Church‘s members to both
understand and protect divine revelation. 295 It ―is a concrete oneness in thought and
feeling,‖ writes Florovsky, that is shared by the members of the Church. 296 Ultimately,
Florovsky identifies the ―mind of the Church‖ as none other than Tradition.
But Florovsky does not regard this ―mind‖ as some esoteric, impersonal reality
that acts as the storehouse for all divinely-revealed truths. On the contrary, he maintains
that this mind ―is not a common consciousness, neither is it the joint consciousness of the
many or the Bewusstsein ueberhaupt of German philosophers. Catholicity is achieved
not by eliminating the living personality, nor by passing over into the plane of an abstract
Logos.‖297 Again, he emphasizes that ―it is not to a ‗transcendental subject,‘ not to any
‗consciousness-in-general‘ that God speaks. The ‗God of the Living,‘ the God of
Revelation speaks to living persons, to empirical subjects.‖298 As the Church to whom
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God reveals Himself is comprised of ―a symphony of personalities,‖ 299 so also is the
mind of the Church.
As a personal reality, Florovsky primarily characterizes the mind of the Church as
both an enacted and relational reality. It is less something possessed in a mystical fashion
by the members of the Church than it is something to be realized by them through the
―transfiguration‖ of their personality: ―It is the ‗telos‘ of personal consciousness, which is
realized in creative development, not in the annihilation of personality.‖300 To repeat,
Florovsky held that the fullness of the experience of faith exists only in the Church
inasmuch as it is the Body of Christ indwelt by the Spirit. Thus, the Christian person
comes to realize this fullness, or, the mind of the Church, only through his or her
participation in Christ, who is the ―personal centre‖ of the Church to which Christians are
united.301 One‘s participation in Christ comes through incorporation into his Body, the
Church, through Baptism, Chrismation, and the Eucharist. This participation increases
through one‘s continued askesis manifested in one‘s life in the Church and growth in the
knowledge of God; in other words, through the life of faith and reason. Because
Florovsky regards the mind of the Church as something realized by the Christian person
through his or her union with Christ through his body, he claims that ―the Christian mind
is through and through a corporate mind.‖ 302 Another way of putting it is that the mind of
the Church is a relational reality.
According to Florovsky, the Church deems those persons who have realized this
fullness ―Fathers and Teachers of the Church.‖ Their realization of this fullness in their
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knowledge and life does not mean for Florovsky that they reached the limit of this
fullness, but that they are able to witness this fullness to the other members of the
Church, to speak from the mind of the Church. 303 In deference to this patristic witness,
Florovsky advocated that Christian theology today seek to recover the ―mind of the
Fathers.‖304 This call for the recovery of the patristic mind represents the essence of
Florovsky‘s call for a Neo-patristic synthesis. However, the ―mind of the Fathers,‖ as
Florovsky understands it, does not refer primarily to the content of patristic theology
(though it is not separable from it), but a way of life in the Church. This way involves
the ―existential theology‖ that Florovsky saw exemplified in the Fathers of the Church.
An ―existential theology‖ is one that seeks after the fullness of Christian experience by
actively unfolding this experience through rational thought and one‘s participation in the
life of the Church.305 Florovsky characterizes this active unfolding of Christian
experience as the vocation of each member of the Church. It is the condition of both the
individual Christian‘s theosis and the completion of the Body of Christ. And
furthermore, as I will argue in Chapter Two, it constitutes the essence of what Florovsky
understands as Tradition and doctrinal development.

C. THE ERRORS OF HELLENISM
Most of Florovsky‘s writings resulted from a perceived need to respond to
challenges to the Christian faith. For the sake of clarity, I have above laid out the main
tenets of Florovsky‘s theology of revelation in a positive fashion. In his writings,
303
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however, his theology of revelation was forged through a defense of Christian orthodoxy
against certain modern intellectual trends, particularly German Idealism and
Romanticism—which he considered the offspring of the Protestant Reformation—in
addition to Russian Sophiology. Florovsky was consciously aware that his theology
through polemic represented another affinity between him and the Fathers of the Church,
whom he said ―most often theologized for the refutation of heretics.‖ 306 In order to
further elaborate Florovsky‘s theology of revelation, I will briefly summarize what he
opposed in these trends.
Florovsky‘s defense of the Christian understanding of revelation, and relatedly,
creation, was influenced by his theology or philosophy of history, which he construes as a
dialectic between Christianity and Hellenism. With Justin Martyr and Clement of
Alexandria, Florovsky was willing to regard Hellenism as a kind of preparatio
Evangelii.307 Indeed, Christianity came to be in a Hellenistic milieu, and thus, the
Hellenistic idiom is formative of the Christian experience that is manifested in Scripture
and dogma. But the Incarnation and Redemption also signaled the need for Hellenism to
be purified and transfigured with the rest of creation, a task that the Church Fathers set
about to accomplish through their writings. The efforts of the Fathers produced what
Florovsky terms ―Christian Hellenism,‖ or, a ―‗Churchification‘ [‗Verkirchlichung‘] of
Hellenism.‖308 However, some Christians in the early Church desired to figuratively
―return to Egypt‖ by judging Christianity by the logic of Hellenism, rather than judging
Hellenism according to the ―mind of the Church.‖ For Florovsky, this return to a pre306
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Christian Hellenism in thought constitutes the nature of Christian heresy not only in the
early Church, but in all ages of the Church.
Florovsky sees the problems of Hellenism as rooted in a deficient understanding
of creation, the concept of which he held ―was alien and even unintelligible to the Greek
mind…‖309 Whereas Christianity understands God to be other than the world and
creation to be ex nihilo, Hellenism was pantheistic and thus regarded ―the Cosmos... as an
‗eternal‘ and ‗immortal‘… being.‖310 The pantheism of Hellenism entailed an impersonal
God—―a common failure of Greek philosophy‖ 311—which meant that the world‘s
existence was not the result of God‘s free act, and thus, was necessary. The necessity of
the cosmos colored human existence with a certain necessity. Men and women could
bring about no change in the world‘s process through their free actions; instead, their
purpose was merely to discern the eternal patterns present within the structure of the
world and either resign themselves to their fate, or try to escape the cyclical process of
the world through a fuga mundi.312
Florovsky discerns some of these same problems in forms of ―de-Christianized
Hellenism‖ that have arisen in Christian history. He sees the dangers of Origenism—
Florovsky‘s type of an erroneous Christian appropriation of Hellenism—as rooted in
Hellenistic ―metaphysical presuppositions‖ that exalt spiritual and immutable reality at
the expense of the bodily and historical. Origen could not reconcile the antinomy of
God‘s immutability and creation‘s newness resulting from God‘s free action, and opted to
preserve the former at the expense of the latter. As a result, Origen postulated the pre-
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existence of souls, and portrayed history and its events as an ephemeral realm needing to
be surpassed and transcended.313
Protestantism represented an attempt to remove what it perceived as Christianity‘s
Hellenistic accretions. Ironically, however, Florovsky believed that anti-Hellenistic
Protestantism created the space necessary for modern forms of de-Christianized
Hellenism to flourish by eliminating religion as an object for the creativity of Christian
thought. German Idealism arose in the wake of Protestantism, and Florovsky paints it as
almost a whole scale, though indirect, ressourcement of the deficient Hellenistic views of
creation. According to Florovsky, Idealism perceived the world as ―an eternal selfrevelation of God, an eternal changing existence of divine life,‖ and was therefore
pantheistic inasmuch as it postulated an ―absolute, insoluble connection of God with the
world, the idea of mutual closest connection.‖ 314 Like Hellenism, Florovsky saw
Idealism as confining men‘s and women‘s activity to morphological thought and ―the
search for the unchangeable foundations of the world, at the revelation of its eternally
ideal outline or the scheme which holds it together.‖315
Florovsky considers a properly orthodox understanding of creation (and
revelation) as a corollary of a properly orthodox Christology. As such, he perceived a
deficient Christology in these forms of de-Christianized Hellenism. He refers to the
Christology of Origen as ―utterly inadequate and ambiguous,‖ for Origen portrayed the
Incarnation as but ―a moment in the continuous story of permanent Theophany of the
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Divine Logos—a central moment, in a sense, but still no more than a central symbol.‖ 316
Idealism does not understand the Incarnation as a central moment in history, but ―only a
section of the entire theogonic process‖ of God‘s continuously evolving self-revelation.
It stresses God‘s link with the world and humankind, and postulates their ultimate unity,
but this unity is not to be brought about by concrete, historical events such as the
Incarnation. Florovsky thus resolves that ―One could say that German Idealism is a
theory of God-humanity without the God-man. That is its fatal error.‖317
The manifestations of de-Christianized Hellenism that Florovsky perceived in
modern Russian theological thought seemed to come to a head during his lifetime in
Sophiology. Florovsky‘s student John Meyendorff has gone so far as to claim that the
―psychological impulse which inspired Florovsky during the writing of his books was the
refutation of the so-called ‗sophiology‘ in all its forms.‖ 318 Sophiology refers to the
theory variously elaborated by Soloviev, Florensky, and Bulgakov, among others, which
postulates the existence of creation in the Godhead almost to the point of conceiving it as
a separate hypostasis called ―Wisdom,‖ or, ―Sophia,‖ symbolized in history in the person
of the Virgin Mary. 319 Florovsky characterizes Sophiology as ―pan-logistic‖ because it
fails to make a distinction between ―the truth of a thing‖ (the thought of the world in
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God‘s essence) and the ―substance of a thing‖ (the act of creating the world).320
According to Florovsky‘s reasoning, if creation and humanity were somehow part of the
Godhead, as Sophiology holds, then they would necessarily exist, and creation would not
be the result of God‘s free will.
He also saw Sophiology as insufficiently accounting for free, human activity. His
critiques about Sophiology‘s views of human activity and history were mainly directed at
the young Soloviev.321 According to Florovsky, Soloviev understood the world as ―an
ideally constructed mechanism,‖ and history as ―a gradual process of Godmanhood, the
profound and free unity of the Divine and the human‖ that would culminate in a ―world
synthesis‖ and the establishment of the Kingdom of God on earth. 322 Florovsky sees a
deficient Christology lurking behind Soloviev‘s problematic conception of history. He
could not help but note the irony that ―Solov‘ev spoke much more about God-manhood
than about the God-man.‖323 ―Yet, even in his Lectures Concerning Godmanhood,‖
Florovsky writes, ―the Historic Christ was more a manifestation of a general idea than a
true Person.‖324 Thus, in Soloviev‘s utopian vision, even the person of Christ fades into
the shadows of the continuous flow of the historical process. As a result, Florovsky
concludes that Soloviev ―did not go beyond Origen‖ and his Logos-theology.325 He
levels this same criticism at Florensky in his scathing review of the latter‘s The Pillar and
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Foundation of Truth: ―In Florensky the fate of Origen repeats itself: for both, Christianity
is the religion of the Logos and not that of Christ… The image of the God-man has still
not been revealed to him.‖ 326
Florovsky‘s calls for a Neo-patristic synthesis and a return to a proper Christian
Hellenism have too hastily been characterized by contemporary Orthodox thinkers as
anti-Western, isolationist, and an example of ―cultural chauvinism.‖ 327 On the contrary,
as Matthew Baker has persuasively argued, Florovsky explicitly repudiated such a
simplistic understanding of his prescription for the renewal of Orthodox theology. Like
Hans Urs von Balthasar, Florovsky recognized that German Idealism was now part of the
Western world‘s hermeneutic, and a programmatic effort of Orthodox to forget it would
itself be a-historical: ―For renouncing Idealism means renouncing the past, means a
cultural and historical break.‖ 328 Plus, though Florovsky warns about certain excesses of
modern Russian theological thought, he clarifies that the path of thinkers such as
Soloviev and Florensky ―is mainly correct,‖ and commends them for their bringing an
examination of the relationship between faith and reason to the forefront of Orthodox
thought.329
Indeed, Florovsky‘s call for a Neo-patristic synthesis was primarily a call for the
reunification of faith and reason in Christian life. ―Solov‘ev‘s basic and fatal
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contradiction‖ does not lie in his dialogue with the Idealist tradition, but rather, ―lies in
the fact that he attempted to construct an ecclesiastical synthesis from non-ecclesiastical
experience.‖330 Christian Hellenism was born when the Church Fathers undertook a
rational engagement with Hellenistic philosophy by passing it through the sieve of the
Christian experience of faith. Florovsky advocates the recovery of this patristic schema:
―the task of theology lies… not in controlling dogma by means of contemporary
philosophy but rather in re-shaping philosophy on experience of faith itself so that the
experience of faith would become the source and measure of philosophical views.‖ 331
Such a theology involves the Church‘s authentic engagement with ideas, rather than a
slavish imitation of them. The Neo-patristic synthesis is therefore a call for Christians to
exercise the freedom that belongs to them as persons.
According to Florovsky, an authentic Christian Hellenism is one that recognizes
its Greek patrimony without being subjected to its logic. It is one that preserves a
uniquely Christian conception of God as necessary, eternal, and immutable, yet also
personal, free, and active. It is one that views both creation and revelation as divine
events, culminating in the Incarnation, and affirms that these events were not merely the
appearance of pre-existent elements, but brought something new into existence and
transformed the world. And it is one that understands history as the forum for both
divine and human events, which both contribute to the completion of the Body of Christ
and the inauguration of the eschaton. In Chapter Two, I will argue that this emphasis on
human events and creative activity leads Florovsky to endorse the idea of doctrinal
development.
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1.3: DIALOGUE
In Chapter One I have focused on summarizing how Newman and Florovsky
understand the mode and character of divine revelation. As I stated at the beginning of
this chapter, I believe Newman‘s theory of doctrinal development follows from his
particular understanding of revelation. In the Dialogue section of this chapter I will
attempt to show that Florovsky‘s understanding of revelation is fundamentally congruent
with Newman‘s, thus laying the groundwork for Chapter Two in which I argue that
Florovsky accepts the idea of doctrinal development.
Newman and Florovsky demonstrate a similar understanding of revelation in large
part because of their common foundation in the theology of the Eastern Church Fathers.
However, a comparison of Newman‘s and Florovsky‘s understandings of revelation also
reveals some interesting differences attributable to their different ecclesial traditions,
influences, and opponents. These differences do not constitute obstacles to my argument
that Florovsky accepts the idea of doctrinal development. Instead, they represent
opportunities for the mutual development of each author‘s position, and potentially point
the way toward the future development of the understanding of revelation in each
author‘s religious tradition.

A. NEWMAN AND FLOROVSKY ON GOD’S REVEALING ACTIVITY
Certain common emphases in Newman‘s and Florovsky‘s theologies of revelation
have emerged in this chapter. They converge in emphasizing that God reveals Himself as
person to men and women through His free actions in history. They both attach a
relational purpose to God‘s revealing activity, which aims at union between God and
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human persons. In addition, both Newman and Florovsky imply that the way in which
God reveals Himself to men and women serves as a model or pattern of the human
reception of revelation. As persons, men and women are called upon to freely receive
revelation through their own creative activity in history, which manifests itself in thought,
word, and deed. These delineations of ―thought, word, and deed‖ are but Newman‘s and
Florovsky‘s categorized way of saying that the Christian‘s entire life constitutes his or
her active reception of revelation. As I will make clear in Chapter Two, this creative
reception of revelation by human persons is nothing other than what Newman refers to as
doctrinal development.
Dictating and coloring these common emphases is perhaps the most important
similarity between Newman and Florovsky: their use of Incarnation as a lens for their
understandings of revelation, and furthermore, for their theologies as a whole. Florovsky
further specifies his Incarnational and Christological hermeneutic as consciously
Chalcedonic, centered on the person of Jesus Christ possessed of both a divine and
human nature. Florovsky interprets Chalcedon as implicitly mandating that any Christian
expression of faith or practice affirm the person and his or her ability to freely act. In
addition, he sees the coinherence of the divine and human natures in the person of Christ
as demanding that Christian theology affirm the place of both θεολογία and οἰκονομία,
the dignity of both body and spirit, the importance of both dogma and life, and the
significance of both history and eschatology.
Newman does not invoke Chalcedon per se, but a Chalcedonic perspective similar
to Florovsky is unmistakably present in his insistence that divine revelation has both
concrete and abstract aspects. Newman holds that truth is most fully concrete when it is
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enhypostasized, and sees Christian revelation as concrete insofar as it consists of the
Person of God revealing Himself to human persons for the sake of their deification. He
also sees the concrete nature of revelation manifested in its historical character, for he
writes that God primarily reveals Himself through distinct ―facts and actions‖ (see note
123) of which the Incarnation represents the fulfillment and the standard. Yet, Newman
also affirmed the abstract character of revelation. According to Newman, Christian
revelation is abstract insofar as men and women conceptually express it in order to
understand it, while knowing that they can never fully do so because of the otherness of
revelation‘s object.
Interestingly, one also finds language of the concrete versus the abstract recurring
throughout Florovsky‘s writings in a manner harmonious with the Chalcedonic character
of his theology of revelation. Perhaps the presence of this scheme of the concrete and
abstract in both Newman and Florovsky is not so surprising, given Hans Urs von
Balthasar‘s contention that ―this scheme of thought is at the basis of Western philosophy
and can be followed down throughout its history.‖332 In his writings, Florovsky
associates the ―concrete‖ with the personal, the free, the historic, the visible, and the
active. 333 Accordingly, Florovsky regards revelation as concrete because God is a person
who freely acts in revealing Himself to persons through visible, historic events. One can
translate his critiques of many alternative theological and philosophical systems as his
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perception that abstract principles in these systems overshadowed and determined
concrete realities. 334
At the same time, Florovsky clearly recognized the importance of the abstract
element in revelation, which he located in human reason‘s call to unfold the concrete
experience of faith through theology. 335 Parallel to the human and divine natures of
Christ, Florovsky held that ―both are to be kept side by side: a somewhat abstract or
generalized presentation of the main message in a creed or in a system, and all particular
documents referring to the concrete instances of revelation. One might say a system and
the history itself.‖336 One could fairly claim that Florovsky believes the ―scheme‖ of the
concrete and the abstract find their definitive reconciliation in the person of Jesus Christ.
The concept of personhood is an emphasis in both Newman‘s and Florovsky‘s
understandings of revelation, but there are some noteworthy differences. Florovsky
exhibits a concept of personhood more fully rooted in theology and metaphysics than
Newman‘s. He principally portrays the person as the nexus of free and creative activity.
In regard to God, this portrayal is a fruit of the Christological controversies of the early
Church, during which the Fathers perceived the need to more clearly distinguish between
God‘s person and nature in order to defend the divinity of the Son (and the Holy Spirit).
Florovsky roots men‘s and women‘s free activity in their personhood belonging to them
by virtue of their creation in the imago Dei. He also implies that personhood is the nexus
of relationality, and that men‘s and women‘s status as persons makes possible their
relation with the person of God in theosis.
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As I pointed out above, Newman also linked personhood with freedom and
activity in his brief, direct foray into metaphysics. One of his recurrent emphases, too,
was that ―life is for action,‖ and that the quality of one‘s reception of divine revelation
was measurable by how much it manifested itself in action. However, when he referred
to the concepts of personhood and revelation together, Newman tended to focus more on
the revelatory effectiveness of personal manifestation, which he considers ―that most
efficient incentive to all action,‖ than on attributing God‘s revealing activity, and the
human being‘s active reception of revelation, to their status as persons. As Walgrave has
pointed out, Newman did not clarify why he regarded the personal as such an effective
impetus to action (see notes 49 and 50). In addition, John Crosby‘s chapter on
Newman‘s ―personalism‖ unintentionally shows how little sustained theological and
philosophical attention Newman gave to the concept of the person in spite of his frequent
invocation of it.337 Here Florovsky‘s link between personhood and the image of God
may be helpful, for it provides theological support for Newman‘s emphasis on the person.
Newman does not devote much reflection to the concept of the image of God, even in his
Lectures on Justification. However, it further bolsters his contention that human beings
are fundamentally acting persons who image God‘s own personal activity.
One of the principles of Newman‘s theory of development is that developments of
ideas are often catalyzed by the circumstances of one‘s context. Newman‘s theology of
revelation exhibits many hallmarks of Eastern Orthodoxy due to his reading of the
Eastern Church Fathers. Indeed, the patristic emphasis of many twentieth and twentyfirst century Orthodox theologians such as Florovsky is in some ways indebted to
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Newman‘s return ad fontes in the nineteenth century.338 However, Newman‘s theology
of revelation was also circumscribed by his Anglican and Roman Catholic contexts,
which included a particular theological vocabulary and the pressing issues of the day.
Some of Florovsky‘s catalysts were not his own. One must remember that while
Florovsky claims patristic provenance for his understanding of personhood, he is also
indebted to modern scholarship such as the philosophy of personhood in Charles
Renouvier. Both Florovsky‘s and Renouvier‘s links between personhood, freedom, and
activity were spurred on by the determinism they perceived in German Idealism and its
theological and philosophical offspring. Newman, on the other hand, was by and large
ignorant of German Idealism save for his brief exposure to it via a secondary source.339
Largely contributing to his ignorance of Idealism was his ignorance of the German
language.
The patristic influence on Florovsky‘s particular understanding of personhood is
evident in his Christocentrism and his paralleling of creation and revelation. The
Christocentric character of personhood is obviously evident in Chalcedon‘s dogma of the
hypostatic union. However, it is also discernible in the earlier Christological
controversies in which the Fathers defended the divinity of Christ by distinguishing
between God‘s θεολογία and οἰκονομία, or, His essence and energies. The Fathers‘
defense was an attempt to successfully navigate the heresies of Arianism and
Sabellianism, and consisted in them clarifying that the begetting of the Son was an act of
338
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God‘s essence, whereas historic events such as creation and revelation were the result of
God‘s personal, and thus free and creative, activity. Florovsky can thus claim that all the
truths of creation are contained within the Church‘s understanding of revelation, and vice
versa, because both creation and revelation testify to a personal God who freely acts in
history.
At the heart of the early Christological controversies was also the question of
men‘s and women‘s eschatological destiny. The Chalcedonic defense of Christ‘s divinity
and humanity was also a defense of the possibility of theosis, for if God did not truly
become human, men and women could not truly participate in God. The distinction
between God‘s essence and energies was also a defense of the character of theosis itself,
for in distinguishing between acts of God‘s essence and acts of God‘s person, the Fathers
assured that men‘s and women‘s deification was conceived as a union of persons without
confusion.
Florovsky‘s understanding of revelation is both synthetic and cosmic, connecting
the concepts of divine personhood and freedom with the historic events of creation, the
Incarnation, and the eschaton. The clear link between the Incarnation, creation, and
eschatology in Florovsky‘s theology of revelation is in part attributable to the influence
of Maximus the Confessor on his thought. As I pointed out above, Florovsky classified
the theology of Maximus as a ―theology of revelation‖ that similarly regarded the
Incarnation as the thread that held together the fabric of the created world. He elsewhere
described Maximus as providing a ―magnificent theological synthesis‖ of Byzantine
thought up to that point in history. 340 Maximus‘ synthesis included a developed
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understanding of revelation that drew upon the Church‘s understanding of creation
formulated in the Christological controversies of the previous centuries.
Florovsky‘s link between revelation and creation was also catalyzed by his
perception that a challenge to the orthodox doctrine of creation was at the heart of
modern forms of de-Hellenized Christianity such as German Idealism and Romanticism,
and their manifestation in Russian Sophiology. Florovsky believed the challenges faced
by the Fathers were similar to those we face today, and saw his role as not that different
from Athanasius who was forced to defend the doctrine of creation against the
―Hellenisms‖ manifest in Origenism and Arianism. As a result of this conscious link,
Florovsky‘s theology of revelation clearly bears those fruits won when orthodoxy
emerged at the councils.
Newman does not similarly link revelation with creation in his writings. But this
lack is not due to a failure to perceive the nuances, or antinomies, of the Christian
doctrine of creation, as witnessed to by Arians, Volume Two of his Select Treatises of St.
Athanasius, and his lengthy essay ―Causes of the Rise and Successes of Arianism.‖ 341
Newman, like Florovsky, also recognized that the divine act of creation was a paradigm
for the rest of God‘s actions in history: ―For that first act of creation could not stand
alone; other acts necessarily followed. Creation and conservation must go together.‖342
And, as I pointed out, Newman had recourse to the eschatological model of deification,
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which was unusual in his context. However, he does not establish the link between
creation, revelation, and men‘s and women‘s deification as clearly as Florovsky.
It is fair to say, then, that Newman lacks Florovsky‘s explicitly formulated
synthetic and cosmic understanding of revelation. I wrote above that Florovsky was
primarily a theologian and not an apologist. Newman, on the other hand, was primarily
an apologist and not a theologian in the sense he understood the term. Like Florovsky,
Newman wished to defend Christian orthodoxy against modern threats. But the battle
Newman waged was primarily on the ground of first principles, where he sought to bring
to light the erroneous premises of his opponents. Unlike Florovsky, Newman‘s
opposition did not usually involve the reassertion and reinterpretation of the Church‘s
dogmatic tradition. Newman engaged in a historical retrieval of the Fathers, and, as
Brian Daley writes, ―felt a deep religious kinship‖ with them, but their influence on his
understanding of revelation was seemingly indirect.343 It is perhaps also noteworthy that
Newman was not well versed in the works of Maximus the Confessor, who exercised
such a great influence on Florovsky‘s view of revelation.
In spite of being less developed, Newman‘s understanding of revelation exhibits
some of the same emphases as Florovsky‘s. The similar emphases are a testament to
Newman‘s and Florovsky‘s common foundation in the patristic ethos, which is marked
by a thoroughly incarnational character. Florovsky‘s theology of revelation offers the
opportunity for the development of the understanding of revelation that acts as the
foundation for Newman‘s idea of doctrinal development. It does so by representing a
fuller expression of the patristic theology that is at the heart of Newman‘s understanding
of revelation.
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As I showed in the first two sections of Chapter One, Newman‘s and Florovsky‘s
shared focus on the centrality of the Incarnation is connected with their shared focus on
the historical character of revelation. Newman described God as revealing Himself
through concrete ―facts and actions.‖ Florovsky was even more concerned with asserting
the historical character of revelation. He also used the terms ―facts‖ and ―actions‖ to
classify God‘s entrances into history, but above all he described them as ―events.‖ Both
Newman and Florovsky also stressed that God continues to act in history through His
Church, the Body of Christ, through its actions of Liturgy, the sacraments, prayer, and
theology. Indeed, the ―Body of Christ‖ is a dominant motif of both Newman‘s and
Florovsky‘s ecclesiologies, a fact that leads one to surmise an intimate connection
between a corporate ecclesiology and a strong emphasis on God‘s continued activity in
ecclesiastical history.
Both Newman and Florovsky also perceived threats to the historical integrity of
Christian revelation in their times that they attributed to Protestantism and its effects.
Newman‘s lifelong battle against ―the spirit of liberalism in religion‖ included a defense
of Christian revelation against those who reduced divine revelation to its moral
implications, or, like William Paley, reduced it to numerous ―evidences‖ whose
miraculous nature pointed toward the existence of God.344 What was ignored by those
Newman opposed, and what he saw as a component of a historical revelation, is the fact
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that God‘s actions were revelatory precisely because they accomplished something in
history. Florovsky saw a denial of revelation as ―event‖ in the pantheism of Idealism and
Romanticism, which conceived of history as the gradual unveiling and realization of an
ideal according to a pre-formed structure. To the Idealist and the Romantic, events were
not dramatic irruptions of time in which God acted in history and effected change in that
history, but instead, were the periodic, symbolic manifestations of the ―Absolute
Reality.‖ Newman famously wrote in the Essay on Development that ―To be deep in
history is to cease to be a Protestant.‖ In the text, he directed this statement toward the
Protestant ―neglect of ecclesiastical history.‖345 However, it also serves as a fitting
summary of Newman‘s and Florovsky‘s shared emphasis upon revelation as consisting of
historical actions.
But a de-emphasis upon revelation as event is not solely a Protestant
phenomenon. It marked the post-Tridentine Roman Catholic characterization of
revelation as a number of propositions about God. It is also evident in the works of
Vladimir Lossky, whose neo-Palamite, apophatically-focused presentation of the
Orthodox faith has been so influential in modern Orthodox theology. When Lossky treats
of revelation, it is mainly revelation in the abstract. He refers in various places to the
―facts‖ and ―data‖ of revelation, but notably absent from these references is any extended
description of the content of these facts and data. The particular datum of revelation that
receives Lossky‘s recurring attention is that of the Holy Trinity, the dogma that he terms
―the highest point of revelation.‖ 346 Yet, Lossky does not devote attention to the
historical means, or mode, by which this dogma was revealed. In contrast to Florovsky‘s
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theology of revelation that begins with events, Lossky begins with the believer‘s
experience, which is the starting point for the believer‘s ascent toward the ―divine
darkness‖ of union with God.
I have showed that the historical character both Newman and Florovsky ascribe to
revelation follows from the central place of the Incarnation in their respective theologies.
It is therefore telling that Florovsky criticizes Lossky‘s Mystical Theology of the Eastern
Church for its lack of a Christological approach to theology. In his review of Lossky‘s
Mystical Theology, Florovsky praises it as an ―excellent‖ book that ―is an essay in what
can be described as a ‗neo-patristic synthesis.‘‖ However, he describes its most
―substantial weakness‖ as ―its basic structure,‖ which follows ―a rather ‗philosophical‘
order of thought: God, creation, Created Being, and Imago Dei, etc., so as to arrive at
Christology only in the middle of the road.‖ He furthermore writes that ―the
christological chapter of Lossky‘s book (chap. vii, ‗The Economy of the Son‘) is the most
controversial…‖347 Florovsky seems to implicitly apply to Lossky a criticism of
Soloviev he originally made to Bulgakov, namely, ―[T]he road to discovering [the main
thing] lies through Christology, not through Trinitology, since only with Jesus Christ did
the worship of the Trinity become reality.‖ 348
I have furthermore argued that a theology marked by a strongly incarnational and
historical focus is amenable to the idea of doctrinal development. It is thus noteworthy
that the lack of an incarnational and historical focus in Lossky‘s theology is accompanied
by a rejection of doctrinal development. Newman‘s and Florovsky‘s portrayal of
revelation as consisting of God‘s actions and events in history leads them to emphasize
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the active human reception of revelation in thought, which I have deemed the essence of
doctrinal development. Conversely, as I will show in Chapter Two, Lossky‘s lack of
emphasis upon revelation as event results in his lack of emphasis upon the active role
played by human thought in receiving revelation. Aidan Nichols has noted that Lossky‘s
focus on the mystical at the expense of the historical has had a negative impact upon
modern Orthodox theology: ―Lossky‘s dictum that all theology must be mystical
theology has given a certain anti-historical bent to contemporary Orthodox writing…‖ 349
One wonders if the Orthodox rejection of doctrinal development is a casualty of this
―anti-historical bent.‖
Newman‘s and Florovsky‘s respective answers to the question of when divine
revelation ended seemingly signal a divergence in the historical character of their
theologies of revelation. Newman appears to retreat to a more static understanding of
revelation by invoking the formula that revelation ended with the death of the last
Apostle. This formula was a fixture of the Roman Catholic theology of Newman‘s time,
and is today typically associated with theories that primarily regard revelation as the
communication of divine truths, rather than a series of divine acts. Florovsky appears
more faithful to an event-based understanding of revelation in claiming that Pentecost
represents the last revelatory event until Christ‘s Second Coming. However, a closer
examination reveals that Newman‘s invocation of this formula is entirely consistent with
an understanding of revelation as event.
Newman believed revelation ended with the death of the last Apostle not simply
out of deference to Roman Catholic school theology, but because it conformed to his
doctrine of inspiration. He understood the Apostles to be inspired in the sense that they
349
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had a special grace, a special presence of the Holy Spirit, by which they possessed ―the
fullness of revealed knowledge.‖350 In his sermon ―The Indwelling Spirit,‖ Newman
describes the interpretation of ―the birth, the life, the death and resurrection of Christ‖ as
a collaboration of divine and human activity whose actors are the Holy Spirit and the
Apostles. Then, in a remarkable phrase, he writes that the Holy Spirit ―has made history
to be doctrine‖ through inspiring the Apostles in their interpretive work.351 Newman here
maintains that the Apostles‘ interpretation of the divine actions in history is also part of
revelation, and thus implies that these acts of interpretation also constitute revelatory
events.
Unlike Newman, Florovsky has no extensive treatment of the doctrine of
inspiration, and mentions it only sparingly in his writings. He writes in ―Revelation and
Interpretation‖ that he considered it theologically appropriate to remain apophatic about
the nature of inspiration, since ―what is the inspiration can never be properly defined—
there is a mystery therein.‖ 352 It is therefore understandable that he would dismiss the
death of the last Apostle formula as an arbitrary construction. In addition, Florovsky
does not appear to believe that the Apostles possessed a special grace of interpretation,
though he regarded them as privileged witnesses of the Christian faith. He would
certainly not claim, as Newman does, that the Apostles were inspired in a way that the
Fathers were not.353 However, what Newman otherwise implicitly affirms in the
formula—that human actions and events are integral to divine revelation—absolutely
350
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conforms to the historical tenor of Florovsky‘s understanding of revelation. Indeed,
within the context of his mention of biblical inspiration in ―Revelation and Interpretation‖
Florovsky writes, ―God spoke to man indeed, but there was man to attend and to
perceive. ‗Anthropomorphism‘ is thus inherent in the very fact.‖ 354 Thus, both Newman
and Florovsky affirm that human actions are constitutive of divine revelation.

B. NEWMAN AND FLOROVSKY ON HUMAN PERSONS’ RECEIVING ACTIVITY
In both Newman‘s and Florovsky‘s understanding of revelation, the way in which
God reveals Himself to men and women serves as a model or pattern of the human
reception of revelation. They portray revelation as God‘s personal and free entrance into
history through actions and events in order to redeem men and women so that they may
participate in His divine life. Accordingly, men and women are called to receive God‘s
revelation through their own creative activity. Newman and Florovsky usually delineate
this active reception in categories such as thought, word, and deed, though really they
regard the entire Christian life as a reception of God‘s revelation.
Using the vocabularies particular to their backgrounds, both Newman and
Florovsky portray the human reception of revelation as active from the beginning.
Newman primarily uses the empiricist term ―impression‖ to describe the initial human
reception of revelation, while Florovsky primarily describes it as an ―experience.‖ These
different terms refer to what appears to be a similar reality in Newman‘s and Florovsky‘s
thought. Both Newman and Florovsky understand this ―impression‖ or ―experience‖ to
originate in a human person‘s contact with an external reality. In fact, Newman writes
that the impression of God through revelation is ―an experience of something in the
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concrete.‖355 Similarly, both Newman and Florovsky emphasize that the human person‘s
impression or experience of revelation derives from the concrete events, facts, and
actions of God in history, which are now communicated through the life of the Church.
In addition, both Newman and Florovsky affirm that the whole of revelation is
contained within the human person‘s impression or experience of it. ―[I]ts truths were
given once for all at the first,‖ writes Newman.356 Newman provides a metaphysical
basis for this wholeness, or unity, of the impression in writing that ―surely, if Almighty
God is ever one and the same, and is revealed to us as one and the same, the true inward
impression of Him, made on the recipient of the revelation, must be one and the same…‖
(see note 47). Florovsky, on the other hand, tended to characterize revelation as a
historical unity, rather than a metaphysical (or, ontological) unity. That is, Florovsky
regarded revelation as a unity primarily because all revelation concerns the divine
purpose—the deification of men and women—that began at creation and will be
consummated at the end of time. Thus, one could say that Florovsky regards revelation as
not only a historical, but an eschatological unity.
Interestingly, both Newman and Florovsky seemed reticent to identify revelation,
or its impression or experience dwelling within the human person, as God. According to
Paul Misner, such an identification would have provided Newman with a more
―adequate‖ and ―comprehensive present-day concept of revelation.‖ 357 Such an
identification on the part of Florovsky would also link him with many neo-Palamite
Orthodox theologians of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, who emphasized that
revelation was a form of God‘s energies, which are truly God. However, Newman‘s firm
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insistence on the principle of mediation led him to avoid identifying revelation and its
impression with God. Florovsky, on the other hand, opposed any interpretation of
revelation that smacked of pantheism or seemingly limited God‘s freedom. NeoPalamism and its excessive focus on the essence-energies distinction seems susceptible to
this charge of pantheism, as it sometimes fails to differentiate between God‘s actions and
His modes of presence in the world. 358 This susceptibility is ironic, to say the least, since
neo-Palamites perceive this distinction as necessary to avoiding such a lapse into
pantheism.
Both Newman and Florovsky recognize that, as God is inexhaustible, so also is
His revelation as known by the believer through his or her impression or experience.
Though it exists as a whole in the human person, it can never be wholly known by that
person. Newman holds that ―mystery is the necessary note of divine revelation,‖ and
describes the ―original impression‖ as existing within us in ―dimness and confusion.‖ 359
Florovsky describes how the experience of revelation ―is received in the silence of faith,
in silent vision—this is the first and apophatic step of the knowledge of God‖ (see note
258).
But neither Newman nor Florovsky holds that the apophatic character of the
impression or experience means that its communication to, or existence in, the human
person is non-cognitive. The impression or experience is received via historical actions
358
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and events that are cognitively processed by the human mind, ―spontaneously, or even
necessarily, becom[ing] the subject of reflection on the part of the mind itself.‖360 In
spite of his misreadings of Newman‘s religious epistemology, Owen Chadwick has
astutely observed that Newman believed ―the ‗sacred impression‘ which can be described
as prior to propositions is in part a proposition-bearing impression‖ (see note 164). The
same could be said of Florovsky, whose philosophical essays show that he understands
the believer‘s experience to be immediately regulated by numerous mental relations, and
is followed by further cognitive examinations that attempt to draw out the contents of the
experience. Newman and Florovsky thus both exhibit a religious epistemology nuanced
enough to know that because the impression or experience is beyond reason, it does not
mean it is non-rational.
Importantly, both Newman and Florovsky believe the impression or experience
that represents the whole of revelation must be expressed. This need for men and women
to give expression to the impression or experience constitutes the impetus and
justification of doctrinal development. For Newman and Florovsky, the active cognition
that marks the person‘s initial reception of revelation is a harbinger of the process that is
to mark his or her life in the Church. Writes Newman, ―[T]he increase and expansion of
the Christian Creed and Ritual… are the necessary attendants on any philosophy or polity
which takes possession of the intellect and heart…‖361 Florovsky regards the act of
giving expression to the experience of faith as the fulfillment of men‘s and women‘s
personhood and their vocation to askesis. ―But Truth must still be expressed and
pronounced,‖ he writes. ―Because man is called not only to receive Truth attentively, but
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also to witness of it. Silencium mysticum does not exhaust the complete calling of man.
He is called to creative activity…‖ 362
Newman and Florovsky both consider the active cognition of the impression or
experience as involving men‘s and women‘s rationality, or, their abstract thought. As
Florovsky puts it, the members of the Church are called to contribute to the growth of
―Christian philosophy.‖ However, Newman and Florovsky also claim that the impression
or experience is something that is lived, and that the individual Christian‘s entire life
contributes to his or her cognition. I have hinted at something in Chapter One that will
become clearer in Chapter Two, namely, the inadequacy of the distinction between life
and thought, or faith and reason, when characterizing the thought of Newman and
Florovsky. Assuredly, both of these authors employed these categories in their writings.
But at the same time, these categories also obscure the mutual coinherence between life
and thought affirmed by Newman and Florovsky. They both imply that rationality is an
integral part of one‘s life in Christ, and that one‘s life in Christ conditions one‘s
rationality.
Also pertinent to the subject of doctrinal development is Newman‘s and
Florovsky‘s claim that the impression or experience of faith is not only a reality at the
individual level, but at the level of the entire Church, as well. They both describe this
communally held knowledge of revelation as existing in the ―mind of the Church.‖ There
are a few issues in regard to Newman‘s and Florovsky‘s respective understandings of the
mind of the Church that pertain to doctrinal development. Both Newman and Florovsky
agree in affirming that the impression or experience of revelation is committed to the
―mind of the Church‖ in its fullness. The term ―deposit‖ is equivalent to this impression
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or experience in Newman‘s and Florovsky‘s writings. Significantly, neither Newman nor
Florovsky regard the deposit committed to the mind of the Church to be reducible to
propositions. It is, as Newman writes, ―a Divine philosophy… not a number of formulas
such as a modern pedantic theologian may make theology to consist in, but a system of
thought…‖363 Florovsky describes the deposit as ―an existential attitude, as a spiritual
orientation.‖364 According to both Newman and Florovsky, the task of the members of
the Church is to give expression to the deposit committed to it through ―word and deed.‖
In this sense, they regard the deposit as a living thing, or, according to the phrase of
Irenaeus that Florovsky frequently referenced, a depositum juvenescens.365 Newman and
Florovsky, as I will argue in Chapter Two, see the idea of doctrinal development as
testifying to the living character of the deposit as held within the mind of Church.
On first examination, it appears that Newman and Florovsky part ways on the
question of where the mind of the Church resides. Newman speaks of the members of
the Church having a common consciousness and phronema, but then declares that the
mind of the Church does not habitually reside in any of its members, and refers to the
mind of the Church as the ―mind of the Spirit.‖ Florovsky, on the other hand, insists that
the Church—the Body of Christ—is most fundamentally a ―symphony of personalities,‖
and would not countenance the idea that the Church‘s mind at any time exists outside of
its members. For him, that would be the equivalent of saying that the mind of the Church
existed outside of the Church.
However, further examination reveals that this seeming difference in Newman
and Florovsky is reconciled by the connection they both make between the mind of the
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Church and theosis. Above, I attempted to show that Newman‘s dual understanding of
the mind of the Church seems to imply that it involves a dialogue between the individual
members of the Church and the Spirit who dwells within the Church. Florovsky
emphasizes that the Church is a ―symphony of personalities,‖ but in no way would he
claim that the mind of the Church exists in these personalities irrespective of their union
with Christ. They participate in the mind of the Church inasmuch as they are ―in direct
and immediate union with Christ and His Father,‖ or, one might say, inasmuch as they
are in union with the mind of Christ.366 Furthermore, Newman and Florovsky converge
in holding that the activity of the Church‘s members contributes to the explication of the
deposit committed to the mind of the Church, but that this process of activity cannot be
separated from their union with Christ.
The real parting of ways between Newman and Florovsky comes on the issue of
who can legitimately speak from the fullness of the mind of the Church. According to
Newman, it is the pope when he pronounces either ex cathedra or in the context of a
council when he is surrounded by his bishops. At that time, Newman maintains, the mind
of the Church ―is capable of being presented to their mind with that fullness and
exactness, under the operation of supernatural grace… with which it habitually, not
occasionally, resided in the minds of the Apostles…‖367 Thus, Newman holds that the
fullness of the mind of the Church is a ―temporary illumination of Divine Grace‖ brought
out only at those times it is required. 368
Florovsky, on the other hand, portrays the mind of the Church as something that
can be achieved in its fullness only through askesis. Accordingly, those most qualified to
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speak from the mind of the Church in any given age are its saints, those who have
existentially appropriated the experience of faith. This is not to say that Florovsky
attributes no role to Church authority. Rather, his emphasis on the enacted character of
the mind of the Church leads him to claim that Church authorities are competent to speak
from this mind only insofar as they remain united with Christ. I will return to this issue
in Chapter Three when I deal with the relation between doctrinal development and
authority.
My goal in Chapter One has been to show that Newman and Florovsky believe
this active reception of revelation mirrors the active character of God‘s revelation to men
and women. In other words, I have attempted to establish that the concept of doctrinal
development follows from a particular concept of revelation that views revelation as
comprised of the personal, free, and historical actions of both God and men and women.
Such a concept of revelation is concomitant with a view of the history of the Church as
comprised of men‘s and women‘s free and active reception of this revelation in their life
and thought.
The character Newman and Florovsky ascribe to the active reception of the
impression or experience of faith will be the focus of the next chapter on Tradition.
There I clarify that ―doctrinal development‖ is nothing other than Newman‘s
nomenclature for this process of active reception, and that the idea of ―doctrinal
development‖ is therefore consonant with Florovsky‘s theology. To use Florovskian
language, doctrinal development is the process in which thought witnesses to the
experience of faith.
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CHAPTER TWO: NEWMAN AND FLOROVSKY ON
TRADITION AND DOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENT
In Chapter Two I will examine selected aspects of Newman‘s and Florovsky‘s
understandings of Tradition as they relate to the idea of doctrinal development. If
Chapter One on revelation was a more indirect, though highly pertinent, consideration of
doctrinal development, Chapter Two will involve a more direct consideration of it. The
concept of Tradition typically refers to the Church‘s preservation and handing on of
revelation through, among other things, its theology, which manifests itself in, among
other things, the definition of doctrines. The Church‘s Tradition thus constitutes the
special realm of doctrinal development, which is why many authors treat the latter as a
function of the former.369
The purpose of this chapter is not to provide a general overview of Newman‘s and
Florovsky‘s respective understandings of Tradition.370 Instead, I will focus on each
author‘s understanding of Tradition as it relates to doctrinal development. In particular, I
will concentrate my discussion on the following aspects: the place and role of Scripture
and dogma in Tradition, the nature of theology, and the fittingness of the organic
metaphor as a descriptor of the process of Tradition. I have also chosen to focus on these
aspects because, as will become apparent, most of the Orthodox objections to doctrinal
development touch on them in some way.
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Throughout the section summarizing his understanding of Tradition, one will note
the fact that Florovsky both affirms and rejects the idea of doctrinal development, the
rejections outweighing the affirmations. The rejections are located in essays from both
Florovsky‘s earlier and later career, while a clear, direct affirmation of doctrinal
development is contained in only one published work of Florovsky‘s, namely, Ways of
Russian Theology. I will seek to address this seeming contradiction in the dialogue
portion of this chapter. There I will contextualize Florovsky‘s rejections of doctrinal
development, showing that his objections to it do not conflict with the principles of
Newman‘s theory. More importantly, I will argue that Florovsky‘s theology of Tradition
is in agreement with these principles, so much so that his calls for a Neo-patristic
synthesis seemingly imply a call for authentic doctrinal development of the Orthodox
Tradition. A consequence of this agreement is that Florovsky‘s theology of Tradition
diverges in significant ways, both implicitly and explicitly, from those contemporary
Orthodox theologians who reject doctrinal development. At the same time, however, I
will point out the ways in which Florovsky‘s theology of Tradition offers important
correctives and supplements to Newman‘s theory of development, and thus, contributes
to the development of the theory itself.

2.1: NEWMAN ON TRADITION
A. THE PRINCIPLES OF NEWMAN’S UNDERSTANDING OF TRADITION
Newman described the development of an idea as the ―process… by which the
aspects of an idea are brought into consistency and form.‖371 This process requires time
and the idea‘s exposure to different contexts, which draw out its various aspects.
371
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Newman‘s concept of Tradition itself was an idea that underwent development. During
his Anglican years he uncovered various aspects of the idea of Tradition, and thus
deepened his understanding of it, with the aid of numerous influences and historical
circumstances. It is therefore fitting that I accompany a description of Newman‘s
doctrine of Tradition with an account of the persons and events that catalyzed its
development. This development resulted not only in his theory of doctrinal development,
but also in his conversion to the Roman Catholic Church.
In the Apologia, Newman attributes an 1818 sermon by Edward Hawkins as
among the earliest influences on his doctrine of Tradition. 372 In particular, Newman
recounts that he gleaned from Hawkins‘ sermon the principle ―that [Scripture] was never
intended to teach doctrine, but only to prove it, and that, if we would learn doctrine, we
must have recourse to the formularies of the Church; for instance, to the Catechism, and
to the Creeds.‖373 Hawkins‘ sermon thus cemented for Newman an understanding of
Tradition in opposition to the Protestant doctrine of sola Scriptura. Newman further
developed his opposition to sola Scriptura through his participation in the Oxford
Movement.
Aiding Newman in this development were the Church Fathers, whose
understanding of Tradition further convinced him in the ―safe truth‖ that ―the Christianity
of history is not Protestantism.‖ 374 In the second volume of his Treatises of St.
Athanasius, Newman describes Athanasius‘ view of Tradition as encompassing Scripture

372

Edward Hawkins (1789-1882) was a fellow of Oriel College at Oxford and vicar of the university
church of St. Mary‘s before Newman, who became vicar in 1828. The sermon in question was entitled A
Dissertation Upon the Use and Importance of Unauthoritative Tradition as an Introduction to the Christian
Doctrines (New York: E. and J.B. Young, 1889).
373
Apo., 29-30.
374
Dev., 7.

104

and having the authority to interpret it: ―The fundamental idea with which [Athanasius]
starts in the [Arian] controversy is a deep sense of the authority of Tradition, which he
considers to have a definitive jurisdiction even in the interpretation of Scripture.‖ 375
Indeed, Newman notes that Athanasius viewed the recourse to Scripture alone as a
characteristic of the Arians.
Newman also employed the patristic term regula fidei (―rule of faith‖) to describe
this interpretive function of Tradition. The Via Media (1837) represents Newman‘s
attempt to provide a positive elaboration of the teachings of the Anglican Church, which
necessarily included its teaching on Tradition. He defines the regula fidei as ―the Bible
and Catholic Tradition taken together. These two together make up a joint rule; Scripture
is interpreted by Tradition, Tradition is verified by Scripture; Tradition gives form to the
doctrine, Scripture gives life; Tradition teaches, Scripture proves.‖ 376 In this work of his
Anglican years, Newman then subdivides Tradition into two categories: Episcopal
Tradition and Prophetical Tradition. Benjamin King refers to this division as Newman‘s
―twofold system of doctrine.‖ For Newman, Episcopal Tradition corresponds to the
Creeds, which he describes as ―a collection of definite articles set apart from the first,
passing from hand to hand… forced upon the attention of each Christian, and thus
demanding and securing due explanation of its meaning.‖377 It includes those teachings
that conform to the criteria of the Vincentian Canon, and thus, have been held semper,
ubique, et ab omnibus (―always, everywhere, and by all‖) since the Church‘s inception. 378
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Newman regarded the dogmas of Episcopal Tradition as necessary to the individual
Christian‘s faith.
Prophetical Tradition includes those other teachings that are part of the Church‘s
patrimony, but not strictly necessary for belief. Newman describes the contents of
Prophetical Tradition as ―partly written, partly unwritten, partly the interpretation, partly
the supplement of Scripture, partly preserved in intellectual expressions, partly latent in
the spirit and temper of Christians; poured to and fro in closets and upon the housetops,
in liturgies, in controversial works, in obscure fragments, in sermons, in popular
prejudices, in local customs.‖ 379 Prophetical Tradition is for Newman the equivalent of
theology. It represents all those elements that are the product of the Church‘s reflection
on revelation such as defined, non-creedal doctrines, theological and devotional works,
liturgy, art, and various other practices.
Newman‘s description of Prophetical Tradition in the Via Media contains the
seeds of his later and fuller understanding of Tradition. Though Newman principally
describes Tradition as content, he also describes it as a lens through which the Church
views revelation, as ―consisting of a certain body of Truth, pervading the Church like an
atmosphere.‖380 He writes that this Tradition ―exist[s] primarily in the bosom of the
Church itself‖381—a passage that illustrates his view of Tradition as an ecclesial reality.
What is more, he quotes Irenaeus in support of this view of Tradition. Irenaeus had
spoken of the ―barbarous nations‖ who were able to believe in Christ without having the
privilege of written Scriptures, instead ―having salvation impressed through the Spirit on
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their hearts.‖382 Newman here claims that Christians have the power to discern the truth
through the indwelling of the Holy Spirit. This power is the basis for the position
Newman later enunciates as a Catholic in his Rambler article ―On Consulting the Faithful
in Matters of Doctrine,‖ namely, that the faithful act as a witness of Tradition. 383
The further development of Newman‘s understanding of Tradition resulted in the
collapse of his twofold system of doctrine. To repeat, Newman held that the teachings
comprising Episcopal Tradition—those considered necessary to the individual believer‘s
faith—were all traceable to Apostolic times. However, through his continued reading of
the Fathers, Newman came to recognize that some of these teachings could not claim
even a minimal consensus in the early Church, and thus, could not claim to pass the test
of the Vincentian Canon. 384 Such, for instance, was the case with the dogma of the
Trinity, which one cannot locate in the pre-Nicene Church without a creative
interpretation of history.
Newman did not consider the falling back upon the Disciplina Arcani (―discipline
of the secret‖) as a solution to this problem, either. The Disciplina Arcani refers to the
early Church‘s occasional practice of keeping certain Church teachings secret from
pagans lest the latter profane them, and has been used by some to explain the paucity of
textual evidence for certain dogmas. 385 Newman therefore postulated the theory of the

382

Irenaeus of Lyons, Adversus Haereses, III, 4; quoted in V.M., 1: 244.
Newman, On Consulting the Faithful in Matters of Doctrine, ed. John Coulson (Kansas City, MO:
Sheed & Ward, 1961), 63. From hereon referred to as ―Cons.‖
384
Already in the Via Media, Newman acknowledged that the ―The Rule of Vincent is not of a
mathematical or demonstrative character, but moral, and requires practical judgment and good sense to
apply it‖ (V.M., 1: 55).
385
Against the idea that the existence of the Disciplina Arcani argues for a continuity between the earlier
and later churches, Newman points out that ―the variations continue beyond the time when it is conceivable
that the discipline was in force,‖ and also, because the teachings appear gradually, not suddenly, as one
would expect them to be if they were suddenly revealed (Dev., 29).
383

107

development of doctrine, which was ―an hypothesis to account for a difficulty.‖ 386
According to this hypothesis, even some of the fundamental dogmas of the Church were
the result of human thought reflecting on God‘s revelation and unfolding its contents over
time. The distinction between what Newman had termed ―Episcopal Tradition‖ and
―Prophetical Tradition‖ having become blurred, the idea of doctrinal development took
on a normative role in his understanding of Tradition.

B. TRADITION AS THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE IDEA OF CHRISTIANITY
Newman‘s broadening of the notion of Tradition with the concept of the
development of doctrine resulted in his use of a broader vocabulary for Tradition. In his
fifteenth Oxford University Sermon (1843) Newman began referring to the ―idea‖ of
Christianity. He continued to use this terminology throughout his Catholic years. I
previously outlined in Chapter One the empiricist schema of revelation operative in
Newman‘s writings, namely, object-impression-idea. I have already expounded upon the
first two portions of this schema, which, briefly, refer to God as the object of revelation,
and the impression as both God‘s activity of revealing Himself and the initial, active
human reception of this revelation. Here I turn to the meaning of ―idea‖ in the schema.
The difficulties of determining what exactly Newman meant by referring to
Christianity as an ―idea‖ are the same as those previously encountered when treating
Newman‘s use of the term ―impression.‖ Newman did not write theology in a systematic
fashion, and thus, he did not always use the term in a consistent manner. 387 At times,
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Newman described revelation itself as the ―initial and essential idea of Christianity.‖ 388
Nicholas Lash thus interprets Newman‘s ―idea‖ as ―God‘s saving revelation, His selfdisclosure in history, which is the ‗vital principle‘ of that Church which is its visible
expression.‖389
Upon examination of Newman‘s entire corpus, however, one cannot so simply
identify the ―idea‖ of Christianity with revelation. By applying the term ―idea‖ to
Christianity, Newman conveys the essential unity of revelation, a unity derivative of the
oneness of God and the oneness of the impression He makes on those who receive His
revelation. Thus, according to Newman, the idea of Christianity, like other ideas, ―is
commensurate with the sum total of [the object‘s] possible aspects, however they may
vary in the separate consciousness of individuals.‖ 390
Perhaps because of the link between the oneness of the ―idea‖ of Christianity and
the oneness of God and His revelation, it is tempting to identify this idea with Christ
himself, who is the fullness of revelation. Lash sees this implication in Newman whom,
he writes, has a tendency ―to express the transcendence of the ‗idea‘ by hypostasizing, or
personalizing it.‖391 Merrigan does not directly challenge Lash‘s position, though what it
implies is not that different from Paul Misner‘s desire that Newman would have treated
God‘s revelation as communicating ―His very Self.‖392 What both Lash and Misner fail
to acknowledge is that Newman did not consider the ―idea‖ to be revelation itself, but
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revelation-as-received. As Merrigan writes, ―The idea is not, properly speaking the
object of faith. It is however, by means of it that the object of faith is apprehended.‖ 393
To repeat the quotation in the paragraph above, Newman held that the ―idea‖ of
Christianity is ―commensurate‖ with God‘s revelation. But the qualification
―commensurate‖ implies that it is not God Himself. Nor is it God‘s revelation itself,
which refers to the divine communicating activity. The idea of Christianity is the human
reflection upon God, upon revelation, as present within the impression made by God‘s
revealing activity—an impression that ―spontaneously, or even necessarily, becomes the
subject of reflection on the part of the mind itself.‖ 394 Newman furthermore held that the
individual Christian gains access to the idea through the existence of the Church, which
possesses the idea in its ―mind.‖ It is ―preserved, by the operation of the Holy Spirit, in
the living tradition of the Church.‖ 395 Given, then, that Newman most consistently
characterizes the idea not as revelation itself, but as revelation possessed and preserved
by the Church, it seems more accurate to identify it with what Roman Catholic theology
classifies as ―Tradition.‖ Tradition, thus understood, is not revelation per se, but
revelation as received by the Church.
According to Newman, the Church‘s reception of revelation consists of not only
reflection and preservation, but also development. Indeed, Newman uses the term ―idea‖
to describe Christian Tradition precisely because it allows him to posit the theory of
doctrinal development. In chapter one of the Essay on Development, Newman sets up an
analogy between the Christian ―idea‖ and other human ideas by describing the latter‘s
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process of formation. Over the course of time, an idea that takes hold of the minds and
hearts of men and women is variously contemplated, interpreted, and applied. The ideas
Newman has in mind are complex, such as ―the doctrine of the divine right of kings, or of
the rights of man, or of the anti-social bearings of a priesthood, or utilitarianism, or free
trade…‖396 At first, holds Newman, the idea will be understood only vaguely. However,
with the passage of time, the reflection of numerous minds, and the manifestation of the
idea in various forms, the complexity and richness of the idea will take greater shape.
―This process,‖ writes Newman, ―whether it be longer or shorter in point of time, by
which the aspects of an idea are brought into consistency and form, I call its
development, being the germination and maturation of some truth or apparent truth on a
large mental field.‖397
Newman considers Christianity to have undergone such a process. He writes, ―If
Christianity is a fact, and impresses an idea of itself on our minds and is a subject-matter
of exercises of the reason, that idea will in course of time expand into a multitude of
ideas, and aspects of ideas, connected and harmonious with one another, and in
themselves determinate and immutable, as is the objective fact itself which is thus
represented.‖398 Such has been the history of Christianity. It began as an impression
upon the Apostles and those in the milieu in which Jesus‘ ministry took place. There was
from the beginning much question about the identity of Jesus and the nature of his
mission. Gradually, over the course of Jesus‘ ministry, people began to ascribe various
titles to him, and the nature of the kingdom that Jesus preached became more fully
revealed. In the years following the Christ-event this reflection on the person of Jesus
396
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and his mission continued, and resulted in the clarification of certain aspects of what
came to be known as Christianity, but also the raising of further questions to which men
and women sought answers. This process was aided by the presence of the Holy Spirit in
the Church and its members.
The Christian idea also came to manifest itself in Scriptures, liturgy, devotional
practices, art, and an ethical system. The aspects associated with Christianity were also
applied to other ideas: particular philosophies, governments, moralities. This
engagement, or application, resulted in the further plumbing of the aspects of the
Christian idea. This process I have described is essentially what Newman understands to
be the development of the Christian idea, i.e., the development of Christian doctrine. It is
a process that continues to occur, and will occur until the eschaton. In the section that
follows, I will consider what Newman regards as the two principal manifestations of the
Christian idea: Scripture and Dogma.
C. MANIFESTATIONS OF THE CHRISTIAN IDEA
I. SCRIPTURE
Scripture represents one of the manifestations of the Christian idea. Because it is
inspired, Newman regards it as the privileged manifestation of the Christian idea. Above,
I explained that Newman interprets the history of the Christian idea as one of doctrinal
development. But, in his Essay on Development, Newman not only wishes to argue that
Christianity has experienced doctrinal development, but also that there is a need for
doctrinal development. In particular, and against the Protestant doctrine of sola
scriptura, he argues that the need for doctrinal development follows from the nature of
Scripture.
112

More specifically, Newman sees the need for doctrinal development following
from the character of Scripture as mystery. According to Newman, as I previously
quoted in Chapter One, ―mystery is the necessary note of divine revelation, that is,
mystery subjectively to the human mind.‖ 399 Newman predicates the term ―mystery‖ of
divine revelation in order to recognize that it is comprehensible, but not fully so; that it is
conveyed in ways that have meaning to men and women, but that it has meanings that
will never be uncovered due to its infinite nature. Inasmuch as it is comprehensible,
Scripture represents a portion of the divine economy; inasmuch as it remains
incomprehensible, Scripture represents a mystery. In a famous passage Newman writes
of Scripture that ―it cannot, as it were, be mapped, or its contents catalogued; but after all
our diligence, to the end of our lives and to the end of the Church, it must be an
unexplored and unsubdued land, with heights and valleys, forests and streams, on the
right and left of our path and close about us, full of concealed wonders and choice
treasures.‖400 The exploration of Scripture is left to the work of doctrinal development,
where men and women seek to grow in their understanding of the mystery while at the
same time acknowledging that they can never fully grasp the mystery.
Secondly, Newman believes Scripture entails the need for doctrinal development
because it does not exhibit self-sufficiency. Scripture does not provide direct answers to
questions that are crucial to the identity, explanation, and living out of the Christian faith:
―great questions exist in the subject-matter of which Scripture treats, which Scripture
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does not solve.‖401 Among such questions Newman includes the question of the Canon
of Scripture, of the nature of its inspiration, whether or not infant baptism is permissible,
and purgatory. Moreover, there are a number of other issues of great pertinence to the
faith that arise with the passage of time, the change of context, and the complexity of
human life. These issues require answers that Scripture does not immediately provide.
Newman also points out that Scripture is not self-interpretive, which further
demonstrates its lack of self-sufficiency. He uses as an example Jn 1:14: ―The Word
became flesh.‖ Newman poses three questions that inevitably arise if someone tries to
discern the meaning of this passage: ―What is meant by ‗the Word,‘ what by ‗flesh,‘ what
by ‗became.‘‖ While the answers to these questions require engagement with the biblical
text itself, one also must have recourse to concepts and uses of these terms that have been
learned elsewhere. For instance, in order to answer the first question (―What is meant by
‗the Word‘‖), one might look to Prov 8:22-31, which describes the ―first-born‖ of the
Lord who was with Him at creation. But such a connection is not immediately justified,
and even if it was, a fuller understanding of the term ―Word‖ (Logos) would require a
study of its origins in Greek philosophy. As Newman rightly concludes, ―The answers to
these involve a process of investigation, and are developments.‖ 402
Newman considers development a principle intrinsic to the biblical narrative.
―The whole Bible,‖ he writes, ―not its prophetical portions only, is written on the
principle of development.‖403 Newman holds that prophecy in the Old Testament
wonderfully illustrates development, since what is initially a mysterious, obscure text, has
light progressively shone on it with the passage of time, even after its historical
401
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fulfillment. Such is most famously the case with the messianic prophecies. But Newman
sees this development in numerous other instances in Scripture. Thus, he regards the
entire history of Israel as ―the growth of an idea‖ in which God gradually revealed
Himself to the chosen people, continually perfecting their understanding of Him that they
were to exhibit in their words and deeds. 404 In the New Testament, too, Newman points
out that the sayings of Christ are ―characterized by mingled simplicity and mystery,‖ and
thus, seemingly require development in order that their meaning be understood and
thereby lived. 405

II. DOCTRINE
Newman held that doctrinal definitions constitute another manifestation of the
Christian idea. He primarily attributed the development of these definitions to the work
of theology. 406 Therefore, it is unsurprising that Newman describes theology and
doctrinal development in a similar fashion. In the Idea of a University Newman defines
theology as ―one idea unfolded in its just proportions… the evolution, not of half-a-dozen
ideas, but of one.‖ 407 It is also significant that Newman identifies theology with the
prophetical office of the Church, as opposed to its priestly and kingly offices. 408 As
shown above, Newman regarded the gradual realization of prophecies as one of the
clearest examples of doctrinal development. The example of the prophet, according to
Newman, best embodies the vocation of the theologian, for ―Apostles rules and preach,
404
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Prophets expound. Prophets… are the interpreters of the revelation; they unfold and
define its mysteries, they illuminate its documents, they harmonize its contents, they
apply its promises.‖409 Finally, Newman refers to theology and its developments as
―commensurate with Revelation,‖ 410 and thus, as authentic manifestations of the Christian
idea, i.e., Tradition.
Newman understood theology in the traditional Catholic sense as the application
of human reason to revelation. It seeks to know the contents of revelation through
abstractions, generalizations, and categorizations. It therefore belongs to the realm of
notional apprehension and knowledge. Faith, on the other hand, belongs to the realm of
real apprehension and knowledge, as it involves giving assent to God—a concrete,
particular person who contains all the aspects sought by notional knowledge. 411
Newman unabashedly affirms the important role played in religion by the notional
work of theology. One could argue that much of his life‘s work was devoted to giving an
apologia pro theologia. Since the Reformation many have presupposed (or constructed)
a dichotomy between the real and the notional, faith and reason, spirituality and theology.
This dichotomy has been particularly unfavorable to theology, which is often
characterized as cold, sterile, and peripheral to one‘s growth in faith. But, as Newman
explains, theology is necessary to the flourishing of faith for a number of reasons. For
one, the notional is the means by which men and women grow in the knowledge of their
faith: ―To apprehend notionally is to have breadth of mind, but to be shallow; to
apprehend really is to be deep, but to be narrow-minded. The latter is the conservative

409

V.M., 1: 250. See also Ari., 58: ―No prophet ends his subject: his brethren after him renew, enlarge,
transfigure or reconstruct it.‖
410
V.M., 1: xlvii.
411
V.M., 1: xli; G.A., 108.

116

principle of knowledge, and the former the principle of its advancement.‖ 412 This
quotation contains a crucial insight. As ―the principle of [knowledge‘s] advancement,‖
the notional realm of knowledge is the realm of doctrinal development. Put another way,
Newman regards the development of doctrine as a development of the Church‘s notional
understanding of revelation. This growth in the Church‘s understanding of the Christian
idea is brought about through the activity of human reason.413
What is more, Newman held that this notional development in the knowledge of
revelation is the rule not only for the Church as a whole, but for each individual
Christian. ―Every religious man is to a certain extent a theologian,‖414 writes Newman,
because all possess a reasoning intellect, and thus, come to understand revelation through
abstractions. According to Newman, it is the duty of all Christians to ponder on the
mysteries of faith, and to grow in their understanding of them. He sees Mary as the
preeminent witness to this duty, for she ―kept all these things, reflecting on them in her
heart‖ (Lk 2:19), thus demonstrating that ―she does not think it enough to accept [Divine
Truth], she dwells upon it; not enough to possess, she uses it; not enough to assent, she
developes [sic] it; not enough to submit the Reason, she reasons upon it.‖415
The above quotation also shows that Newman viewed the real and the notional,
faith and theology, as intimately connected with one another. Indeed, Newman viewed
faith as an act of reason, and reason as needing to make faith-like ventures and
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assumptions in its pursuit of knowledge. 416 Beyond their intermingled nature, faith and
theology perform important functions for each other. ―Reason (or theology),‖ writes
Newman, ―has not only submitted, it has ministered to Faith; it has illustrated its
documents; it has raised illiterate peasants into philosophers and divines; it has elicited a
meaning from their words which their immediate hearers little suspected.‖417
Theology‘s ministry to faith thus primarily consists in helping the Church to grow
in its knowledge of God. As Newman points out, such knowledge is inseparable from the
love of God: ―We love our parents, as our parents, when we know them to be our parents;
we must know concerning God, before we can feel love, fear, hope, or trust towards
Him.‖418 Theology also ministers to faith by serving as ―the fundamental and regulating
principle of the whole Church system.‖ 419 Theology ―regulat[es]… the whole Church
system‖ by not only ordering and developing the truths of revelation, but also by
providing a check on both the excesses of the intellect that manifest themselves in heresy,
and the excesses of devotion that manifest themselves in superstition and sentimentality.
Newman thus implies that a religion that does not notionally develop jeopardizes its
grasp upon the real.
In their mutually interpenetrative relationship, the real also ministers to the
notional: faith minsters to theology. Admittedly, Newman did not see an exact parity
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between the real and the notional. He held that ―Theology may stand as a substantive
science, though it be without the life of religion; but religion cannot maintain its ground
at all without theology.‖ 420 Nevertheless, a notional knowledge that does not remain
rooted in the real is also subject to its own errors. For example, a business professor who
has a solely notional knowledge might be able to discourse about the principles of his or
her discipline as contained in a textbook. However, he or she cannot apply these
principles to particular examples of success and failure in contemporary business models.
The principles will survive, but their existence will be shadowy, losing their force and
vigor as a result of their failure to be enacted. In theology, one sees this phenomenon
occur with the professor who teaches the truths of the faith, but has lost his or her faith.
When theology becomes increasingly disconnected from the realities that are the basis of
its notions, its abstractions become less relevant to the concerns of the Church and its
faithful, and it devolves into a science pursued for its own end. What is more, it ceases to
be a living theology, since the real, for Newman, is the principle of action. 421
The notional work of theology manifests itself, among other things, in the
formulation of dogmas. Newman defines a dogma as ―a proposition [that] stands for a
notion or for a thing; and to believe it is to give the assent of the mind to it, as it stands
for the one or for the other.‖422 Since the time of the Reformation, the expression of
revelation in propositional form has come to be associated with a static understanding of
religion. Newman was aware of this association, referring to the existence of ―people…
[who] object that such propositions are but a formal and human medium destroying all
true reception of the Gospel, and making religion a matter of words or of logic, instead of
420
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having its seat in the heart.‖423 But to Newman, doctrinal propositions were simply
necessary to the continuance and growth of a human religion: ―If there is a Revelation,
there must be a doctrine; both our reason and our hearts tell us so.‖424 Men and women,
due to their own finitude, cannot reflect upon the whole of a reality such as the Christian
idea without breaking it into its separate aspects or notions. 425 Dogmas, in spite of the
new wording they may sometimes utilize, are not new revelations, but are aspects or
notions of the original idea of Christianity. They are those aspects that the Church has
previously held implicitly within its ―mind,‖ but is now able to hold explicitly through
their having been clothed with human expression. Dogmas are none other than
incarnations of the Christian idea.
Newman held that defined dogmas help the Church better communicate the
Christian idea to the faithful. Writes Newman, ―…they are necessary to the mind in the
same way that language is ever necessary for denoting facts, both for ourselves as
individuals, and for our intercourse with others. Again, they are useful in their dogmatic
aspect as ascertaining and making clear for us the truths on which the religious
imagination has to rest.‖426 As Walgrave points out, it is only the realm of the notional
that is communicable. The real is the level of the personal, based in one‘s individual
experience, and therefore cannot be imparted to another. Walgrave‘s contrast between
the real and the notional is perhaps too stark, as the Holy Spirit, who dwells within each
member of the Church, is perhaps able to effect a shared experience among them.
However, he is right in maintaining that dogmas specially function to give expression to
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this experience, and enable the Church to both preserve and transmit this experience to
others.427
Newman‘s position that dogmatic definitions concretize aspects of Christian
revelation is balanced by an apophatic attitude toward them. In Western expressions of
Christianity, the term ―apophaticism‖ is usually synonymous with what is known as
―negative theology.‖ Negative theology holds that finite, human statements can never
quite adequately express truths about the infinite God, and indeed, are more unlike than
like Him. Modern Orthodox authors, however, have contended that the Eastern tradition
of Christianity has a fuller and richer understanding of apophaticism that goes beyond
mere negative theology. Vladimir Lossky sums up the Orthodox position well when he
writes that apophaticism ―is not simply a question of a process of dialectic but of
something else: a purification, a κάθαρσις... It is an existential attitude which involves the
whole man.‖428
It is therefore significant that C. Stephen Dessain holds that Newman‘s writings
illustrate an apophaticism characteristic of the Eastern Tradition. Dessain writes that the
―sense of reverence, of God‘s transcendence and of the mystery in Christianity is
characteristic of all Newman‘s religious writings.‖ 429 The mystery that Newman
predicated of Scripture he also predicated of dogma, inasmuch as the latter is also
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commensurate with revelation. 430 Dogmatic propositions seek to approach a truth of
divine revelation, but they never quite encompass that truth. Once they are formulated,
there is a feeling that they correspond to the intended truth in some way, but there is
coterminously a ―difficulty of recognizing them… as the true representation of our
meaning.‖431 They are, writes Newman, ―approximation[s] to the truth,…
expedient[s],… the truth as far as they go.‖432 Newman elsewhere terms them ―symbols
of a Divine fact which cannot be compassed by them,‖ and which serve to represent our
assent to the reality behind them. 433
Yet, for all his emphasis on mystery, Newman was sanguine about how much
recourse theology should have to the idea of it. To repeat, Newman held that the task of
theology is to abstract from the concrete realities of revelation, breaking them into
separate notions so that we may grow in our understanding of these realities. He
maintained that the term ―mystery‖ is also a notion, as it is ―not part of the Divine
Verity… but in relation to creatures and to the human intellect.‖434 In this passage from
the Grammar, Newman is responding to those who have disdain for the endless number
of propositions that human beings attach to God; in other words, to those who have
disdain for theology. The error Newman perceives in those who frequently invoke the
term ―mystery‖ for God is that they believe it somehow enables them to behold God as a
whole, per modum unius. Newman believes we can experience God as one through our
430
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personal relationship with Him; in other words, through real knowledge. He also
believes that the faculty of the imagination enables the intellect to associate a number of
separate propositions with a single object, such as God.435 But he does not believe we
can understand God as one through the invocation of the term ―mystery,‖ which he
simply considers to be a substitution of one notion at the expense of innumerable
others.436
Rather than being a theological safeguard of the ineffability of the one God,
Newman sees mystery more as an existential attitude: an experience of the infinite God
who remains far beyond the grasp of any human words and concepts. 437 In this way
Newman exhibits that deeper understanding of apophaticism that lies beyond mere
negative theology, and regards such an apophatic attitude as crucial to faith. However, it
is important to note that Newman did not think this attitude a substitute for theology, nor
did he think it identifiable with theology. As I will discuss in the Dialogue section of this
chapter, this substitution or identification of apophaticism and theology factors into some
Orthodox authors‘ rejection of doctrinal development.
Newman recognized that human words will always fall short of the divine reality,
but he at the same time recognized that we must nevertheless use these words: ―We are
aware, while we do so, that they are inadequate, but we have the alternative of doing so,
or doing nothing at all.‖438 The idea of economy is a two-sided coin: on one side, it
deems human formulations of divine truth as inadequate, and God‘s deigning to be
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expressed by the human as a form of kenosis. But on the other side it affirms that these
formulations do indeed convey divine truth. Therefore, concludes Newman, theology
proceeds ―by saying and unsaying, to a positive result.‖439 In sum, we have here
Newman‘s acknowledgement of the need for both cataphatic and apophatic theology.
In his attitude toward doctrinal definition, Newman attempted to maintain a
tension between the cataphatic and apophatic throughout his life. Perhaps his attempt is
consistent with the tension inherent in the categories themselves. While Newman was an
Anglican, Rowan Williams argues, he predominantly viewed definitions in a negative
light. Williams interprets Newman as implying in Arians that it would be preferable for
the Church to not have recourse to the technical language of definition, instead being able
to behold God using the simple words and images of revelation in its infancy. However,
heresies forced the Church‘s hand, compelling it to define doctrines when it would have
rather remained reticent. Williams characterizes Newman as regarding these definitions
as ―necessary evils,‖ and writes, ―Newman comes close to a Verfallstheorie of dogmatic
language, the notion of formulation itself being a kind of betrayal of some richer truth;
but it is a necessary fall, a felix culpa, given that the Church lives in a history of change,
contingency, and human sinfulness, and that the gospel must be preached in a variety of
contexts.‖440 Thus, from the ―necessary evil‖ of definition arise consequent goods.
Newman‘s seemingly negative view of definition is not, however, limited to
Arians. In the Essay on Development, Newman defends the lack of officially defined
teachings on the papacy in the early Church with the statement: ―No doctrine is defined
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till it is violated.‖441 Newman appears here to once again express the belief that doctrinal
definition only follows close upon the heels of heresy. He later expressed this same
sentiment as a Catholic when the First Vatican Council was threatening to define papal
infallibility as a dogma. Writing in confidentiality to Bishop Ullathorne, Newman asks,
―When has definition of doctrine de fide been a luxury of devotion, and not a stern
painful necessity?‖442
This negative view of doctrinal definition, however, appears inconsistent with
Newman‘s view that definition is a natural result of the application of human reason to
revelation. It also seems inconsistent with Newman‘s belief that definitions represented a
term in the process of development; in other words, that they are the fulfillment of
doctrinal development.443 One must also take into account Newman‘s consistently
positive attitude toward the dogmatic proclamation of the Immaculate Conception (1854),
which was not a response to a particular heresy. In 1849 he described Pius IX‘s
encyclical foreboding it as ―very joyful news‖ and ―a wonderful time,‖ 444 and his
subsequent writings testify that he did not waver in this initial sentiment throughout his
life. Newman also recognized that the definition on the Immaculate Conception would
potentially represent a confirmation of his theory of doctrinal development, and even
contrasted it with previous definitions that had arisen because of heresy:
The Bull Unigenitus has generally been appealed to on the question of the Pope‘s
Infallibility—but there what was doctrinal was indirect, viz. from the necessity
of putting down a heresy which had risen; but now the Pope comes forward
proprio motu, directly to decree a point of faith, which is demanded by the growth
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of opinion. Its bearing upon the doctrine of development is equally
striking…‖445
In this letter, Newman expresses the remarkability of a pope defining a dogma as a result
of devotion rather than heresy, but he does not express a theological objection to it.
A second look at those places where Newman appears to espouse a negative view
of doctrinal definition reveals the need for qualification. I grant Williams that the
Newman of Arians seems to have some nostalgia about the pre-Nicene Church, and
views heresy as the principal historical impetus for doctrinal definition. However,
Williams ignores Newman‘s more balanced attitude toward definition in this work.
Indeed, one finds this balance exhibited amidst those statements that Williams terms
Newman‘s near ―Verfallstheorie of dogmatic language.‖ Newman writes,
As the mind is cultivated and expanded, it cannot refrain from the attempt to
analyze the vision which influences the heart, and the Object in which that vision
centres; nor does it stop till it has, in some sort, succeeded in expressing in words,
what has all along been a principle both of its affections and of its obedience…
Much as we may wish it, we cannot restrain the rovings of the intellect, or silence
its clamorous demand for a formal statement concerning the Object of our
worship. If, for instance, Scripture bids us adore God, and adore His Son, our
reason at once asks, whether it does not follow that there are two Gods; and a
system of doctrine becomes unavoidable; being framed, let it be observed, not
with a view of explaining, but of arranging the inspired notices concerning the
Supreme Being, of providing, not a consistent, but a connected statement. There
the inquisitiveness of a pious mind rests, viz., when it has pursued the subject into
the mystery which is its limit. But this is not all. The intellectual expression of
theological truth not only excludes heresy, but directly assists the acts of religious
worship and obedience; fixing and stimulating the Christian spirit in the same way
as the knowledge of the One God relieves and illuminates the perplexed
conscience of the religious heathen.—And thus much on the importance of Creeds
to tranquilize the mind; the text of Scripture being addressed principally to the
affections, and of a religious, not a philosophical character.446
In this passage are the seeds of Newman‘s theory of doctrinal development. Though
definition most often comes about as a result of heresy, Newman also admits that it
445
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serves a demand of reason for ―formal statements,‖ and thus satisfies the constitution of
the human intellect. It is not the definition that is the felix culpa, but the heresy.
In addition, one must further contextualize Newman‘s statement about de fide
definitions being ―a stern painful necessity.‖ It is well documented that Newman was
concerned not about the orthodoxy of papal infallibility per se—whose impending
definition precipitated Newman‘s statement—but about the opportuneness of its
dogmatic definition.447 More specifically, he was concerned that the ultramontanes—
who seemingly desired that definitions become ―as plenty as blackberries‖448—were
pushing the definition through without due regard for a proper period of reception. He
contrasted the definition of papal infallibility with the definition of the Immaculate
Conception, which had been preceded by ―many steps… [and] many centuries… before
the dogma was ripe.‖449 He thought, in other words, that the coming-to-be of the
definition of the Immaculate Conception illustrated the process of doctrinal development,
whereas the definition of papal infallibility did not. If he had indeed thought that dogmas
could be legitimately proclaimed only as a result of heresy, his unabashed approval of the
proclamation of the Immaculate Conception would be unintelligible, since there was no
immediate heresy against which it was directed.
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Newman‘s concern that the definition of papal infallibility did not have a heretical
impetus also appears to be related to his understanding of the function of ecumenical
councils. In the same letter in which he claims that dogmas should only arise as a result
of ―a stern painful necessity,‖ he writes that ―a Council‘s proper office is, when some
great heresy or other evil impends, to inspire the faithful with hope and confidence.‖ 450
Two months earlier, in a letter to Mrs. William Froude, Newman had further elaborated
his position with historical examples: ―In the early times the Nicene Council gave rise to
dissensions and to confusions which lasted near a century. The Council of Ephesus
opened a question which it took three centuries to settle. Well, these Councils were
NECESSARY—they were called to resist and to defend opposition to our Lord‘s
divinity—heresies—They could not be helped.‖451 Thus, Newman regards an ecumenical
council as a moment of crisis, called to respond to teachings that pose an imminent threat
to the faith. This response occasionally comes in the form of dogmatic definitions. Such
definitions are somewhat lamentable not because they define what should remain
undefined, but because they define what has not necessarily undergone a due course of
development in the mind of the Church. They hastily require the assent of the faithful to
an aspect of the Christian idea that has not yet matured in their understanding.
Having established Newman‘s positive view of doctrine, and qualified his
reservations about it, I turn now to another aspect of Newman‘s understanding of
theology, namely, its systematic thrust. He regards theology as systematic by nature: ―the
Science of God, or the truths we know about God put into system.‖ 452 This systematic
character belongs to theology inasmuch as it is a science whose instrument is human
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reasoning, which seeks to order the various notions and aspects of ideas into a unity that
is an image of what it cannot comprehend as a whole. The goal of all sciences is to
―raise… a conceptual construct which is able to house the whole world of human
experience,‖ i.e., a system. 453 Theology is no different, for it is a conceptual, notional
construct of the Church‘s experience of revelation, ―and the notional is the general and
systematic.‖454
Newman viewed a theological system as a fruit of the development of doctrine.
His very summary of the idea of doctrinal development in the Essay on Development
serves as a summary of his understanding of a system: ―This process, whether it be longer
or shorter in point of time, by which the aspects of an idea are brought into consistency
and form, I call its development, being the germination and maturation of some truth or
apparent truth of a large mental field.‖ 455 Just as there is an inevitability to the
development of the Christian idea due to the nature of human reason, so there is an
inevitability that human reason will order this development into a system.
Benjamin King points out that Newman considered what he called the ―Catholic
system‖ to exist in the Apostles, and to have been transmitted to their disciples. While
granting the occasional nature of the Fathers‘ writings, Newman maintains, ―It is hardly
too much to say that almost the whole system of Catholic doctrine may be discovered, at
least in outline, not to say in parts filled up, in the course of [the Fathers].‖456 As an
Anglican, Newman considered the Roman Catholic Church to have a definite system,
though he rejected its identity with the system of the Fathers. He at the same time
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acknowledged that the Anglican Church was missing a positive system. Its identity, he
perceived, was principally constructed from the negative: anti-Protestantism and antiRomanism. He set out in the Via Media to construct a positive system to supply a need
for the lack of one in the Anglican Church. 457 Eventually, Newman came to see that the
Anglican system he had constructed (which, he admitted, existed only on paper) was in
fact not in conformity with the theological system present in the Fathers. 458 Instead, he
came to see the Roman Catholic Church as the nearest approximation to the Church of
the Fathers. Newman‘s conversion to Roman Catholicism thus consisted of an assent to
one theological system (the Roman) over another (the Anglican).
Lash describes a two-stage process to the process of the development of the
Christian idea: ―The first stage is the development from implicit awareness to explicit
articulation in a body of doctrine. The second stage is the further elaboration and
expansion of that body of doctrine.‖459 Dogmas are thus both the fruits and vehicles of
doctrinal development. However, Newman understood that the mode and manifestation
of development was not limited to dogmatic definitions. Lash puts it well when he
remarks, ―One of the more striking feature of the Essay, in contrast to most catholic
studies of doctrinal development, consists in the fact that the range of data to which, in
principle, Newman appeals, includes all aspects of the church‘s life, thought, structure
and experience.‖460 Of the aspects of the Church‘s life that play a role in the
development of doctrine, Newman accords a special place to worship. Thus, Newman
considers that the dogmatic statements on the Trinity developed in large part due to the
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worship the early Church directed toward the Son and the Spirit. This development,
writes Newman, ―fulfill[ed] the maxim, ‗Lex orandi, lex credendi.‘‖461 Newman also
implied that developments of doctrine can result from praxis. Such is the case, for
instance, with the Church‘s allowance for infant baptism, which ―would be the practical
development of [a father‘s] faith in Christ and love for his offspring.‖ 462
To summarize, Newman holds that the notional is the principle of development,
and helps us to grow in our knowledge of what we know really through our experience.
The examples above, however, testify that Newman also believed that the real should be
a cause of notional development: that experience and concrete actions should lead men
and women to reflect more deeply on ideas. It remains to be seen whether or not
Newman believed that notional development can cause real development: whether the
development of doctrine results in the development of faith, or whether growth in
theological understanding can cause growth in holiness, both in the individual Christian
and the corporate Church. I will examine this question further in the next section.
D. DOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENT AND THE ORGANIC METAPHOR
One of the most consistently invoked reasons for rejecting Newman‘s
understanding of doctrinal development is its seeming dependence on the organic
metaphor. Newman claimed that the manner in which the Christian understanding of
revelation developed was analogous to the way in which biological phenomena
developed, beginning as a seed or embryo and progressively growing to full maturity.
The rejection of doctrinal development for its organic reading of Church history and
doctrine is a point of convergence between Orthodox and Protestants. The Orthodox
461
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theologian Andrew Louth rightfully acknowledges a place for organic metaphors applied
to ecclesiology, but balks at applying the metaphor to doctrinal history, and criticizes
Newman‘s theory for its parallels with Darwin‘s theory of evolution. 463 Lossky rejects an
organic conception of dogmatic history because he believes it would imply ―an inner
necessity, which would effect a progressive increase in the Church of the knowledge of
revealed Truth.‖464 George Lindbeck claims to represent the Protestant consensus when
he writes that ―organismic analogies [of Christian history] are sharply rejected.‖ 465 In the
Dialogue portion of this chapter, I will respond in greater detail to the principles
operative in these allergies to the organic metaphor. In this section, I will limit myself to
summarizing what Newman‘s use of the organic metaphor implies about his
understanding of doctrinal development.
Newman identifies the chief contemporary influence behind his application of the
organic metaphor to doctrinal development: Joseph Butler‘s Analogy. The hypothesis
operative in Butler‘s Analogy is that the Christian religion acts in a manner analogous to
―the whole natural world.‖ This world, according to Butler, is a ―progressive…system,‖
as exhibited by ―the change of seasons, the ripening of the fruits of the earth, the very
history of a flower...and…human life.‖ 466
While Newman was influenced by Butler‘s Analogy, there are some differences in
his application of the organic metaphor to his theory of doctrinal development. Owen
Chadwick has examined some of these differences. Among the differences Chadwick
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perceives is that Butler did not allow that the progress exhibited in nature could be used
as an a priori argument for a similar progress in our understanding of God‘s revelation,
whereas Newman did. 467 But Chadwick misrepresents Newman by exaggerating the
importance of a priori reasoning to his theory of doctrinal development. A posteriori
reasoning is much more crucial to Newman‘s theory: most of his Essay on Development
is devoted to arguing that the pattern of doctrine in the Christian Tradition has indeed
shown development much like the development we witness in the realm of nature.
Chadwick also ignores the Scriptural warrant for Newman‘s use of the organic metaphor,
a warrant that Newman himself refers to in the Essay on Development when he recalls the
parables of Jesus that anticipate the growth of the Kingdom of God. Newman sees the
development of doctrine as intrinsic to the growth of this Kingdom. 468
Chadwick ultimately rejects the supposition that there were other direct modern
influences behind Newman‘s use of the organic metaphor. It is perhaps tempting to
suppose a connection between Newman‘s theory of doctrinal development and Darwin‘s
theory of evolution, which both came out of nineteenth-century England. Or, if one were
to look for a more theological influence on Newman‘s theory, Möhler‘s Die Einheit in
Der Kirche (1825) would be the most likely candidate. Yet, though Newman knew of
Möhler, there is no evidence that he ever read him. Chadwick concludes that, though the
idea of development ―was in the atmosphere which surrounded Newman at Littlemore,‖
―the line of thought, the expression of ideas, the use of analogies, the form and argument
were Newman‘s, original to him, individual, stamped with the impress of that unusual
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cast of mind.‖469 But Henry Tristram overstates when he writes that ―We can affirm
without hesitation that Newman derived the idea of development from no other source
than his own mind.‖470 As Chadwick points out after an examination of the notebooks
and drafts Newman used to write the Essay on Development, ―There are his authorities
and the ideas which they suggested to him—and… they are patristic authorities. He was
not reading Möhler, nor Wiseman, nor Perrone, nor even Petau. He was reading Justin
Martyr, Athanasius, Tertullian, Ambrose, Lactantius, Cyril.‖ 471 Thus, Newman‘s use of
the organic metaphor was primarily theological, derived from Scripture and Tradition as
expressed in the works of the Fathers.
Before I describe Newman‘s use of the organic metaphor for the development of
doctrine, a clarification is necessary. Newman viewed the organic metaphor as just that:
a metaphor. Like all metaphors and analogies it is limited, and does not fully conform to
the reality to which it is applied. That said, one needs ask: in what manner did Newman
believe the idea of Christianity to be like an organism? For one, Newman describes an
idea as ―living.‖ Indeed, Newman claims in a letter of 1846 that he was ―the first writer
to make life the mark of a true church.‖ 472 In a passage that reinforces the metaphorical
character of his use of organic terminology, Newman explains what he means by a living
idea: ―When an idea, whether real or not, is of a nature to arrest and possess the mind, it
may be said to have life, that is, to live in the mind which is its recipient.‖473 The history
of the Christian idea—its beginnings in the time of Christ, its persistence through times
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of persecution and heresy, its triumphs in spite of tribulations, and its continuing ability
to dwell in the minds and hearts of men and women—bears witness to its living
character.
According to Newman, the Christian idea is also living precisely because it has
undergone change. In a famous statement that has more theology in it than most initially
suspect, Newman writes, ―In a higher world it is otherwise, but here below to live is to
change, and to be perfect is to have changed often.‖474 Behind this passage is one of the
fundamental principles of Alexandrian and Cappadocian patristic theology, namely, that
the mark of the uncreated is immutability, while the mark of the created (what Newman
means by ―living‖ in the context of this quote) is change. This distinction was one of the
hinges on which turned the Christological dogmas produced by the patristic age. The
change Newman predicates of the Christian idea once again illustrates the received nature
of revelation: its origin is in the unchanging God, but it is received by changing creatures,
and as such, its reception is subject to change.
Newman predicates not only life and change of organic realities, but progress and
development. He holds that the sign of a truly living reality is that it exhibits progress.
Thomas Scott‘s aphorism ―Growth the only evidence of life‖ acted as a first principle for
Newman. 475 This principle also serves to demonstrate the patristic character of
Newman‘s theology. Newman‘s identification of progress as a sign of life is consonant
with the ascetical character of patristic theology. The Church Fathers deemed persistence
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in a life of askesis to be the mark of a true Christian. Though most often associated with
acts of renunciation and self-discipline, the word askesis refers to any Christian practice
directed toward increasing one‘s participation in God.

Like the Church Fathers,

Newman also held that ―[man] is a being of progress with relation to his perfection and
characteristic good.‖476 His Parochial and Plain Sermons are perhaps the best
illustrations of the ascetical character of his theology. He claimed that he attempted in
these sermons to ―lead his hearers to the Patristic Church‖ 477 by encouraging the practices
of prayer, fasting, and watchfulness.
Likewise, Newman deems the Christian idea to be living (organic) precisely
because the Church has exhibited progress in its understanding of it. Once again, the
progress he predicates of the Church is a notional progress in its understanding of
revelation. He claims that such notional progress naturally occurs over time with any
idea that captures the attention of men and women. This process can be described as
organic inasmuch as it is a function of the nature of the human mind: ―the increase and
expansion of the Christian Creed and Ritual… are the necessary attendants of any
philosophy or polity which takes possession of the intellect and heart… that from the
nature of the human mind, time is necessary for the full comprehension and perfection of
great ideas…‖478 Because human beings are rational animals who require time in order
to understand, and because time has indeed passed since the Christian idea took hold of
the Church‘s mind, Newman holds that the progress of the Christian idea has necessarily
taken place in the Church.
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Interestingly, Newman does not ascribe the same necessity to notional progress on
the individual level as he does to notional progress on the collective level of the Church.
Of individual progress he writes, ―Nor is this progress mechanical, nor is it of necessity;
it is committed to the personal efforts of each individual of the species…‖ 479 Newman is
not referring here in the Grammar toward a more holistic form of progress of the
individual; he is indeed referring to the ―law of progress…carried out by means of the
acquisition of knowledge.‖ 480 Whereas he claims that the individual‘s progress in
knowledge is contingent on his actions, he claims that the Church‘s progress in the
understanding of the Christian idea, like other ideas, necessarily happens with time.
Newman here fails to simultaneously hold in tension the Church‘s unity and diversity:
that the Church is one, but that its oneness is comprised of a number of individuals.
Newman‘s doctrine of Providence is perhaps behind the necessity he predicates of
the Church‘s progress in its understanding of the Christian idea. As the title of
Merrigan‘s essay on this subject points out, Newman considered Providence to be that
―momentous doctrine or principle which enters into my own reasoning‖ that served a
―unitive function‖ in his theology.481 In the Essay on Development, Newman assigns a
special role to Providence in watching over and directing the development of doctrine.
He holds that God, in His providential design, has left ―gaps… in the structure of the
original creed of the Church‖ that He intended to be filled up through the application of
human reason. ―Thus,‖ writes Newman, ―developments of Christianity are proved to

479

G.A., 274.
G.A., 274.
481
G.A., 320-321; Merrigan, ―‗One Momentous Doctrine Which Enters Into My Reasoning‘: The Unitive
Function of Newman‘s Doctrine of Providence,‖ Downside Review 108 (1990): 254-281. Merrigan is here
admittedly dependent on his mentor, Walgrave, who regarded Divine Providence as ―the supreme principle
of Newman‘s thought‖ (Walgrave, Newman the Theologian, 90).
480

137

have been in the contemplation of its Divine Author.‖482 The providential guidance of
the development of doctrine is consonant with God‘s providential guidance as illustrated
in Scripture: He does not reveal Himself all at once, but ―works out gradually what He
has determined absolutely…‖483 As in the Bible, so in the Church: God leads human
beings step-by-step toward a fuller understanding of Him, allowing room for the
operation of their own free will and reason.
Newman‘s understanding of Providence, applied to doctrinal development, rightly
maintains a tension between necessity and freedom. God guides His Church toward a
fuller understanding of revelation, but incorporates the activity of human reason into His
guidance. Such a tension between necessity and freedom is arguably the litmus test for a
truly Christian use of organic metaphors. Unfortunately, Newman does not seem to
maintain this tension within human reason itself. His consistent tendency is to emphasize
that developments are the results of human nature, rather than human will.
Newman‘s position that the Church‘s progress in its understanding of revelation is
not altogether smooth does not necessarily mitigate this tendency. In the ―Letter to
Flanagan,‖ Newman describes the episodic character of doctrinal development in the
Church, which answers questions that arise ―intermittently, in times & seasons, often
delaying and postponing, according as she is guided by her Divine Instructor.‖484 Even
before he formally posited his theory of doctrinal development, he had come to
understand such development as occurring in ―fits and starts.‖485 Because doctrinal
482
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development happens intermittently, Newman holds that the most one can predict is that
it will occur, but not when or how it will occur: ―we will triumph in the leave given us to
go forward, ‗not knowing whither we go‘…‖486 At first glance, this position seems to
argue against a purely organic development that happens naturally and continuously: it
seems to accord a place for contingent, unpredictable, and free human actions. But
Newman is here only referring to the type of development that is catalyzed by historically
contingent heresies and results in doctrinal definitions. He is not referring to that more
general type of development of the Christian idea, that inevitable development for which
he does not adequately incorporate human freedom. Thus, positing an episodic character
to doctrinal development does not necessarily represent a qualification of the organic
metaphor.
The allowance for occasional regressions in the Church‘s understanding of
revelation would seemingly have more promise as a qualification of the organic
metaphor. In other words, one could hold that the Church has experienced not only
periods of doctrinal development, but also periods of doctrinal regression, when the
Christian idea grew dim in the minds of men and women. That there have been
occasional regressions seems justified by history. Lash echoes the thoughts of many
others when he asks, ―Is a ‗linear‘, ‗cumulative‘, ‗progressive‘ view of doctrinal history
demanded by the claims of christian belief, and justified by history?‖ 487 There is no way
to definitively determine which periods might constitute regressions in the Church‘s
understanding of revelation, though there seems to be a consensus of scorn for certain
periods. Just as it is popular to regard the patristic age as one noteworthy for its
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development of the Christian idea, so it is also popular today to regard the ages of late
scholasticism and manual theology for their desiccation of the Christian idea.
Newman, however, does not admit of such regressions in his theory of doctrinal
development. His immediate reason for not doing so is theological rather than biological:
it is rooted in the providential relationship between God and His people as revealed in
Scripture. According to Newman, the entire Bible illustrates the principle of
development, as God gradually leads His creatures to a fuller understanding of Him. In
this relationship, writes Newman, ―[God] does not reverse, but perfect, what has gone
before.‖488 Because of his doctrine of Providence, and his understanding of the limits of
historical retrospection, Newman would have been untroubled by the seeming difficulty
of affirming doctrinal progress throughout all eras of the Church‘s history. While
allowing for trials and tribulations in the Church‘s doctrinal history, Newman would still
claim that the overall movement of this history was one of progress. Indeed, as I have
shown, Newman believed these apparent regressions were but temporary, as they soon
themselves became the means for doctrinal progress.
Most importantly, though, the way in which Newman understands doctrinal
development means that he does not need to entertain the hypothesis of regressions. For
Newman, doctrinal development means notional development. It means the process of
men and women uncovering various aspects of the Christian idea. It occurs merely as a
result of mental engagement over the course of time and place. Given this understanding
of doctrinal development, a regression could in theory only occur with the complete and
utter abandonment of an idea, or the cessation of time.
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The notional character Newman attributes to doctrinal development also serves as
a response to those who claim that the theory implies the superiority of the present-day
Church to the Church of the past. Newman indeed affirms a superiority, but he clarifies
that it is a ―particular superiority,‖ 489 namely, a notional superiority. That is, the Church
of today is superior only inasmuch as it has the benefit of two-thousand years of
reflection on the Christian idea from which it may draw in trying to deepen its own
understanding of the idea. It is able to benefit from the questions, challenges, and
controversies to which the Church has responded with new terminology, new ideas, and
new comparisons, all of which have served to ―throw the [Christian] idea into fresh
forms‖ and thus reveal its previously undiscovered aspects.490 This ―particular
superiority‖ needs further qualification. It does not refer to the quality of mind or
understanding. Thus, it does not necessarily follow that there are members of the Church
today superior to Augustine or Aquinas in their comprehensive vision of revelation. 491
Nor does it follow that the Church today necessarily unites all of the uncovered aspects of
the Christian idea into a better synthesis than the Church of, say, the patristic age.
Nor does Newman intend to claim that doctrinal development means the Church
today is necessarily holier than the early Church. However, there is some question about
whether Newman‘s theory in principle implies that the Church‘s doctrinal development is
attended by a concomitant development in holiness. Previous Newman scholars have
discussed this implication only briefly, and often hesitatingly, lest they take a position
489
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that places them outside the bounds of Christian orthodoxy. Lash has seen this
implication in Newman, though he agrees that Newman himself did not countenance it.
Lash bases his position on the supposition that ―Throughout his life, Newman insisted
that growth in holiness is a necessary condition of growth in the knowledge of God.‖
Unfortunately, Lash does not support this supposition with examples from Newman‘s
works. Nevertheless, he goes on to write, ―In view of this, it would seem possible to
claim that the contemporary church had a deeper grasp of God‘s revelation than had the
primitive church only if, at the same time, it could be claimed that the church had grown
in holiness.‖492 Ian Ker opposes Lash‘s position in an essay entitled ―Newman‘s
theory—Development or continuing Revelation?‖ Ker, like Lash, points out that,
according to Newman, ―the development of ideas whether in the individual‘s intellect or
in the mind of the Church has no necessary connection with virtue or holiness.‖ 493
However, Ker fails to ask whether or not Newman‘s writings might themselves imply this
connection.
Like Lash and Ker, I also cannot find evidence that Newman explicitly
maintained that the development of doctrine corresponded to a development in holiness.
From his explicit statements, the most one can maintain is that he acknowledged the
mutual interpenetration of the real and the notional, of faith and theology. Though
Newman assigned a crucial place to theology in the practice of religion, his emphasis
remained on the negative function of theology as a protective against heresy and spiritual
excess. He did not draw out the implications of the positive role theology played in
religion, and the possibility of theology‘s intimate connection with the individual‘s, and
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the Church‘s, progress in holiness. Newman did not have his thought on development
catalyzed by this question, a question Newman thought was necessary to the drawing out
of the implications of an idea. In the Dialogue section of this chapter, I will examine
whether Newman‘s theology contains the principles that enable one to make the leap of
claiming a necessary connection between doctrinal development and development in
holiness. In other words, I will examine whether this aspect of Newman‘s theory of
doctrinal development is itself capable of development.
In this section, I have shown how Newman‘s theory of doctrinal development was
much more than ―an hypothesis to account for a difficulty‖ (namely, the difficulty of
defending the orthodoxy of doctrines not ostensibly taught in either Scripture or the early
Church).494 Rather, it was a description of the process by which the Church actively
receives the revelation God has impressed upon it. This process is otherwise known as
Tradition, and represents the reasoned reflection of the Church on the Christian ―idea,‖
informed by faith, and concretely incarnated in Scripture and Dogma. Newman
understands theology to be this dual work of reason and faith, notional and real
knowledge. It is the means by which the Church grows in its knowledge of God, and it is
how the Church manifests its living, organic identity as the Body of Christ. While
dogmatic definition undoubtedly performs both a preservative and a protective function,
it also serves to give concrete shape to the notional reflection of the Church, which is
ordered toward systematization. Definitions and systems represent the fruits of this
reflection, and thus, the fruits of doctrinal development.
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2.2: FLOROVSKY ON TRADITION
A. THE CONTOURS OF FLOROVSKY’S UNDERSTANDING OF TRADITION
The nineteenth and twentieth centuries witnessed an enrichment of the concept of
Tradition by both Roman Catholics and Eastern Orthodox. The Council of Trent (15451563) responded to the Protestant reliance on Scripture alone with a two-source theory of
revelation comprised of Scripture and Tradition. Tradition was understood to represent
those teachings Christ communicated to the Apostles that were not recorded in Scripture,
but were just as binding as Scripture on the Church.495 However, such an understanding
of Tradition, while useful as an initial rejoinder to sola scriptura, itself has limitations.
Without further supplementation, it seems to imply a solely propositional model of
revelation, and does not convey a fuller, theological understanding of the concept.
Florovsky was among the Orthodox theologians who contributed to a developed
understanding of the concept of Tradition, one that he considered more consonant with
the patristic ethos. Perhaps because of its supposed patristic character, many
contemporary Orthodox have received Florovsky‘s understanding of Tradition as
representative. 496
Part of the richness of Florovsky‘s understanding of Tradition derives from its
integration with other areas of theology. Aidan Nichols points out that Florovsky
considers Tradition to be a ―dimension of ecclesiology.‖ 497 In the first chapter, I
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elaborated on Florovsky‘s understanding of revelation as events that are appropriated by
human experience. Since Pentecost, this experience of God‘s revelation in all its fullness
now lives in the Church. Indeed, if one is to reduce Florovsky‘s understanding of
Tradition to one idea, it is that Tradition is fundamentally ―the life of the Church‖ 498—it
is revelation and the human response to revelation ―ever re-enacted‖ in the numerous
modes of the Church‘s existence. 499 Through membership in the Church, the Christian
has access to the experience of revelation in all its fullness: ―Revelation has been granted
to the Church not to individuals.‖500 It is primarily this experience—this faith—that is
tradunt, or ―handed on,‖ to subsequent generations in the Church.
According to Florovsky, Christians‘ ecclesial experience of revelation is the basis
of the regula fidei (―rule of faith‖) by which they judge the orthodoxy of interpretations
of revelation, or, ―the true meaning of Scripture.‖501 For him, the regula fidei is the
equivalent of the ―mind of the Church‖—the concept I elaborated on in Chapter One.
Drawing from numerous Fathers, Florovsky regards the patristic understanding of the
regula fidei as ―first of all, a hermeneutical principle and method,‖ by which Christians
interpret revelation according to the ―common mind of the Church,‖ or, the υρόνημα
ἐκκλησιαστικόν.502 They are ―initiated… by their baptismal profession‖ into the rule,
which consists of ―the witness and preaching of the Apostles, their κήρσγμα and
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praedicatio‖—in other words, the teaching of the Apostles based upon their experience
of revelation. 503 Florovsky even refers to ―faithfulness to Tradition‖ as ―a participation in
Pentecost,‖ and Tradition itself as ―a fulfillment of Pentecost.‖504 Through the regula
fidei, the members of the Church, guided by the Holy Spirit, preserve and transmit the
faith. Though all the members have a share in this process of the preservation and
transmission of the faith, it is especially entrusted to those who have been given the
authority to teach through their succession from the Apostles. 505
As an ecclesiological phenomenon, Tradition for Florovsky is also a
Christological phenomenon, for ―ecclesiology, in the Orthodox view is an integral part of
Christology.‖506 Florovsky believed that the ―Body of Christ‖ is the preeminent image
for the Church, but he effectively accounted for the Spirit‘s role in the Body in his
descriptions of Tradition. 507 Thus, he defines Tradition as ―the witness of the Spirit‖ and
―the constant abiding of the Spirit‖ who ―lives and abides ceaselessly in the Church.‖ 508
But in what he considered a faithful witness to the theology of the Fathers, and in
reaction to Joachimite tendencies manifest in an overemphasis on the pneumatological
character of the Church, Florovsky never separated the work of the Holy Spirit from that
of the Son; in other words, he never separated the Spirit from the Body. He affirmed that
the Church is where the Spirit dwells, but that one must always keep in mind that the
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dwelling place is the Body of Christ.509 Consequently, Florovsky maintains that the
Tradition of the Church is a pneumatological reality only inasmuch as it is a
Christological reality.
Finally, inasmuch as Florovsky‘s understanding of Tradition is ecclesiological
and Christological, it is also eschatological. ―Eschatology,‖ writes Florovsky, is not just
one particular section of the Christian theological system, but rather its basis and
foundation, its guiding and inspiring principle, or, as it were, the climate of the whole of
Christian thinking.‖510 Florovsky regarded the telos of the Church, the Body of Christ, as
its progressive deification, which will be completed at the end of time. In a statement
that perhaps best summarizes his theology of history Florovsky writes, ―History goes on
because the Body has not yet been completed.‖511 He also emphasized that the
deification of the Church is contingent upon the freely-willed response of men and
women. The Spirit‘s mission is to guide the Church toward its deification through His
presence in the Church, His constant revelation of Christ to men and women, and His
preservation of this revelation and the Church‘s access to the sanctified means by which
509
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men and women may participate in the divine life. Tradition is then both this guiding
action of the Spirit directed toward deification, in addition to the human response to
Christ‘s revealing and sanctifying acts. Tradition, for Florovsky, is thus a synergetic
reality. 512
If doctrinal development does indeed have a place in Florovsky‘s theology of
Tradition, it, too, must exhibit the characteristics described above. That is, it must be
ecclesiological, Christological, and eschatological. It must be intimately connected with
the life of the Church, it must have an incarnational character, and it must be directed
toward, and contribute to, the completion of the Body of Christ.
B. TRADITION AS THEOLOGY
That Florovsky‘s understanding of Tradition has been favorably received by other
contemporary Orthodox theologians is in part due to the quality of its exposition and its
consonance with the patristic mind. It is also perhaps due to its partial dependence on
Slavophilism—the Russian intellectual movement of the early nineteenth-century, led by
thinkers such as Alexei Khomiakov (1804-1860), Ivan Kireevsky (1806-1856), and Yuri
Samarin (1819-1876), which sought to combat Russia‘s imposed Westernization through
a return to its original national and ecclesiastical consciousness. Lewis Shaw has rightly
dubbed Slavophilism the ―common ancestor‖ of modern Russian ecclesiological
thought.513 As Rowan Williams notes, ―Florovsky, as much as Lossky, cannot but read
the Fathers through spectacles faintly tinged with Slavophil interests.‖ 514 The Slavophile
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doctrine most evident in Florovsky‘s understanding of Tradition is that of sobornost, a
Slavic term that Florovsky typically translates as ―catholicity.‖
As is frequently pointed out, the term sobornost does not have an English parallel
that can convey the richness of the Slavic term. For Florovsky, the term refers to the
fullness of the life of the Church: all that constitutes the unity and identity of the Church,
in all ages, and contributes toward the fulfillment of its mission. Florovsky basically
considers sobornost, then, as the equivalent of Tradition. Such an equivocation is evident
in the following definition of Tradition: ―It is the unity of the Holy Spirit, the communion
of the sacraments… [O]nly in the Church is authentic tradition possible. Only in the
Church does the Grace of the Holy Spirit pour forth revealed truth in an unbroken stream
and admonish with it.‖515
Yet, the Slavophile term sobornost is also the axis on which Florovsky‘s critique
of Slavophilism turns. As much as Florovsky was indebted to Slavophilism, the beau
idéal for his understanding of Tradition was Philaret (Drozdov), the Metropolitan of
Moscow (1782-1867) whom Shaw dubs Florovsky‘s ―nineteenth-century hero.‖516 ―With
Philaret,‖ Florovsky claims, ―begins the real liberation of Russian theology not only from
Western influences but from Westernization in general… by a creative return to Patristic
foundations and sources…‖517 Florovsky criticizes the Slavophile understanding of
Tradition for its primarily passive character—a criticism latent in his contention that
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―[Slavophilism‘s] entire pathos lies precisely in its escape or even retreat from
history.‖518 Khomiakov and others rightly described Tradition as a fullness and a unity
rooted in the presence of the Spirit in the Church. But at the same time they failed to
adequately describe the human role in Tradition, holding that it was ―generally not a
human, but a divine characteristic of the Church.‖ 519 One of the main tenets of
Florovsky‘s understanding of Tradition is that it is not only constitutive, but creative, as
well: ―Tradition is not only a protective, conservative principle; it is, primarily, the
principle of growth and regeneration.‖ 520 Florovsky considered Philaret as better
accounting for the active, creative role of men and women in Tradition, perhaps most
uniquely in the dignity that he accorded to the work of theology. According to
Florovsky, ―Filaret always emphasized the necessity to engage in theology as the single
and immutable foundation for a complete religious life.‖ 521
As I pointed out above, Florovsky believed the entirety of God‘s revelation is
contained in what he terms the ―experience‖ of that revelation. The Christian has access
to this experience through membership in the Church, whose Tradition preserves and
communicates this experience in its fullness. Yet, according to Florovsky, this
experience requires men and women to bear witness to it, to freely respond to it through
word and deed. Theology—the reflection on divine revelation through the use of human
reason—constitutes the human response to God in word: ―It is the human response to
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God, who has spoken first. It is man‘s witness to God who has spoken to him, whose
word he has heard, whose words he has kept and is now recording and repeating.‖522
Florovsky perceived both a positive and a negative need for this response. The
positive need for it follows from his theology of personhood, which places importance on
the free and creative response of human beings to revelation. The importance Florovsky
attached to this response is evident in his emphasis on podvig, or, askesis. In accord with
what he described as the ―existential character‖ of patristic theology, Florovsky regarded
theology as an ascetical endeavor. He looked especially to the example of Maximus the
Confessor, in whose system he saw ―dogmatics and ascetics… organically and
inseparably brought together.‖523 As I pointed out above, Florovsky used the term
asceticism in its commonly understood sense to refer to the activities of prayer and selfdenial. These activities, according to Florovsky, are inseparable from the work of
theology: ―The theologian must learn to discover himself continually within the Church
through ascetic trial and self-discipline.‖524 Yet he also used the term in a wider sense to
refer to any free and creative response to revelation that is proper to human beings as
persons. His understanding of theology is a marriage of these two senses of asceticism: it
is a freely-willed activity, on the part of men and women, purified by their prayer and
self-denial.
The ―negative‖ need for theology follows from the limitations of human
epistemology. Florovsky holds that the ―fullness of knowledge and understanding is
given, but this fullness is only gradually and partially disclosed and professed…‖ due to
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the fact that ―knowledge in this world is always only a ‗partial‘ knowledge.‖ 525 He thus
holds that the finite nature of the human intellect requires the rational elaboration of
revelation by men and women in the Church.
Matthew Baker believes that Florovsky is particularly to be lauded among
Orthodox for the positive role he assigns to reason in theology. He holds that
―Florovsky‘s positive account of the place of rationality in theological enterprise remains
relatively unique amongst modern Orthodox theologians; the only major figure whose
thought bears comparison on this question is Dumitru Staniloae.‖526 Baker argues that
there has been a prevalent tendency in modern Orthodox theology (though by no means is
it limited to Orthodox theology) to regard experience, or faith, as opposed to reason.
Indeed, Florovsky himself exhibited signs of this tendency early in his publishing career
when reacting against Neo-Kantian rationalism. 527 This tendency manifests itself in some
modern Orthodox theologians‘ predilection for apophatic theology and their
characterization of it as a path of theandric ascent that seeks to move beyond discursive
thought. I will elaborate further on the nature this Orthodox predilection for
apophaticism, and its consequences for theology, later in this chapter.
Though Florovsky‘s earlier writings may at times privilege experience at the
expense of reason, his later writings clearly accord a positive role to reason in making
experience intelligible. Florovsky, like Philaret, viewed the vocation of all Christians as
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a theological one. According to Florovsky, ―Filaret of Moscow was the first person in
the history of modern Russian theology for whom theology once more became the aim of
life, the essential step toward spiritual progress and construction.‖ 528 Florovsky was even
wont to quote the Anselmian definition for theology in referring to the Christian vocation
as ―fides quaerens intellectum.‖529 Unabashedly supporting the place of reason in the
religious realm, Florovsky refers to theology as ―a kind of Christian philosophy.‖ 530 Of
course, he qualifies in a number of places that the use of reason in theology must always
remain rooted in the living experience of the Church. He writes that one who theologizes
without faith ―risks remaining outside and not really finding anything.‖ 531 Yet, he also
does not reduce theology to the experience that belongs to the Christian by faith. Instead,
as Baker emphasizes, Philaret‘s aphorism that ―theology reasons‖ encapsulated for
Florovsky the proper relationship between reason and experience. 532
The positive role Florovsky accords to reason and theology is a function of his
positive view of history, and men‘s and women‘s roles in history. Through their
reasoning, men and women perform an important and necessary task in making concrete
the various aspects of revelation contained within Christian experience. This application
of human reason to divine revelation in order to progressively unfold its contents
constitutes the heart of Florovsky‘s understanding of theology. And theology, in turn,
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constitutes the meaning of history as it fulfills the vocation of men and women to respond
to God‘s revelation through creative activity.
Given the connection Florovsky posits between theology and history, it is no
surprise that he also saw an intimate connection between theology and culture. Florovsky
understood culture as the entire matrix of ―aims… concerns… habits… and values‖ that
constitute the identity of a civilized group of human beings. It is ―produced and
accumulated in the creative process of history, and tend[s] to obtain a semi-independent
existence, i.e., independent of that creative endeavor which originated or discovered these
‗values.‘‖533 Both theology and culture thus testify to the ―creative vocation of man‖:
―that Man was created by God for a creative purpose and was to act in the world as its
king, priest, and prophet.‖ The redemption accomplished by Christ has allowed man ―to
resume his [original] role and function in the Creation.‖ Christian men and women are
thus called not only to ―display obedience, but also… to accomplish the task which was
appointed by God in his creative design precisely as the task of man.‖ They accomplish
this task through their creative activity, which includes, among other things, their
application of reason to revelation and their Christianization of the world. These tasks of
theology and the building up of culture fulfill the vocation of Christian men and women
only if they are eschatological—only if they are ordered toward deification and the
completion of the Body of Christ. Thus, Florovsky writes that ―the cultural process in
history is related to the ultimate consummation, if in a manner and in a sense which we
cannot adequately decipher now.‖534
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To those who do not attach such a positive role to theology, one has to pose the
same question Florovsky posed in ―The Predicament of the Christian Historian‖: ―Has
history any constructive value, now after Christ? or any ‗meaning‘ at all?‖ 535 Is it, asks
Florovsky, merely ―an enigmatic interim between the Mighty Deeds of God, for which it
[is] difficult to assign any proper substance,‖536 or is it the forum for human creativity?
Are men and women to respond to revelation by turning inward, by resting in the
experience of faith? Or, are they to apply the reason that is proper to their natures to
more fully elaborate this revelation? Is theology only preservative and elaborative, or is
it also creative and transformative? According to Florovsky, the answers to these
questions have implications not only for theology, but also for history and eschatology.
C. THE “RESPONSES” TO CHRISTIAN EXPERIENCE—SCRIPTURE AND DOGMA
Florovsky holds that Sacred Scripture represents men‘s and women‘s ―primary
response‖ to revelation. Its status as the ―primary response‖ follows from the fact that it
is also inspired: it is ―at once both the Word of God and the human response—the Word
of God mediated through the faithful response of man.‖ 537 Because Florovsky regards
theology as the human response to God, and because Scripture constitutes such a
response, one could claim that he regards Scripture as a work of theology. Like many of
the Church Fathers, whom Florovsky considered to be exemplar theologians, the contents
of Scripture permeate his writings rather than being the subject of direct commentary.
When he directly treats of Scripture as a whole, he repeatedly qualifies its place within
the Church‘s Tradition. It appears that his qualifications are in large part a reaction to the
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Protestant identification of the Word of God with Scripture, and perhaps also the past
Roman Catholic tendency to separate Scripture from Tradition. Thus, he clarifies in a
number of places that experience is temporally and hierarchically prior to Scripture; that
while the Bible flows from the Christian experience of revelation, it does not exhaust
it;538 and that the Church, as the bearer of experience, ―stands mystically first and is fuller
than Scripture.‖539 Unfortunately, Florovsky does not devote enough attention to giving a
positive account of Scripture. In addition, he does not provide a sufficient account of the
doctrine of biblical inspiration, and thus, it is unclear what he views as the qualitative
difference between Scripture and other theological responses.
Dogma constitutes another theological response to God‘s revelation. Like
Scripture, it proceeds from the experience of the Church while not exhausting that
experience. Though Florovsky refers to Scripture as ―the primary response‖ to
revelation, dogma is the response that receives the primary focus in his oeuvre. Indeed,
in Florovsky‘s writings one finds a particularly remarkable theology of dogma that
includes many insights apropos to contemporary theological discussions.
Florovsky uses a variety of terms and images to describe the nature and function
of a dogma. Chief among these terms is that dogma is ―a witness of experience.‖ 540 This
witness, which takes the form of ―definitions and conceptions,‖ 541 is a function of the
active response to revelation that God requires of men and women qua persons; it is the
result of men‘s and women‘s creative activity through thought as applied to Christian
experience. Florovsky also sees this witness in ―definitions and conceptions‖ as a
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function of human epistemology, of men‘s and women‘s need for abstraction in order to
understand:
Revelation is received in the silence of faith, the silence of contemplation—such
is the first silently receptive moment of theology. And in this receptive silence of
contemplation the whole fullness of Truth is contained and given. But Truth must
still be expressed and pronounced. Because man is called not only to receive
Truth attentively, but also to witness to it… He is called to creative activity, above
all, to the building up of his own self. 542
In deeming revelation as first ―received in the silence of faith,‖ Florovsky here perhaps
unnecessarily assumes a schema of temporal succession where experience precedes
expression, as if expression was not concomitant with the experience, or the cause of the
experience. However, his truth consists in affirming the positive character of the abstract
language of doctrinal definitions. Against all such Harnackian characterizations of
dogmas as representative of a compromise of Christianity‘s original simplicity, Florovsky
claims that dogmas represent precisely Christianity‘s fulfillment.
Using the language particular to the Orthodox tradition, Florovsky also refers to
dogma as an ―ikon‖ of Christian experience. 543 In Orthodox theology, the icon is a visual
sacrament through which one may enter more deeply into the divine reality. By referring
to dogma as an icon, Florovsky implies that it is a verbal sacrament through which one
may enter more deeply into the divine reality. He allows the possibility that one may
come to a fuller participation in God—the reality within Christian experience—the more
he or she grows in his or her understanding of a dogma. 544
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Florovsky‘s use of ―ikonic‖ language for dogma also implies the Christological
sanction of dogma. Through the Incarnation, Christ became the ultimate icon of God,
and the human became the means by which one could depict and come to know God. 545
This sanction applies not only to the writing of icons, but also to the formulation of
dogma. ―Knowledge of God,‖ writes Florovsky, ―has become possible through that
renewal of nature which Christ accomplished in his death and resurrection.‖ 546 With
Christ‘s redemptive renewal of nature and transformation of the world, dogma can now
serve as ―a ‗logical icon‘ of divine reality‖547 that adequately expresses this reality. 548
What is more, Florovsky holds that men and women participate in Christ‘s redemptive
activity through their formulation of revelation into dogma: ―When divine truth is
expressed in human language, the words themselves are transformed.‖ 549 Theological
activity itself then becomes transformative for the human participants, as ―the very realm
of thought becomes transfigured, sanctified, and renewed.‖ 550
Florovsky‘s application of the term ―icon‖ to dogma also implies the limitedness
of dogma. An icon is an image of a reality, and therefore does not capture the fullness of
the reality it portrays. Similarly, a dogma is an image, or witness, of a truth of revelation,
and thus, it does not capture the fullness of that truth. In Western theology it has become
popular to use the ―substance-expression‖ distinction to convey the economic character
of dogmatic language. This distinction implies that the humanly-formulated expression
545
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of a dogma can never adequately, or accurately, describe a dogma‘s divinely-revealed
substance. Among the supposed advantages of this distinction is that it allows for some
wiggle-room in the reception of a dogma. Thus, for instance, in his well-known work on
the subject, Francis Sullivan argues that Lateran IV‘s formulation (expression) of extra
ecclesiam nulla salus (―there is no salvation outside of the Church‖) still remains valid,
even if the Church‘s present interpretation of it is vastly different than in 1215. The
expression, explains Sullivan, inadequately conveyed the substance of the teaching that
has been held by the Church from the beginning. 551
My raising of the substance-expression distinction perhaps pre-emptively takes
this chapter into the dialogical realm. I nevertheless raise it because it helps illuminate
Florovsky‘s own understanding of dogma. Though Florovsky does not address this
distinction in his writings, he most assuredly would have been uncomfortable with it for a
number of reasons. For one, Florovsky shirked the use of ―essentialist‖ language for any
human, created realities. As already discussed, he was at pains to curb the Idealistic
influences that had crept into Christianity, which included a pantheism that blurred the
distinction between God and His creation. Against this pantheism, Florovsky reaffirmed
the patristic (and biblical) distinction between created and uncreated realities.
The expression of revelation in dogma, while certainly speaking truly of God, is
nevertheless a created, economic reality: it is ―the Word of God that has been heard by
us.‖552 Only through affirming this does Florovsky believe that one can avoid a kind of
pantheism—a ―pan-logism‖—that identifies ―the thought of a thing and the Divine
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thought-design concerning a thing.‖ 553 Just as a pantheistic Idealism reduces the
importance of free and creative human actions (as discussed in Chapter One), so also a
dogmatic pan-logism that highlights the ―essences‖ of dogmas relativizes their wording,
and in principle constitutes the death of theology. Thus, Florovsky preferred to speak of
the ―truth‖ of a dogma rather than its ―essence‖ or ―substance.‖ 554
Secondly, the implication behind the substance-expression distinction seems to be
that the substance, or essence, of a doctrine is separable from the human terms in which it
has been expressed. Florovsky repeatedly fought against this assumption as manifested
in those who, like Harnack, called for the de-Hellenization of Christianity and its
dogmatic language in an attempt to once again return Christianity to its original purity.
For Florovsky, Christian revelation is inseparable from the milieu in which it emerged in
history, and this milieu was Hellenism. In solidarity with others who have made a similar
point, Florovsky reminds us that the New Testament was originally written in Greek, and
is thus eternally tied to the conceptual framework of the Greek language. According to
Florovsky, the formulation of Christian dogmas in the language of Hellenistic philosophy
did not place limitations on Christianity, but instead, enabled it to increase its influence.
In fact, Florovsky believed that the attempt to abstract truth from its historical framework
results not in the ability to behold truth in a more unadulterated state, but in the abolition
of the truth.555 His belief that we must take the original context of Christian dogmatic
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formulation seriously is what prompts his bold (and often misunderstood) comment that
we must ―become more Greek in order that we may be more Catholic.‖ 556
Third, Florovsky believed the Church‘s dogmatic language adequately conveyed
the truth of Christian experience. Partly in reaction to the perceived, negative influence
of Western Neo-Scholasticism on Eastern Orthodox theology, partly due to their
particular recovery of Pseudo-Dionysius, many Orthodox theologians in the twentieth
century exalted apophatic theology as the preeminent means of Christian spiritual
ascent.557 The most influential promoter of apophaticism among these Orthodox
theologians was Vladimir Lossky. According to Lossky, apophaticism does not simply
refer to the intellectual exercise known in the West as negative theology, but is ―an
existential attitude which involves the whole man.‖558 This existential attitude requires
one to acknowledge the impossibility of knowing God in His essence, and to eventually
abandon human concepts of God in order to grow in divine participation through prayer
and askesis. Taking Gregory of Nyssa‘s Life of Moses as illustrative of the apophatic
way, Lossky emphasizes that the ―light‖ that shone forth from the burning bush (Ex 3)
was not as great a theophany as the ―divine darkness‖ that later enveloped Moses on Mt.
Sinai (Ex 24). He interprets the former theophany as signaling that cataphatic, rational
thought was still predominant in Moses, while the latter theophany illustrates God
showing Moses that the apophatic way is greater.
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A consequence of the modern Orthodox emphasis on apophaticism has been a
marked de-emphasis on the ability of doctrinal statements to convey truths of religious
experience. This de-emphasis in two particular Orthodox authors—Lossky and Andrew
Louth—is related to their rejection of doctrinal development. By no means do Lossky
and Louth go so far as to deny the relation between doctrinal definitions and experience.
Lossky recognizes that, as a function of the fullness of faith he or she possesses, ―the
Christian knows all, but theology is necessary to actuate this knowledge.‖ 559 And Louth
describes theology as ―a search for truth, because we are seeking to find ways of
expressing that truth, using the historically conditioned categories available to us.‖560
What they deny, however, is the ability of theology (understood as the application of
reason to revelation) to continually contribute to an ever-deeper knowledge of
experience. In other words, they deny that theology is a handmaiden in our ascent toward
God.
Illustrative of their denial is their position that new doctrinal language does not
contribute to a greater understanding of revelation either for the individual Christian or
the entire Church. Lossky acknowledges that the Church must preserve its dogmatic
tradition by occasionally renewing the language in which it communicates this tradition,
but that ―‗to renew‘ does not mean to replace ancient expressions of the Truth by new
ones, more explicit and theologically better elaborated.‖561 A doctrine, according to
Lossky, only ―each time opens anew an access towards the fulness outside of which the
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revealed Truth can be neither known nor confessed.‖562 Louth echoes Lossky through the
words of his former student, Mihail Neamţu:
The profound dogmatic elaborations of the fourth century, on the side of the
orthodox theologians, did not bring the apostolic faith somewhere further, on to a
deeper level of understanding. Given their relative flexibility regarding the
language, the champions of orthodoxy in the fourth century only provided new
means of conceptualization of what is essentially encapsulated in the
proclamation of Christ‘s lordship and divinity… 563
For Lossky and Louth, then, theology makes explicit certain aspects of the implicitly-held
mystery of revelation without ever penetrating that mystery. Doctrines ―open an access‖
toward understanding revelation, but do not reveal a path toward further understanding
after the initial access. They are merely points along the circumference of the mystery of
revelation which do not afford one the ability to progress toward the center. According to
them, the formulation of doctrine does not lead to any sort of development. 564
For Lossky and Louth, doctrinal definition mainly performs a negative function.
Such a view of doctrine is operative in their belief that doctrine‘s main purpose is to serve
as a protective measure against heresies. According to Louth, ―The main concern of
theology is not so much to elucidate anything, as to prevent us, the Church, from
dissolving the mystery that lies at the heart of the faith.‖ 565 In Lossky‘s words, doctrines
therefore function as ―boundaries,‖ as Tradition‘s ―external limit,‖ outside of which lie
false interpretations of revelation. 566 The implication in this view is that doctrine
primarily serves as a bulwark against heresies; that it is merely a necessity imposed upon
562

Ibid., 162.
Mihail Neamţu, ―The Unfolding of Truth: Eunomius of Cyzicus and Gregory of Nyssa in debate over
Orthodoxy (360-381),‖ Archaeus VI (2002), fasc. 1-2:113; quoted in Louth, ―Is Doctrinal Development a
Valid Category?‖ 60. The emphasis in the quotation is mine.
564
For a fuller discussion of this issue, see my article ―The Orthodox Rejection of Doctrinal Development,‖
Pro Ecclesia 20:4 (Fall 2011): 389-410.
565
Louth, Discerning the Mystery: An Essay on the Nature of Theology (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983),
71.
566
Lossky, ―Tradition and Traditions,‖ 162, 163.
563

163

the Church, at certain times in its history, when faith has dwindled, and the experience of
faith is not enough to sustain the faithful.
Florovsky differs sharply from his fellow Orthodox theologians in his positive
attitude toward doctrinal definition. 567 As I pointed out above, Florovsky affirms that
―the Word of God may be adequately and rightly expressed in human words‖ as a result
of men‘s and women‘s possession of the imago Dei and Christ‘s redemption of human
nature, which included the redemption of human knowledge. 568 This affirmation serves
to counter an overemphasis on apophatic theology and the inability of human words to
convey divine truth. Florovsky‘s positive attitude toward doctrinal definition implies that
an overemphasis upon apophaticism fails on two accounts: one, it fails to respect the
dignity of human knowledge in spite of the fall. Or, perhaps more accurately, it fails to
adequately incorporate rationality into the understanding of the imago Dei which, writes
Florovsky, ―is in the whole man… and not just one part of man.‖ 569 Two, an
overemphasis upon apophaticism fails to account for the redeemed, and thus transformed,
character of human knowledge following Christ‘s salvific acts. As Florovsky writes,
―The resurrection is the true renewal, the transfiguration, the reformation of the whole
creation. Not just a return of what has passed away, but a heightening, a fulfillment of
something better and more perfect.‖570 Florovsky‘s positive view of doctrine is thus
connected with his conviction of the reality of Redemption.
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Moreover, Florovsky believes that doctrines, once defined, have a perennial and
eternal character. ―The words of dogmatic definitions,‖ he writes, ―are not ‗simple
words,‘ they are not ‗accidental‘ words which one can replace by other words. They are
eternal words, incapable of being replaced. This means that certain words—certain
concepts—are eternalized by the very fact that they express divine truth.‖571 They
represent, as it were, the termini of certain truths of Christian experience that will not be
superseded by improved expressions for the same truths. Unfortunately, Florovsky did
not devote extensive attention to this point, but it is a point that could provide balance to
the modern theology‘s tendency to over-hermeneuticize doctrinal definitions.
It is interesting to note that Florovsky himself perceived the exaggerated
apophaticism evident in Lossky and Louth operative in those Russian theologians who
objected to doctrinal development in the nineteenth-century. Responding to P.I.
Leporskii‘s position against development on the ground that ―a deeper apprehension of
the mystery [doctrines] contain was [im]possible,‖ Florovsky writes, ―He exaggerated the
incomprehensibility of revelation, leaving an aftertaste of an unexpected agnosticism.‖ 572
What is more, Florovksy sees in this form of apophaticism the seeds of relativism and the
reduction of religion to morality—dangers perennially present in the a-dogmatism of
Protestant theology. 573 Thus Baker‘s perceptive comment that an Orthodox
overemphasis on apophaticism, and their supposition of a dichotomy between experience
and reason, ―threatens a retreat of Orthodox thought and culture into a form of masked
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fideism having more in common with the spirit of Luther than that of the Greek
Fathers.‖574
Florovsky‘s optimistic estimate of human reason is manifest in his belief that the
formulation of new doctrines—usually done at ecumenical councils—does indeed result
in new understanding. He saw this principle affirmed by Vladimir Soloviev‘s
understanding of dogmatic development. Such support for Soloviev on this point of
dogmatic development is surprising given that Florovsky opposes much within
Soloviev‘s system, including the understanding of history present within that system. 575
Florovsky interprets Soloviev‘s endorsement of dogmatic development as an affirmation
that ―the ecumenical councils defined and described with new precision and binding
authority that Christian truth which had existed from the beginning, and their importance
and novelty lies in this precision and authoritativeness—this new degree or stage of
exactness.‖576 Florovsky characterized those who assigned only a preservative and
protective, rather than a constructive and illuminative, role to doctrinal definitions as
having a negative view of history. The opponents of Soloviev‘s idea of doctrinal
development, according to Florovsky, held that ―the councils only protected tradition and
clarified it relative to the ‗passing needs of the Church at that moment,‘‖ and that
574
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―ecumenical testimony has largely a negative significance: the condemnation and
exclusion of definite heresies or errors.‖577 Florovsky perceived in such a view of
doctrine a rather pessimistic view of Church history that considers doctrines as evidence
of particular lapses in Christian faith. ―The entire discussion,‖ writes Florovsky, ―is a
variation on the typical theme of Protestant historiography: church history as decay.‖ 578 I
will further examine Florovsky‘s endorsement of Solovev‘s understanding of dogmatic
development in the Dialogue section of this chapter.
Florovsky also differs from Lossky and Louth inasmuch as he views the role of
human reason in theology as inseparable from the ascent to God. Once again, in holding
this position he mirrors Philaret, who ―was the first person in the history of modern
Russian theology for whom theology once more became the aim of life, the essential step
toward spiritual progress and construction.‖ 579 He also sees himself as following the
example of the Church Fathers, whose theology was of an ―existential‖ character that
informed the character of Christian life. 580 Just as Florovsky‘s ecclesiology is rooted in
the totus Christus, one might say his anthropology is rooted in the totus homo.
According to Florovsky, the entire man—including his thought—becomes progressively
united with Christ in the process of the human person‘s deification. He sees theology,
too, as part of the theanthropic process that culminates in men‘s and women‘s
deification.
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Ironically, Florovsky congratulated Lossky above all else for ―his insistence that
doctrine and spirituality were intimately correlated.‖581 Yet, Lossky‘s strength is also the
source of his weakness, for in affirming the inseparability of theology and spirituality he
at the same time conflates them by not according an adequate role to knowledge in
deification. Florovsky, too, notes this weakness in his review of Lossky‘s Mystical
Theology. He concedes to Lossky that ―the ultimate knowledge of God is available ‗by
faith‘ only, in an ‗experience‘ which transcends ‗logical reason.‘‖ ―But,‖ he qualifies,
―‗knowledge‘ is still an integral part of this beatific ‗life‘‖—an insight he ascribes to the
Cappadocian Fathers.582
On a final note, I wish to point out that Florovsky‘s positive evaluation of
doctrine and theology is balanced by his own recognition of the apophatic character of
theology. Louth is right in noting that Florovsky ―makes little of the language of
apophaticism.‖583 George Williams also notes this lacuna, but points out that
Florovsky‘s oeuvre is permeated by a ―profoundly apophatic‖ character.584 The
apophatic character of Florovsky‘s theology is sufficiently evident in his position that
experience contains a fullness that can never be exhausted by Scripture and dogma. 585
He also employed the traditional distinction between theology and economy in order to
distinguish between knowledge of God‘s essence (which is impossible) and that known
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through God‘s revelation through His energies. 586 Indeed, Florovsky admitted that
―theology itself is bound to be ultimately rather an ‗apophatic theology,‘ just a symbol of
the unfathomable mystery of God…‖587 Furthermore, Florovsky repeatedly
acknowledged that there are times when theology reaches its limit, and where silence
must take over in the face of mystery.588
But Florovsky was also cautious about the emphasis one should give apophatic
theology. ―I am for apophatic theology,‖ writes Florovsky, ―but its use must be regulated
very carefully…‖589 As Florovsky saw it, the consequence of a one-sidedly apophatic
theology was the eventual devaluation of the dogmatic element in theology, ―to a renewal
of the heresy of the ‗antisophoi,‘ ‗gnosimachoi.‘‖ 590 Moreover, Florovsky would have
seen it as devaluing the anthropological character of revelation. As I have pointed out
above, Florovsky believed that divine truth could be adequately communicated in human
language because men and women have been created in the image of God. He also
believed that Christians had a vocation to use their gift of reason to unfold and clarify the
experience of revelation in the course of human history. Florovsky understood theology
to constitute this rational unfolding and clarifying of revelation. He thus regarded an
exaggerated apophaticism as devaluing the rational element within human beings, and as
fatal to theology. He regarded an exaggerated apophatic theology as really no theology at
all.
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D. THEOLOGY AND THE ORGANIC METAPHOR
Both George Williams and Matthew Baker interpret Florovsky‘s rejection of
doctrinal development as a function of his rejection of certain organic models of history.
Florovsky opposed biologistic historical models that interpret the course of temporal
events as identical to that of the life of an organism, which develops (or ―evolves,‖ as he
terms it elsewhere) according to a structure that pre-exists in the organism itself. 591 Such
a conception of doctrinal history would mean that revelation develops, or unfolds, its
contents in history as a realization of its own innate power. Florovsky reacts against this
type of historical model—which he saw as endemic to the historiographies of both
Idealism and Slavophilism, in addition to that of Soloviev—because, again, he believed
that it failed to provide a role for the free divine and human creativity that belongs to
personhood. A biologistic reading of history means, for Florovsky, that history is the
realization of a process from a beginning to an end that is achieved without, or in spite of,
the irruptions of divine and human acts. As Williams implies and Baker argues,
Florovsky considered the word ―development‖ as synonymous with such a reading of
history, a fact that colors his attitude toward the idea of doctrinal development.
In his Masters‘ thesis, Baker has already provided a softening of Florovsky‘s
rejection of doctrinal development as it relates to the organic metaphor.592 Baker, as did
George Williams before, explains that Florovsky preferred the term ―epigenesis‖ to
―evolution‖ or ―entwicklung‖ (―development‖) as a historical model. 593 ―Epigenesis‖
refers, in general, to the genetic changes in organisms that take place as a result of factors
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not present within the genes themselves, e.g., through environmental factors. Florovsky
believed this term better accounted for the unpredictable character of history, where
unforeseen and freely-willed divine and human actions help contribute to the
achievement of creation‘s telos. He associated entwicklung, on the other hand, with nonvolitional biological processes. Baker also points out that Florovsky did not associate all
theories of doctrinal development with a biologistic conception of history, as evidenced
by his support for Soloviev‘s understanding of doctrinal development in Ways. Indeed,
Florovsky seemingly qualifies his objection to doctrinal development in Ways when he
explains that he does not oppose what doctrinal development claims about the human
reception of revelation; rather, he objects to the imprecision of the term. 594
Baker notes that while Florovsky opposed organic conceptions of history, he at
the same time utilized organic metaphors in expressing his theology of history.
―Epigenesis‖ is itself an organic metaphor. Indeed, one could characterize Florovsky as
holding that an authentically Christian theology of history is necessarily an organic
theology of history. As already pointed out, Florovsky‘s preferred image for the Church
was the ―Body of Christ‖—an image whose reestablished preeminence in theology he
attributed to Möhler and Khomiakov, in addition to Philaret.595 As Florovsky recognizes,
the Church is an organic reality inasmuch as it is a body: ―The Church is a body indeed,
an organism, much more than a society or a corporation. And perhaps an ‗organism‘ is
the best modern rendering of the term to soma, as used by St. Paul.‖596 Baker points out
that Florovsky recognizes limitations to the organic metaphor as applied to the Church:
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that the unity implied in the corporate imagery needs to be held in tension with ―the idea
of [the Church as] a symphony of personalities.‖ 597 The Church as the ―Body of Christ‖
is, as Baker rightly qualifies, a ―spiritual analogy.‖ 598
At the same time, however, Florovsky reminds us of the realism that the Fathers
attached to the image of the Church as the Body of Christ. ―It is,‖ he writes, ―a real and
ontological unity, the realization of a single organic life in Christ… The ancient fathers
did not hesitate to speak of ‗natural‘ and ‗physical‘ union…‖ 599 Admittedly, the organic
imagery as applied to the Church suffers from the same limitations as all analogies that
attempt to express divine realities. However, some of the characteristics that Florovsky
attributes to the Church are also those of physical, organic bodies. And he very much
saw the Church, in accordance with the Chalcedonian doctrine, as a theanthropic reality.
Florovsky recognized that the organic character of the Church as the Body of
Christ has consequences for its theology. Thus, he attributes a living character to the
theology of the Church. Shaw summarizes this recognition, quoting Florovsky: ―As the
Church is an organism, so its articulation of its pilgrimage, its theology and sense of
unity, are ‗inner, intimate, organic.‘‖ 600 In Ways, Florovsky attributes the truth of
Soloviev‘s theory of doctrinal development precisely to his ―living sense of the sacred
reality of history in the Church.‖ 601 The living character of theology is cognizable in its
bearing of ―fruit‖: ―The Word of God is preserved in the human spirit as a seed which
sprouts and brings forth fruit.‖ 602 Pace those Orthodox theologians who primarily
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characterized dogmas as boundary markers and inadequate formulations of Christian
experience, Florovsky regarded them as necessary fruits born by human reflection on
revelation.603
Even more remarkable for a modern Orthodox theologian, Florovsky viewed a
―system‖ as one of the fruits born by a living theology: ―Revelation must unfold within
human thought, must develop into an entire system of believing confession, into a system
of religious perspective—one may say, into a system of religious philosophy and a
philosophy of Revelation.‖ 604 I say this is remarkable, for the dominant school of
Orthodox theology in the twentieth century, in which Florovsky is usually included,
generally considers the idea of theological systems as anathema. They are associated
with the rationalizing character of the West, as especially embodied in the scholasticism
of Thomas Aquinas in the thirteenth century, and are considered to be the signs of a
decadent theology. 605
A word closely associated with ―system‖ in Florovsky‘s thought is ―synthesis.‖606
There have been some attempts to identify what Florovsky himself means when he uses
the terms ―system‖ and ―synthesis.‖ Lewis Shaw describes it as the search for ―the
‗code‘ underlying the ‗ecclesial mind‘ expressed in the Church's literary classics,
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iconography and liturgy.‖607 Baker, whose thesis is concerned with exegeting
Florovsky‘s understanding of ―synthesis,‖ sees the term used by Florovsky in a twofold
sense: as the entirety of the Church‘s theological tradition, and as the summaries of the
faith provided by individual Fathers addressing their particular contexts.608 I wish to add
to this second sense. Florovsky seemed to understand a system, or synthesis, as an
attempt by human reason, informed by faith, to order the truths of the experience of
revelation into a unified whole. This ordering function is usually accomplished by
assigning centrality to certain truths of the faith (such as Florovsky‘s Christocentrism), or
by describing these truths in a particular idiom (such as the Aristotelianism permeating
Aquinas‘ Summa Theologiae).609
Baker‘s thesis argues that Florovsky‘s famed call for a ―Neo-Patristic synthesis‖
must be considered precisely as a call to construct a new theological system appropriate
for the modern context. Baker also points out that Florovsky did not believe this call was
unique; rather, he believed that it was simply a general method for how theology should
be done. ―Orthodox theology…,‖ writes Florovsky, ―must not only retain the experience
of the Fathers, but moreover develop it while discovering it, and use it in order to create a
living work.‖610 This method was the same one he saw supported by Soloviev‘s
understanding of doctrinal development, though he was critical of Soloviev for
607
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attempting to construct a synthesis based on non-ecclesiastical experience. 611 In sum, the
creation of systems—a process that cannot reach perfection on this side of the eschaton—
is for Florovsky the sign of a living faith, a manifestation of the Church‘s nature as an
organism. It is a sign of a faith that is truly engaging with Christian experience in all its
fullness, which ―is only gradually discerned, dissected, and described in necessary
definitions.‖612
The organic character of the Church as the Body of Christ has other consequences
for its history. Growth is a sign of a body‘s life, and thus, as Florovsky acknowledged,
―the truth of the [New Testament] is revealed and vindicated by the growth of the
Body.‖613 George Williams qualifies that Florovsky‘s opposition to organismic readings
of history was in part an opposition—shared with the French philosopher Charles
Renouvier (1815-1903)—to ―theories of inevitable progress in history‖ that failed to
account for human acts in the historical process. 614 That qualification aside, Florovsky
believed that history was indeed characterized by progress. In fact, he believed that the
concept of history as a ―sacred process‖ was a revealed truth: ―Our modern concept of the
linear time, with a sense of direction or vectorality, with the possibility of progression
and achievement of new things, has been derived from the Bible and the Biblical
conception of history.‖615 What is more, Florovsky considered the view that history did
not exhibit progress as one of the principle marks of Hellenism: ―there was no room for
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any progress, but only for ‗re-volutions,‘ re-circulation, cyclophoria and anacyclosis.‖616
Because Florovsky viewed most Christian heresies as returns to a pre-Christian
Hellenism, he was particularly attuned to this unprogressive view of history in many of
the past and present threats to Christian orthodoxy. 617
But of which realms of the Church‘s history can one predicate this progress? For
one, Florovsky believed it characterized the Church‘s theological work. My contention
that Florovsky considered the Church‘s unfolding of revelation to be progressive
throughout time will seem erroneous to those who have associated his call for a Neopatristic synthesis with a derisive attitude toward all post-Patristic theologies. Florovsky
exalts the Fathers for the model they provided us for our own performance of theology,
namely, an ―existential theology.‖ But he certainly did not countenance a ―theology of
repetition‖ that merely preserved the Patristic theology in a pristine state, nor did he
believe that the content of Patristic theology reached an apex that theology could not
possibly improve upon.618 Instead, he held that Tradition is not so much a safeguarding
and conservative principle, as a progressive and adducible one—the beginning of life,
renewal, and growth.619
Again, Florovsky did not believe Christians today can know more than the
Church Fathers in terms of having a greater experience of the truth. However, he did
believe that the Church‘s theology in each age ―testifies of greater things.‖ ―In its
definitions,‖ he writes, ―it always unchangeably describes the same thing, but in the
616
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unchanged image ever new features become visible.‖620 The Church‘s faith today is the
same as yesterday, ―but now, as it were, properly and fully articulated.‖621 Thus,
Florovsky did not believe theology today had progressed beyond the theology of the
Fathers in terms of quality or method, but he did believe it had progressed inasmuch as
more aspects of Christian experience had been articulated through reason. As I showed
above, Lossky and Louth deny theology even this kind of progress.
To repeat, Florovsky held that theology was intimately connected with one‘s
participation in God, or, with one‘s growth in holiness. To once again play upon the
phrase of Augustine, one may ascribe this belief to Florovsky‘s doctrine of the totus
homo, which takes into account the interconnectivity of faith, or experience, and reason.
Lossky did not wish to make the leap from what is true for the individual to what is true
for the Body: he did not wish to claim that what takes place in a person‘s life of faith—
where growth in holiness is attended by growth in knowledge—also takes place at the
corporate level. In opposing the idea of doctrinal development, he allowed that ―this
knowledge of the Truth in the Tradition thus will be able to increase in a person, in
company with his increase in sanctification (Col 1:10): a Christian will be more perfect in
knowledge at the age of his spiritual maturity.‖ But then he asks, ―Would one dare to
speak, against all the evidence, of a collective progress in the knowledge of the Christian
mystery, a progress which would be due to a ‗dogmatic development‘ of the Church?‖ 622
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Does Florovsky make this leap? Does he claim that the Church, the Body of
Christ, progressively grows in holiness throughout history in a parallel fashion to its
theological growth? The answer is yes, because he takes seriously the reality of the
Church as the Body of Christ, as the totus Christus. According to Florovsky, it is not
only the deification of individuals that is taking place in history, but the deification of the
Church, as well. History now is the history of the completion of the Body of Christ. In
one of his most impassioned pieces of writing—the concluding chapter to Ways—
Florovsky describes the history of the Church ―as the ‗process of God-manhood,‘ as a
departure from time into grace-filled eternity—the formation and creation of the body of
Christ.‖623 Thus, because Florovsky affirms that the Body of Christ is continually
growing, is progressively being deified according to the pattern of Christ‘s own life, and
because he believes this deification is inseparable from the Church‘s dogmatic
profession, it follows that he would hold that the Church‘s growth in theological
understanding is inseparable from its growth in holiness. 624 Indeed, he directly makes the
connection in his essay ―The Work of the Holy Spirit in Revelation‖: ―The fullness of
Revelation is assimilated by the Church in the measure of its spiritual growth. And this
gradualness in the profession of faith is connected with the dynamic growth of Church
existence, with the process of vital salvation, sanctification, and transfiguration.‖ 625
It is important to ask whether or not Florovsky would also allow for a regression
in the Church‘s growth, both in the understanding of doctrine and in its holiness. Both
apophaticism, both Florovsky and Newman are much more apophatic, and less confident, when it comes to
the interpretation of history.
623
V6, 296. I refer to this conclusion as one of Florovsky‘s ―most impassioned pieces of writing‖ because
he wrote all forty pages of it in one sitting, and it remains in its unedited form (See Blane, 53).
624
Staniloae shares this belief with Florovsky, namely, that the development of doctrine is connected with
the progress of the Church, and all humankind, in its participation in Christ. See Staniloae, ―The Orthodox
Conception of Tradition and the Development of Doctrine.‖
625
―Work of the Holy Spirit,‖ 14.

178

Staniloae and Jean-Marie Tillard believe that the theory of the development of doctrine
must leave room for such regress. Staniloae recognizes that ―Humanity as a whole, and
Christian humanity in particular, has its halts and setbacks in the course of history. There
are many temporary deviations on to wrong roads, dark sides in this journey towards the
light.‖626 Interestingly, both Staniloae and Tillard connect their postulation of regresses
in the Church‘s development of doctrine with their qualification of the organic metaphor.
Thus, Staniloae writes, ―We are dealing here not with an organic, but with a spiritual
level.‖627 Tillard qualifies the organic metaphor as follows:
But this concrete existence shows that the condition of this truth is not that of a
seed led by its inner force toward an always more perfect development. It is the
condition of a transcendent reality, delivered once for all (ephapax) with its whole
richness (its katholou) in the kairos of Christ Jesus, always re-received in the
communion of all the local churches of God, remaining the same in its inner
perfection (its katholou) but expressed in the complex and constantly changing
situation of humanity, sometimes advancing, sometimes regressing. 628
In allowing for the possibility of regressions in the Church‘s development of doctrine,
both Staniloae and Tillard are concerned with leaving room for human freedom in the
historical process. Florovsky of course shares this concern, which is why he prefers the
historical model of ―epigenesis.‖ This model seems to allow for possible regressions in
the Church‘s development of doctrine and its progressive participation in the life of
Christ. Florovsky‘s Christological theandrism implies that there must be an overall
growth and progression in the history of the Church, but between these ―leaps‖ there may
very well be perceptible ebbs in the doctrinal and spiritual life of the Church.629
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Florovsky regards the ―pseudomorphosis‖ of Russian theological thought as one
of these ebbs. He contends that the pseudomorphosis brought about through Russia‘s
rash appropriation of Western categories of thought was a schism in the Russian soul
between theology and experience—between the tradition of liturgy, prayer, worship, or,
the Russian people‘s life in Christ, and the rational expression of that life. 630 According
to Florovsky, Russia‘s pseudomorphosis was especially embodied in, and brought about
by, the Romanizing tendencies of Peter Mogila (1596-1646) and the Protestant and
secularizing reforms of Czar Peter I (1672-1725).631 Florovsky regarded ―a creative
return to Patristic foundations and sources‖—a return already signaled by Philaret—as
the only way to combat this pseudomorphosis. In other words, Florovsky regarded a
Neo-patristic synthesis resulting from both rational and ascetical activity as the
antidote.632
Consistent with the concerns of Staniloae and Tillard, Florovsky considered
Russian theology‘s pseudomorphosis to be a regression in its tradition because it was not
indicative of a free human response to revelation. The post-Reformation Russian
response to Western theology was not, according to Florovsky, one that proceeded from
the depths of its experience as informed by the wealth of its patristic and Byzantine
forebears. Such would have constituted a free and dialogical engagement with Western
ideas and categories. Instead, the Russian response to Western theology bore the marks
of a hasty adoption and a servile imitation. As a result, writes Florovsky, ―no true
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encounter with the West has yet taken place. That could only happen in the freedom and
equality of love.‖633
Contrary to the claims of some modern Orthodox authors, Florovsky‘s diagnosis
of pseudomorphosis was not a call for a reestablishment of Orthodox isolationism. 634
Quite the contrary, in fact, for Florovsky believed that ―a complete break with the West
does not give a true and authentic liberation.‖635 It was instead a call for a free encounter
with the West, from which a true synthesis may come about. In fact, the call for a true
synthesis was at the same time a call for true ―development‖ to come about. ―Did not the
rupture with the eastern part result in the grafting on of an alien and artificial tradition
which would inevitably block the path of creative development?‖ asks Florovsky. 636
Through a Neo-patristic synthesis, Florovsky hopes that the Russian Church will once
again return to a theological path in organic continuity with Byzantinism and the Patristic
age.637 Such a path leads to freedom, to synthesis, and to development.
Given Florovsky‘s emphasis on human beings‘ creative activity—which is able to
effect changes in history toward the achievement of creation‘s telos—one might well
conclude with Rowan Williams that there is ―a rather voluntaristic flavor to some of his
writings.‖638 However, Williams is among a number of commentators on Florovsky,
including Baker, who do not balance Florovsky‘s critique of organic readings of history
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with a treatment of the role he assigns to Providence in history. True enough, against
interpretations of history that relegate men and women to a position of passivity,
Florovsky wished to accentuate that the ascetic activity (podvig) of human beings does
truly contribute to the achievement of history‘s end. But he was also clear that God
retains an active role in the historical process in guiding his creation ―toward the
accomplishment of His ultimate purpose,‖ which is the predetermined end of the
completion of the Body of Christ.639 Though Baker unfortunately left Florovsky‘s
understanding of Providence unexplored, he makes clear elsewhere in his thesis that
Florovsky ultimately understood the historical process as a synergy between God‘s grace
and human freedom.640
This same idea of synergy pervades Florovsky‘s understanding of theology. In
history, God guides the Church toward a greater knowledge of His revelation. How this
knowledge unfolds, however, is in part the result of the various persons, events, thoughts,
and contexts that make up the historical matrix. Interestingly, Florovsky recognizes that
one‘s ascription to the doctrine of Providence is intimately connected with the idea of
doctrinal development. Among his critiques of the opponents of Soloviev‘s
understanding of doctrinal development is the following: ―It is precisely divine assistance
that is not a thread in the historical fabric.‖ 641 Florovsky characterizes Soloviev‘s
opponents as regarding theology and ecumenical councils as purely human affairs that
served a purely negative purpose, namely, the putting down of heresies that threatened
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the true interpretation of Christian revelation. Florovsky regarded such extreme
voluntarism, like exaggerated apophaticism, as also fatal to theology. 642
In conclusion, Florovsky‘s understanding of Tradition represents a faithful
synthesis of Orthodox thought on the subject. Inspired by the Church Fathers, he
attempts to elaborate a doctrine of Tradition that is Christocentric, and thus, Chalcedonic,
leaving room for the operation of both the human and divine in the transmission of
revelation. In its Christocentrism, Florovsky‘s understanding of Tradition is also
pneumatological, ecclesiological, and eschatological. Like his other Orthodox
contemporaries, Florovsky‘s understanding of Tradition is also indebted to the heritage of
Slavophilism, which manifests itself, for better or worse, in his inclusion of all aspects of
the Church‘s life in the concept of Tradition.
Yet, Florovsky also parts ways with some of his Orthodox contemporaries on
aspects of Tradition. Most strikingly, he assigns a more positive role to reason and
theology within the domain of Tradition. He does not believe that men and women are
called to merely preserve revelation in an apophatic experience, begrudgingly
formulating this experience in propositions only when heresy forces the issue. Rather, he
believes propositional formulation is one of the expressions of the theological vocation of
all men and women of the Church, who are called to apply their reason to the experience
642
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of revelation in order to grow in their understanding of the latter. What is more, he
believes that this growth in understanding is intimately connected with the building up of
the Body of Christ. In the Dialogue section, I will attempt to answer whether or not this
understanding of theology amounts to an acceptance of doctrinal development as
Newman understands it.

2.3: DIALOGUE
I begin this dialogue section by returning to the question of Florovsky‘s
apparently inconsistent position on the development of doctrine. His rejections of
doctrinal development provide a convenient framework for this section of Chapter Two.
As I have already shown, his tendency was to reject the idea of doctrinal development.
Yet, in Ways, Florovsky explicitly endorses doctrinal development and at the same time
criticizes those who reject the idea. In addition, positive references to ―development‖ are
scattered throughout his writings, leaving one wondering whether he does indeed believe
development is the pattern of the Church‘s doctrinal history. How, then, is one to
negotiate these seemingly contradictory positions?
In searching for an answer to this question, one must begin by simply
acknowledging that Florovsky‘s assessments of dogmatic development are confused, and
often cryptic. He never at any point directly defines what he understands dogmatic
development to mean. His opinions on the matter are situated in general essays on
revelation and the Church, and lack sustained attention. With the exception of Soloviev‘s
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understanding of dogmatic development, he does not indicate in his writings an in-depth
knowledge of particular treatments of the subject. 643
Florovsky‘s objections to dogmatic development appear in large part to involve
terminological issues. That is, Florovsky seemed to be operating with a very particular
understanding of the phrase ―dogmatic development‖ that conditioned his reaction
against it. Indeed, I believe that terminological issues are one of the principal factors
operative in the Orthodox reaction against doctrinal development in the twentieth, and the
now the twenty-first, century. It is often the case that the Orthodox understandings of the
term ―doctrinal development‖ do not correspond to the principles of Newman‘s theory of
doctrinal development, which has been received by Christian scholars as the
representative theory.
A number of modern Orthodox theologians have rejected doctrinal development
under the guise that it would allow for new revelation, or a development of Tradition
itself. Such is the understanding of doctrinal development provided by Paul Valliere in
Modern Russian Theology, and the one he portrays as true to an Orthodoxy unafraid of
engagement with the modern world. He describes the point of contention with Orthodox
theology today as follows: ―The issue concerns that which is added to the foundation.
Does it involve substantive additions and new discoveries, or does it simply entail new
ways of expressing, articulating or defining that which the church has always known and
preached?‖644 Those Orthodox who oppose doctrinal development on the supposition
that it hypothesizes changes to the substance of revelation include John Behr, who writes
643
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that ―from an Orthodox perspective there is no such thing as dogmatic development,‖ for
―a tradition with potential for growth ultimately undermines the Gospel itself; it would
leave open the possibility for further revelation, and therefore the Gospel would no longer
be sure and certain.‖645 Florovsky, however, does not appear to interpret doctrinal
development as making the claim that Tradition itself develops. In his mentions of
doctrinal development he indeed clarifies that dogmatic definition does not amount to
new revelation, but it does not constitute part of his rejection of the idea of doctrinal
development.646 And of course, as I have already established, Newman does not claim
that doctrinal development implies the development of revelation or Tradition.
Matthew Baker argues that Florovsky‘s rejection of doctrinal development was
principally a function of his rejection of organismic readings of history. Baker‘s
argument is clearly dependent upon George Williams‘ position that ―Florovsky formally
rejects the idea of ‗the development of dogmas‘ in the course of Church history; but this
must be understood in the specialized sense which the word ‗development‘ (entwicklung)
has long since acquired in his systematic rejection of organismic views of ecclesiastical
history.‖647 Both Baker and Williams take Florovsky‘s essay ―Evolution und Epigenesis‖
(1930) as the lens through which they evaluate Florovsky‘s rejection of doctrinal
development. They argue (Baker in considerably more detail) that Florovsky‘s
opposition to entwicklung (―development‖) as a historical model—which represented for
Florovsky a model that failed to take into account free divine and human actions as
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affecting the historical process—colored his attitude toward the theory of doctrinal
development.
Florovsky‘s latest mention of doctrinal development in his oeuvre supports
Baker‘s and Williams‘ contention. In his 1961 essay ―The Quest for Christian Unity and
the Orthodox Church,‖ Florovsky at one point attempts to navigate between both
excessively static and excessively dynamic views of Tradition. With the advent of
historical consciousness in the modern era, Florovsky expressly approves that a more
dynamic understanding of Church history has come to predominate, which included
acceptance of the idea of development. But, he laments,
when the pattern of ―development‖ was finally adopted in the interpretation of
Church history, it came to be used without adequate discrimination and without
proper attention to the nature of the Church. ―Development‖ was often equated
with ―evolution‖ or was interpreted in the terms of Hegelian philosophy, and in all
cases it was regarded as something exclusively ―human‖ and ―all too Human,‖
and for that reason inextricably relative. 648
Once again, Florovsky does not name any specific perpetrators of this type of view of
doctrinal development—one might hypothesize that he has in mind Möhler and the
Tubingen school, whose theology was formed in dialogue with Idealism, and who viewed
the history of dogma as a dialectical process. 649 Nevertheless, this passage clearly shows
Florovsky‘s concern lest the Church‘s doctrinal history be viewed in a biologistic sense.
However, neither Baker nor Williams directly address what Florovsky ostensibly
reacts against in his other mentions of doctrinal development, namely, the idea of ―logical
development.‖ Logical theories of development were first explicated in the CounterReformation and Baroque eras, and were employed in the works of Luis de Molina
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(1535-1600), Francisco Suarez (1548-1617), and John de Lugo (1583-1660), among
others. Advocates of logical development in the twentieth century included the
Dominicans Francisco Marin-Sola (1873-1932) and Marcolinus Maria Tuyaerts (18781948), and the Jesuit Charles Boyer (1884-1980).650 Employing a number of distinctions
such as the ―explicitly‖ versus the ―implicitly‖ revealed, or the ―formally‖ versus the
―virtually‖ revealed, logical theories implied that Tradition can be said to ―develop‖ only
inasmuch as the Church comes to name an aspect of revelation through a syllogistic
process involving already acknowledged premises. Thus, for instance, the Roman
Catholic Church could be said to ―conclude‖ the dogma of Mary‘s Immaculate
Conception from the already acknowledged (revealed) truths that Jesus was without
Original Sin, and that Original Sin is transferred through generation. 651
Florovsky‘s rejection of logical forms of development is the catena linking his
earlier rejections of dogmatic development in ―The House of the Father‖ (1927),
―Revelation, Philosophy and Theology‖ (1931), and ―The Work of the Holy Spirit in
Revelation‖ (1932), with his later rejection in ―Le Corps du Christ vivant‖ (1948). One
must recall that Florovsky understood theology as reasoning from the fullness of
Christian experience, and that this reasoning must always stay rooted in this experience if
it is to remain a true theology. I have already pointed out Florovsky‘s approval of
Soloviev‘s understanding of doctrinal development. Interestingly, Florovsky also
650
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approves of an understanding of doctrinal development he perceives in Khomiakov
precisely because it preserves the inseparability of theology and experience. Florovsky
portrays Khomiakov‘s view of development as forged in the latter‘s debate with his
fellow Slavophile Iurii (Yuri) Samarin. Khomiakov criticized Samarin for supporting a
Hegelian view of ―ecclesiastical-dogmatic development‖ that ―made too sharp a
distinction between… the Church as the life of the sacraments (and he admitted no
development of this aspect), and the Church as a school… and for ―erect[ing] a firm
border between reason and faith.‖ 652
On the contrary, Florovsky writes that Khomiakov operates from an ―organic
point of view‖ that ―predicate[s]… an original wholeness.‖ 653 More specifically,
Khomiakov saw the Church as a living organism ―of truth and love‖ 654: one that affirmed
the unity of reason and experience. According to Florovsky, ―the entire uniqueness of
Khomiakov‘s doctrine on the development of the Church is rooted in [the following]
statement‖: ―The mystery of life and its inner sources are inaccessible to science and
belong only to love.‖655 In spite of Khomiakov‘s proneness to exaggeration, this
statement contains the important truth that the Church‘s theology can never be divorced
from its experience, or, its life. In an aphorism that acts as a fitting complement to
Philaret‘s maxim that ―theology reasons,‖ Florovsky quotes Khomiakov‘s reminder that,
in the Church, ―teaching lives and life teaches.‖ 656
Florovsky considers that those who promote logical development assume that
theology and experience can be separated. Thus, he quotes Khomiakov as saying, ―The
652
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decision of the Church flows out of an inner sense proceeding from God, and not from
logical argumentation.‖ 657 He also notes that ―Khomiakov hesitated to acknowledge
dogmatic terminology as self-sufficient and adequate outside of experience, that is, as a
demonstrative exposition.‖ 658 Thus, Florovsky rejects a logical understanding of
dogmatic development because he sees it as implying that dogmas, once defined, have
become separable from Christian experience and are accessible to further development by
reason irrespective of one‘s faith. Such a view is in contradistinction to both Florovsky‘s
and Khomiakov‘s view of theology as a necessarily existential and living endeavor.
Furthermore, Florovsky rejects logical development because he believes it
imposes a mathematical model of knowledge onto theology. One might say that such an
imposition results in the ―pseudomorphosis‖ of a truly Christian theology. If one is in
search of a lens through which to view Florovsky‘s rejection of dogmatic development, it
is his 1924 essay ―On the Substantiation of Logical Relativism.‖ 659 ―When a geometer,‖
Florovsky writes, ―ascribes ‗truthfulness to any theorem… in essence he is asserting only
that the given proposition flows with logical necessity from the series of preceding ones,
from axioms and theorems.‖660 In other words, the geometer, or the logician, creates a
conceptual construct or system based upon laws derived from nature considered in the
abstract, and all subsequent occurrences of necessity conform to these laws. ―Dogmas,‖
on the other hand, writes Florovsky in ―Le Corps,‖ ―are not theoretical axioms from
which one can deduce new theorems. A dogma is precisely a witness, a rational sketch of
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a mystery of the faith.‖661 Its formulation is not a conclusion flowing from necessity, but
is an interpretation ―based on a particular, immediate, living relation to what occurs on
[the Church‘s] direct understanding of the experience.‖ 662
Florovsky‘s rejection of a logical understanding of doctrinal development is also
related to his view of the adequacy of dogmatic language. Again, he emphasized the
ability of human words to adequately express truth: an ability he believes is rooted in the
human possession of the imago Dei. He characterized the dogmas of the Church as
adequate expressions, or ―witnesses,‖ of certain aspects of the Christian experience of
revelation. They are, as it were, termini of the Christian process of reasoning that cannot
be ―developed‖ into more improved expressions in the future. Thus, Florovsky rejects
the possibility that the dogmatic formulas surrounding the Trinity, the hypostatic union,
or the essence-energies distinction are replaceable, or can yield to greater truths through a
process of deduction: ―As strange as it may appear, one can indeed say: dogmas arise,
dogmas are established, but they do not develop. And once established, a dogma is
perennial and already an immutable ‗rule of faith‘ ["regula fidei;" ho kanôn tis
pisteôs].‖663 In other words, Florovsky rejects the idea that there is a process of
development going on within the defined dogma, or truth of Christian experience, itself.
It is likely that Florovsky had in mind modern theories of logical development in
his rejections of doctrinal development. Though Newman‘s theory is today considered
synonymous with doctrinal development, it was not so with the Neo-scholastic, Roman
Catholic theology of the first half of the twentieth century. Then it was logical theories
of development—articulated, in part, against modernist theories of doctrine—that were
661
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considered as faithfully representing a Catholic understanding of how new doctrines are
defined.664 It was in this climate that Florovsky wrote on doctrinal development, and
there is some evidence that he knew the works of the above-mentioned advocates of
logical development.665
My pointing out of Florovsky‘s objections to logical development is intended to
act as a complement to Baker‘s and Williams‘ argument that Florovsky‘s rejection of
doctrinal development was a rejection of evolutionary and deterministic historical
theories. Indeed, Florovsky‘s reservations about predominantly logical epistemologies
are intimately connected with his theology of history. To repeat, the idea that growth in
theological understanding comes about solely through a syllogistic process implies the
separation of theology and experience. For Florovsky, of course, the Church‘s
experience originates in the historical events of revelation, and is further constituted by
the Church‘s creative reception of revelation in thought and deed throughout history.
Theology, according to Florovsky, is conducted ―from the living experience of the
Church.‖666 In logic, however, ―time stands still,‖ as knowledge comes about through an
exitus of abstraction from historical events and persons without a corresponding
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reditus.667 A theory of knowledge as a purely logical system means ―the thought
process… is exclusively ‗substantial,‘ and everything follows modo aeterno, purely
logically, through immanent movement. There is no place for acts or heroic ‗feats.‘‖ 668
Men and women are subsumed within this system, and thus, their actions are in no way
constitutive of their knowledge. Ironically, Florovsky regards logical theories of
doctrinal development, then, as implying that there is no development in history. 669
But Newman‘s theory is certainly not a theory of logical development in which
new dogmatic formulations come about through a syllogistic process. In fact, it is quite
the opposite, which causes Chadwick to comment: ―For centuries Catholic theologians
had explained doctrinal development by the use of logical inference. Yet the Christian
public now associates the idea of development with a thinker whose suspicion of Dr.
Hampden or the Reverend Charles Kingsley was as nothing compared with his distrust of
the syllogism.‖670 Walgrave effectively distinguishes Newman‘s theory of development
from logical theories, while at the same time explaining the place of logic within it:
Development of doctrine, then is a continuous organic process of life by which
the realizing faith of the Church expands itself into intellectual consciousness
under the guidance of its illative sense, which is itself guided by the allpenetrating presence of the Holy Spirit… Such a development is to be
distinguished from an application of logical devices to a set of original
propositions. The process uses reason but largely goes beyond it. There are
spontaneous processes in it that later will be found to be in accordance with the
rules of formal logic. For ‗we think in logic as we talk in prose.‘ But the process
as a whole cannot be described in terms of verbal logic, and some movements in it
may seem incongruous for a time but will be corrected afterward. ‗Nor do those
enunciations become logical, because theologians afterwards can reduce them to
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their relations to other doctrines or give them a position in the general system of
theology.671
Newman himself directly distinguishes his theory of the development of doctrine from
mathematical and logical deduction in the Essay on Development.672 However, his
Grammar of Assent, which many view as a continuation of his theory of doctrinal
development, is a tour de force against the assumption that the human thought process
operates in a purely logical manner. Indeed, on the title page of the Grammar, Newman
cited a phrase of St. Ambrose: ―Non in dialectica complacuit Deo salvum facere populum
suum‖—―It is not by logic that it has pleased God to save His people.‖ 673 In the
Grammar, Newman elaborates his view of knowledge as a personal and historical
process in which an interplay between the real and the notional continually takes place.
This view of knowledge as both personal and historical is a shared first principle between
Newman and Florovsky.
In ―Le Corps du Christ vivant,‖ Florovsky endorses the essence of Newman‘s
theory of development in the same breath in which he condemns logical development:
The truth is in effect given in its entirety at once. But the apprehension of the
truth is progressive. That which develops in the ages of Christian existence is not
the truth itself, but the witness of the Church… The witness of the Church
becomes more explicit with time, or is transmitted in a new vocabulary, but it is
always a witness of the same reality. 674
While endorsing such an understanding of development in relation to revelation,
however, Florovsky rejects ―dogmatic development‖ because he believes ―the term is
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contradictory.‖ The difference between Newman and Florovsky‘s understandings of
development is thus principally terminological. 675
Ironically, the only form of development Lossky appears to endorse is logical
development. Thus, Lossky writes that ―one can speak of dogmatic development only in
a very limited sense: in formulating a new dogma the Church takes as her point of
departure already existing dogmas, which constitute a rule of faith that she has in
common with her adversaries.‖ He then goes on to describe this process: ―Thus, the
dogma of Chalcedon makes use of that of Nicaea and speaks of the Son consubstantial
with the Father in His divinity, to say afterwards that He is also consubstantial with us in
His humanity…‖ Lossky also claims that the dogma of Christ‘s two wills at the Third
Council of Constantinople (681) logically followed upon Chalcedon‘s determination that
Christ possessed two natures, and that Palamas‘ essence-energies distinction follows
upon III Constantinople.676 Florovsky would of course agree that past dogmas help frame
the Church‘s approach to new questions or contexts, but he would maintain that the
―departure‖ point is always the experience and life of the Church, which is ―mystically
more primary‖ and ―broader and fuller than definitions.‖ 677
Florovsky‘s insistence on the irreplaceability of dogmatic definitions does not
constitute sufficient grounds on which to reject Newman‘s theory of doctrinal
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development, but it is a worthy dialogical point. Newman does not seem to entertain the
notion that the development of the Christian idea could result in a dogmatic formulation
eventually being replaced in favor of an improved formulation. As Lash points out, a
two-stage process of development emerges from Newman‘s writings: ―The first stage is
the development from implicit awareness to explicit articulation in a body of doctrine.
The second stage is the further elaboration and expansion of that body of doctrine.‖ 678
Thus, once an aspect of the Christian idea is formulated in an explicit dogmatic
statement, the only future development Newman sees it undergoing is a deepened
understanding of it in the minds of men and women. Indeed, Lash, who advocates for the
possibility of either altering or sometimes eradicating certain dogmatic formulations,
accuses Newman of ―betray[ing] an inadequate appreciation of [doctrines‘] historically
conditioned nature‖ by ―regarding their crystallisation in dogmatic statements as the term
of a process of ‗metaphysical development.‘‖679
One might also point to Newman‘s famed ―seven notes‖ of an authentic
development in establishing that he did not believe such development could result in the
replacement of a dogmatic definition. ―I venture to set down,‖ writes Newman, ―seven
Notes of varying cogency, independence and applicability, to discriminate healthy
developments of an idea from its state of corruption and decay.‖ 680 These ―notes‖
constitute criteria by which one may judge historically, though not with certainty,
whether or not a proposed development is, in fact, a development or a corruption. The
―notes‖ are: 1) preservation of type: that a true doctrinal development maintains a
678
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recognizable unity with the Christian idea; 2) continuity of principles: that a development
is consistent with those principles discernible in the Christian idea (such as the
incarnational principle); 3) power of assimilation: a development demonstrates its truth
by its ability to be exposed to other ideas without fear of corruption; 4) logical sequence:
that one can retrospectively discern that a development conforms with the proper rules of
reason, without holding that the development came about through strict logical
procedures; 5) anticipation of its future: that one can retrospectively discern earlier
historical evidence of what was later to be deemed a development; 6) conservative action
upon its past: that a true development does not reverse, but protects, the course of
doctrine that proceeded it; and 7) chronic vigour: that a true development will stand the
test of time, whereas a corruption exhibits a process of decay. 681 Taken together, these
―notes‖ seem to point to the conclusion that Newman did not believe the Church could
overthrow or reverse a previously defined doctrine either in its wording or its meaning.
But Newman did not provide a positive theological defense of why the dogmatic
formulation of an aspect of the Christian idea constituted a term in the process of
development, and what would prevent its replacement in the future. Plus, his persistent
stress on the inadequacy of dogmatic language leaves his theory open to the suggestion
that it allows for such replacements. Rowan Williams has used Newman‘s stress on the
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inadequacy of dogmatic formulations, and Newman‘s view that these formulations are
merely the necessary and unfortunate residue of the Church‘s response to heresy, to argue
for a ―doctrinal ecology‖ in which ―doctrinal definition is [considered]… itself a response
to narrowing over-definition… and is itself open to potential critique in the name of a
better sense of doctrinal ecology.‖682
It is perhaps no coincidence that Williams, who advocates for a doctrinal ecology,
is an astute commentator on Eastern Orthodox theology. Indeed, he wrote his
dissertation on Vladimir Lossky, whose understanding of apophaticism is still
representative in Orthodox theology today. 683 Williams and Lossky share a
predominantly negative attitude toward dogmatic formulation. Neither Lossky, nor the
overwhelming majority of Orthodox theologians today, would advocate for the
replacement of the dogmatic formulations of the past. Nevertheless, the seeds of a
doctrinal relativism are present in an exaggerated apophaticism, and even though other
strengths of Orthodoxy (such as its emphases on Liturgy and asceticism, and its
commitment to the patristic tradition) may keep these seeds from sprouting into outright
relativism, they may nevertheless sprout in other ways. Indeed, I maintain that they have
sprouted and manifested themselves in a negative attitude toward theology among many
Orthodox.
Florovsky‘s emphasis on the ability of human thought to convey divine truth
constitutes a positive response to such negative attitudes toward dogmatic formulation—
one that does not merely rely on recourse to authority. He roots this ability in human
beings‘ creation in the image of God and redemption accomplished in Christ.
682

R. Williams, ―Newman‘s Arians,‖ 285. Williams does admit that his conception of a doctrinal ecology
involves ―go[ing] well beyond Newman.‖
683
R. Williams, ―The Theology of Vladimir Nikolaievich Lossky: An Exposition and Critique.‖

198

Admittedly, Florovsky does not develop this connection between the imago Dei,
redemption, and human language in his later writings. However, it certainly underlies his
persistent defense of the Hellenistic categories in which Christianity was first expressed,
in addition to his qualification that theologians must be careful about exaggerating the
economic character of revelation.
Florovsky‘s estimation of dogmatic language was not purely cataphatic, as he
acknowledged the apophatic character of theology. Unlike others, however, Florovsky
better held in tension the cataphatic and apophatic elements of theology, as he did not use
the divine ineffability as an excuse for denigrating the cataphatic. In holding these in
tension, Florovsky illustrates an incarnational dogmatic theology. The principle
operative in the Incarnation of the Second Person of the Trinity is that human flesh can be
made to communicate the divine to men and women. This same principle is operative in
Florovsky‘s affirmation that dogma is able to convey the truths of Christian experience.
Both the over-qualification of human dogmatic formulations in an exaggerated
apophaticism, and the relativizing of dogmatic formulations under the assumption that
they are replaceable, ends up denigrating that which is human.
In conclusion, Florovsky‘s concern that dogmas be acknowledged as ―eternal and
inviolable ‗rule[s] of faith‘‖ does not necessitate a rejection of Newman‘s theory of
doctrinal development.684 In fact, it represents a development of an aspect of Newman‘s
theory that Newman himself did not take into account. While Newman affirmed that
dogmatic formulations represented the terms of the process of development, he did not
consistently emphasize the adequacy of these formulations. Such an emphasis is a sine
qua non of the judgment that development has taken place, for such a judgment assumes
684
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a non-relativistic valuation of human language. It also protects developments that have
been defined from one day being deemed the opposite, namely, regressions in the
Church‘s understanding of revelation.
Newman‘s use of the organic metaphor in describing doctrinal development also
would not constitute grounds for Florovsky‘s rejection of Newman‘s theory. As I have
explained, Florovsky‘s rejection of certain applications of the organic metaphor to history
was not equivalent to a whole scale rejection of that metaphor. What he rejected was a
biologistic conception of creation that viewed history as the pre-determined and
necessary evolution of creation irrespective of the free choices of persons. But such is
not the only application of the organic metaphor to history. Florovsky‘s writings
illustrate his consistent recourse to a biblically and patristically-inspired organic view of
history, namely, history as the completion of the Body of Christ. He regards this
completion as a synergetic process that is composed of both divine and human actions.
Significantly, he includes the work of theology among the human actions that contribute
to the completion of the Body of Christ, thus assigning an organic character to theology,
as well.
Again, Florovsky understood theology as the application of human reason to the
Christian experience of revelation—as the gradual disclosure and profession of that
which the Church possesses in its fullness. 685 George Williams, seemingly aware of the
various understandings of the idea of doctrinal development, qualifies Florovsky‘s
rejection of doctrinal development as follows: ―Insofar as the Church is for him in fact a
supernatural organism as a congeries of redeemed persons, he obviously acknowledges,
indeed works continuously with, the idea of development in the sense of renewal,
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clarification, and exfoliation…‖686 As I have shown, Florovsky believed theology‘s
unfolding of Christian experience manifested itself in organic results such as ―growth‖ in
the Church‘s understanding of this experience, in addition to ―fruits‖ such as dogmas and
systems. These latter fruits spring from both the need for a free human response and
witness to God‘s revelation, in addition to the human epistemological need for the
rational elaboration of faith. 687 Once again, Newman regards doctrinal development as
the unfolding of the idea of Christianity in the minds and hearts of men and women. This
process of unfolding is manifested in, among others things, dogmatic definitions, which
are then ordered into a system.
I submit that what Florovsky regards as theology is essentially what Newman
regards as doctrinal development: it is the unfolding of the Christian idea in the mind of
the Church. It is therefore unsurprising that Florovsky commends Soloviev‘s
understanding of doctrinal development for ―establish[ing] a method for dogmatic
theology.‖688 I wrote above that Florovsky‘s call for a Neo-patristic synthesis was simply
a call to return to a proper method of theology—one that did not merely repeat the
answers of the Fathers, but existentially and rationally appropriated them. Because
Florovsky equated theology with doctrinal development, and because he equated a Neopatristic synthesis with theology, it is also therefore unsurprising that he equated a Neopatristic synthesis with doctrinal development. He writes,
This call to ―go back‖ to the Fathers can be easily misunderstood. It does not
mean a return to the letter of old patristic documents. To follow in the steps of
the Fathers does not mean ―jurare in verba magistri.‖ What is really meant and
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required is not a blind or servile imitation and repetitions but rather a further
development of this patristic teaching, but homogeneous and congenial. 689
Florovsky then goes on to quote Newman in support of this call for a theology that
creatively appropriates and develops the work of the Fathers: ―As Cardinal Newman said
on one occasion: ‗The Fathers are our teachers but not our confessors or casuists; they are
the prophets of great things, not the spiritual directors of individuals.‘‖690 It would be a
stretch to assign any constructive role to Newman‘s work in Florovsky‘s call for a Neopatristic synthesis. However, Florovsky‘s association here of Neo-patristic synthesis,
development, and Newman perhaps shows that he viewed Newman‘s theory of
development as harmonious with that call for a Neo-patristic synthesis that has been so
influential in modern Orthodoxy.
Newman‘s principal purpose in using the organic metaphor in the Essay on
Development was to argue that the growth exhibited by organisms analogously pointed
toward the Church‘s growth in its understanding of the Christian idea. Florovsky, as I
have shown, does not disagree with this basic and essential idea that the Church grows in
its understanding of the Christian idea, or, revelation. That said, I believe that
Florovsky‘s particular organic understanding of Church history has the potential to give a
greater theological grounding to Newman‘s theory of development. It would be wrong to
claim that Newman‘s theory needs ―baptism,‖ since it is already written within the
Christian tradition, and its object is the doctrinal history of that tradition. In addition,
Newman shows a concern with establishing that development is a process illustrated not
only in nature, but also revelation.
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Pushing the sacramental analogy, however, one might claim that Newman‘s
theory could use ―chrismation‖—that is, a further garbing in the theological language of
the Church. Newman was a controversialist and an apologist. His immediate purpose in
positing the theory of doctrinal development was to argue for the probability of such
development: that it is reasonable to believe that ―new‖ doctrines would arise as a result
of the Church‘s growth in the understanding of revelation. The impetus behind this
purpose was the Protestant charge that certain Roman Catholic doctrines were
corruptions since there was no definitive evidence of their having been held by the early
Church. Having argued for the probability of developments, Newman did not concern
himself with the full theological implications of his theory.
Later commentators on Newman‘s theory of doctrinal development have also not
yet explored many of its theological implications. Instead, the process of its reception
has been mainly historical, confined to the attempt to determine whether or not the
history of Christian doctrine justifies it. The theological treatment of it has principally
involved establishing whether or not it expresses an orthodox view of revelation,
Tradition, and the Spirit‘s guidance of the Church. This dialogue with Florovsky
provides an opportunity for doctrinal development to further pass through the sieve of
Christian Hellenism.
Florovsky‘s emphasis on askesis offers an important critique of Newman‘s
organic view of the epistemology of development. Newman held that the notional
development of an idea was an inevitable result of the nature of human reason, which
judges, classifies, and abstracts when confronted with an object. This development,
writes Newman, ―is not an effect of wishing and resolving, or of forced enthusiasm, or of
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any mechanism of reasoning, or of any mere subtlety of intellect; but comes of its own
innate power of expansion within the mind in its season, though with the use of reflection
and argument and original thought…‖691 Newman‘s qualification at the end of this
statement is instructive, for though he assigned a place for human action in the process of
development, his emphasis was on development as a function of nature rather than will.
Florovsky opposed any understanding of history that did not adequately accord a
role for human action and freedom. Thus, he would also oppose any understanding of
theology, or, doctrinal development, that did not incorporate human freedom in the
Church‘s growth in the understanding of revelation. He accordingly would not regard the
doctrinal developments of the Church as mere inevitabilities of time and changed
circumstance. Nor would he regard them solely as necessities flowing from the nature of
human reason. Instead, he would regard them as results of human ascetical activity, as
well.
Such an ascetical understanding of doctrinal development is in continuity with the
principles of Newman‘s theology. Though Newman did not have a developed theology
of personhood (from which Florovsky‘s ascetical emphasis springs), he affirmed the
ability of human beings to contribute to their salvation through their actions as attested to
by his recommendation of the practices of prayer, fasting, and watchfulness in his
Anglican sermons. Perhaps Newman would have better clarified the role of human
freedom in a later edition of the Essay on Development if not for his conformity to
Roman Catholic custom upon his acceptance into its fold. In Newman‘s understanding,
the Roman Catholic Church considered ascetical speculations to be the purview of trained
theologians, which Newman was not. He therefore confined himself to both preaching
691
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and practicing the ascetical disciplines officially recommended by the Church. By his
own admission in 1857 Newman said, ―I have not written on dogmatics or asceticism
since I have been a Catholic, and I suppose never shall—because I gave up private
judgment when I became one.‖692
The ascetical corrective provided by Florovsky enables Newman‘s theory of
doctrinal development to be not only descriptive, but prescriptive. Doctrinal
development describes not only the history of the Church thus far, but what that history
should be. The prescriptive character of doctrinal development follows from the views
that such development is consonant with human beings‘ creation in the imago Dei and
their redemption in Christ. God‘s revelation is not merely to be passively received and
preserved by men and women; rather, revelation is given in order they may creatively
appropriate it through their reason and faith. This appropriation results not only in
defined dogmas, but in other creative expressions that make up the life of the Church.
The theory of doctrinal development is thus a theology of history, and the history of the
Church is theology. The ascetic activity of the Church, as exercised in Christian
rationality, testifies that ―the future is more truly and profoundly revealed when seen as
an obligation rather than as an expectation and premonition. The future is not merely
something exacted or awaited—it is something created.‖693
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Florovsky‘s belief that theology is an integral part of the growth of the Church,
the Body of Christ, also offers potential for the development of Newman‘s theory, as well
as a critique of certain Orthodox understandings of theology today. In Florovsky‘s
assessment, ―Dogmatics and asceticism are organically and inseparably brought together
in the system of St. Maximus.‖ For Maximus, men‘s and women‘s askesis is ordered
toward deification. Florovsky interprets Maximus as holding that knowledge is an
integral part of men‘s and women‘s deification, and thus, the deification of the Church
and all creation. Florovsky writes, ―And knowledge is man‘s reply, man‘s response.
Cognition of nature as God‘s creation has its own special religious significance. In
contemplation the soul is pacified—but contemplation itself is possible through apatheia.
A new motive is creatively introduced into the harmony of the cosmos.‖694 According to
both Maximus and Florovsky, then, the priestly and prophetic offices are interrelated: the
work of theology is part of men‘s and women‘s sanctification of the world. In Ways,
Florovsky quoted Archpriest I. Slobodskoi as saying, ―The development of dogmas is
nothing other than the development of our whole life, of man himself, in the image of
Christ.‖695 Because Florovsky also regards men and women as microcosms of the
Church, he holds that, inasmuch as dogmatic development involves the development of
men and women into the image of Christ, it also describes the development of the life of
the entire Church. In other words, he holds that dogmatic development—the Church‘s
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growth in the understanding of revelation—is ordered toward, and inseparable from, the
Church‘s growth as the Body of Christ.696
Florovsky saw the separation of dogmatics and asceticism, in addition to their
conflation, as one of the main indicators of the decline of modern Russian theology. ―In
any event,‖ he writes, ―one cannot substitute asceticism for dogmatics, and neither can
one dissolve dogmatics in asceticism. Such a temptation is always an indication of a
theological decline.‖697 Florovsky perceived this temptation in those who rejected the
idea of doctrinal development. He cautioned that its rejection was the precursor to, if not
the indicator of, relativism and the reduction of religion to morality. What is more,
informed by the Maximian cosmology, he implies that the rejection of doctrinal
development introduces a division into the totus Christus inasmuch as it does not give
any meaningful role to rational activity in the building up of the Body of Christ and the
deification of the world.698
In order to be fair to those Orthodox whose rejections of doctrinal development
have received the most attention in this dissertation—Lossky and Louth—I do not think
that either of them would directly claim that theology plays no role in one‘s deification.
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Nor do I think they desire that human categories of thought be done away with in favor of
experience. Their rejection of doctrinal development appears to be largely a result of
their lack of familiarity with the theory itself (at least in the case of Lossky), in addition
to a reaction against Western rationalism. 699 But ideas have consequences, and the
negative attitudes toward theology in which their rejections of doctrinal development are
couched are indicative of anti-intellectualistic tendencies present among some Orthodox
today. As Florovsky demonstrates, the proper response to rationalism is not the rejection
of reason, but the cultivation of Christian rationality.
I have already pointed out that the mutual interpenetration Newman attributed to
the relationship between real and notional knowledge offers the potential to posit a closer
link between doctrinal development and the spiritual growth of the Church (assuming the
difference for now). Though Newman maintained that doctrinal development was of the
notional realm, he also maintained that the notional affects the real. In the Grammar of
Assent, he limited his discussion to the purifying effect that the notional has on the real.
That is, he regarded the notional work of theology as preventing religion from falling into
the errors of superstition and devotional excess. However, it is reasonable to suppose that
the notional could have more than a preventative role to serve in its relation with religion.
Religion, as represented by the real, aims at the growth in its members‘ relationship with
God. This growth is expressed by Roman Catholics and Orthodox alike as a growth in

699

Louth is clearly well-versed in Newman‘s theology, and thus, the theory of doctrinal development. In
addition to his articles on Newman I have already referenced, one should note that he devotes the
conclusion of his Discerning the Mystery (132-147) to praising Newman‘s understanding of the
relationship between faith and reason, and thus, his understanding of theology. Therefore, his more recent,
cursory treatments of Newman‘s theory of development (such as his dismissive statement in the foreword
to John Behr‘s Formation of Christian Theology series: ―Orthodox theologians ought to have more
problems with [the idea of the development of doctrine], a fruity of Romanticism, popularized by Cardinal
Newman, than they often seem to‖ [Behr, The Formation of Christian Theology, vol. 1, The Way to Nicaea
(Crestwood, NY: SVS Press, 2001), xii.] are puzzling, to say the least.

208

the participation in God, or, deification. If the notional continually helps maintain the
integrity of religion, and if religion is ordered toward participation in God, it follows that
the notional work of theology has a contributive role to play in deification.
However, the idea that doctrinal development is connected with the spiritual
growth of the Church is in more direct harmony with the principles of Newman‘s
theology. Newman‘s reading of the Eastern Fathers led him to characterize the goal of
the Christian life as deification. Though now an opponent of Newman‘s theory of
development, Andrew Louth argues that deification was the central theme of Newman‘s
1838 Lectures on Justification.700 As too was the case with the Fathers, Newman‘s path
to his emphasis on deification was through Christology. C. Stephen Dessain, in his essay
on ―Cardinal Newman and the Eastern Tradition,‖ expresses the connection between
deification and the Christological dogmas well: ―One of the reasons why the Greek
Fathers of the fourth century defended so firmly the divinity of Christ and the divinity of
the Holy Spirit, was the connection of these truths with the divinization, the deification of
the Christian.‖701
Benjamin King shows that Newman‘s Christology did not remain stagnant during
his Anglican years, but underwent considerable development. Certainly, as King argues,
Newman‘s study of the early Church‘s Christological controversies and the struggle for
appropriate theological language provided him with a model of the doctrinal development
that is ever taking place in the Church. Yet, it is also likely that Newman‘s Christological
reflections contributed to his formulation of the theory of doctrinal development. More
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specifically, Christ‘s deification of human nature, and subsequently all creation, acts as a
pattern for the development of doctrine. Newman held that the entire life of Christ
constituted the progressive deification of human nature.702 As especially instanced in Lk
2:52—―and Jesus advanced in wisdom and age and favor before God and men‖—
Newman held that this process included the deification of the human intellect. What is
more, Newman affirmed that Christ would accomplish within each of us the progressive
deification he accomplished through his Incarnation, life, death, and resurrection: ―Christ
Himself vouchsafes to repeat in each of us in figure and mystery all that He did and
suffered in the flesh.‖703 Our progressive deification, modeled after Christ‘s deification
of human nature, also includes the deification of our intellect. King notes that ―Newman
followed Origen in making the resurrected Christ his intellectual pattern of life.‖ 704
There is an interesting, and perhaps unmistakable, parallel when one considers
Newman‘s understanding of revelation and deification in the light of development.
Newman asserts that revelation has been given in its fullness, but one can grow in his or
her understanding of it over the course of time. So also, Newman holds that deification
(or justification) has been achieved in its fullness through the salvific actions of Christ,
but the individual Christian can grow in his or her participation in God:
The fact that we are the temple of God does not admit of more or less; such words
have no meaning when applied to it… But when we compare the various orders of
just and acceptable beings with one another, we see that though they all are in
God's favour, some may be more ‗pleasant,‘ ‗acceptable,‘ ‗righteous,‘ than others,
and may have more of the light of God's countenance shed on them; as a glorified
Saint is more acceptable than one still in the flesh. 705
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The Orthodox theologian George Dragas also sees this connection between
Newman‘s principle of development and the deification of the Christian:
Newman developed catholically and believed in catholic development. He was
concerned with human development in God‘s grace, rather than the development
of abstract forms… [M]ankind is given in the pentecostal gift the ability to
participate in [the resurrection] and taste its powers so that it may transform the
old history and proceed through death to the pleroma of the resurrection.
Christians are catholics in via, in development and growth. They seek to integrate
themselves with the whole world, because they know that all belongs to Him who
makes, redeems from sin and gives the gift of eternal and blessed life. Christians
know that He is constantly coming to make them whole in His wholeness and
integrate the world with catholicity. This is what Newman has bequeathed to the
modern Roman Church and through her to all the Christian churches
everywhere—the catholic truth of the Risen Lord with all its implications for
Christian life and growth in history. 706
Dragas here interprets Newman‘s work as affirming the truth that men and women are
microcosms—that the development that happens within Christian men and women helps
bring about the transformation of the world. The deification of the Christian, which
includes the deification of the intellect, also serves as a microcosm of the progressive
deification of the Church. As Newman writes, ―[T]he heart of every Christian ought to
represent in miniature the Catholic Church, since one Spirit makes both the whole Church
and every member of it to be His Temple.‖707 A number of commentators on Newman
have observed that he believed doctrinal development to represent not only a
development of the minds of individual Christians, but also a development of the ―mind
of the Church.‖ Because Newman regarded the development of the mind as part of the
process of deification, and because he held that doctrinal development represented a
development in the mind of the entire Church, it follows that a correlation between
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doctrinal development and the deification of the Church is consistent with the principles
of Newman‘s theology.
Framing Newman‘s theory of doctrinal development in terms of the Church‘s
growth as the Body of Christ perhaps provides a solution to the query about whether or
not doctrinal development corresponds to the growth of the Church in holiness. Newman
scholars have struggled with this question, and have more often than not rejected the link,
because they seem to be operating with a predominantly voluntaristic notion of holiness.
One would search in vain for historical proof that the Church has cumulatively developed
in such holiness. But holiness belongs to the Church primarily as a result of its status as
the Body of Christ which is permeated by the Holy Spirit. It is primarily an ontological,
rather than a moral, characteristic. Florovsky rightly maintains that ―[h]oliness comes
from the Holy One, i.e. only from God. To be holy for a man means to share the Divine
Life. Holiness is available to individuals only in the community, or rather in the
‗fellowship of the Holy Spirit.‘‖708 As one of Newman‘s sermon titles puts it,
―Righteousness [is] not of us, but in us.‖ 709 Certainly the actions of the members of the
Church contribute to the building up of the Body of Christ, but the Divine Actor is also at
work in ways that cannot be measured. Because knowledge is intrinsic to deification, one
can safely affirm that doctrinal development contributes to the Church‘s growth in
holiness, even if such growth is often imperceptible. Such an affirmation is theological,
if not always empirical.
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It is interesting to note that Dessain, who has written on the Eastern character of
Newman‘s theology, sees a parallel between Newman and Florovsky precisely in regard
to their Christocentric conceptions of the Church:
Newman held to what he had learned from the Fathers, in spite of the
predominant opinion of the theologians and those in high places at the time. It is
only when Newman‘s view of the Church as a communion and not merely an
institution is recognized, as it has been in Lumen Gentium, the Decree on the
Church at the Second Vatican Council, that the way is properly prepared for the
complete reunion of East and West. Newman‘s teaching and that of one of the
most authoritative of the modern exponents of Orthodox ecclesiology, Father
George Florovsky, seem to be in entire agreement in this matter. Khomiakoff and
the doctrine of Sobornost treat the Church only as a communion and base
ecclesiology too exclusively on the Holy Spirit, just as at times the Latins have
based it too exclusively on Christ and the authority he conferred. Surely the
genuine and traditional ecclesiology is that in which Newman and Florovsky
agree, which tries to be faithful to the actual plan of salvation, in which the work
of the Holy Spirit in forming the Church derives from the work of Christ. He
gives the Spirit, and our life in him results from the gift of the Spirit. 710
Dessain‘s statement about the identity between Newman‘s and Florovsky‘s ecclesiology
certainly needs qualification, and his estimations about the ecumenical potential of
communion ecclesiology are perhaps a bit grandiose. However, contained within his
statement is also a truth, namely, that Newman and Florovsky both viewed the Church as
one because it is the Body of Christ indwelt by the Holy Spirit. The Church is also one in
its eschatological goal, namely, its participation in the divine nature. All the activity of
the Church—including its theological activity—if it is meaningful, is ordered toward the
accomplishment of this goal.
I mentioned earlier in this chapter that Florovsky could only accept the idea of
doctrinal development if it displayed the characteristics of a truly Orthodox
understanding of Tradition: if it was Christological, ecclesiological, and eschatological.
As I have shown, these characteristics are indeed implicit in Newman‘s understanding of
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doctrinal development. He simply did not have the wherewithal, or opportunity, to make
them explicit during his lifetime. In Unfolding Revelation, Walgrave provides a
taxonomy of theories of doctrinal development in the Church‘s history, categorizing them
as either ―logical,‖ ―transformistic,‖ or ―theological.‖ He designates Newman‘s theory as
a ―theological theory of development.‖711 It is my hope that further dialogue with
Florovsky and Eastern Orthodox theology will help Newman‘s theory to realize this
designation.
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CHAPTER THREE: NEWMAN AND FLOROVSKY ON THE ROLE OF
AUTHORITY IN DOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENT
Inevitably, it seems that all roads of ecumenical investigation lead in some way to
that ―greatest obstacle‖ to ecumenical reunion: the papacy. It is no different with an
Orthodox-Catholic dialogue on the concept of doctrinal development. I have thus far
argued that Newman and Florovsky share many similar emphases in their respective
understandings of revelation and Tradition, and thus, that the understanding of revelation
and Tradition operative in Newman‘s theory of development is harmonious with the
Orthodox understanding of the same. Furthermore, I have shown that Florovsky accepted
the idea of doctrinal development, and that his objections to it were not directed toward
the principles of Newman‘s theory.
However, there remains the question of whether or not Newman‘s theory of
development is inextricably bound to a particular, Roman Catholic conception of
authority embodied in the papacy. In the Essay on Development, Newman maintains that
admission of the principle of doctrinal development leads to the further admission that
―an infallible developing authority [is] to be expected.‖ As one might expect, Newman‘s
description of the characteristics belonging to this infallible authority resemble those the
Roman Catholic Church locates in the pope and the Magisterium. Shortly after the
publication of the Essay, Anglican critics such as James Mozley and Frederick Maurice
saw Newman‘s understanding of authority as central to his idea of doctrinal development.
Mozley went so far as to write, ―The doctrine of the Papal Infallibility comes out as the
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keystone of Mr. Newman‘s whole argument, and according as he proves, or fails to
prove, that doctrine, that argument stands or falls.‖ 712
The Orthodox theologian Andrew Louth also makes this charge in his
aforementioned essay, ―Is Development of Doctrine a Valid Category for Orthodox
Theology?‖ He holds that Newman‘s theory of development ―involves at least three
specific senses, or connotations or entailments‖ that dovetail with each other. These
three ―senses‖ are as follows: one, Newman‘s use of the organic metaphor to claim that
the Church actually grows, or develops, in its understanding of revelation; two, that the
occurrence of these developments is unpredictable; and three, that the unpredictability of
these developments requires a clearly-recognized infallible authority who has the power
to judge what constitutes a development and what does not.713
Louth‘s charge on this third point—that Newman‘s theory requires an infallible
authority—is worth quoting in full, for it provides a fitting summary of the issue at the
heart of this chapter:
Newman‘s idea of development entails an infallible teaching office to adjudicate.
Here Newman abandons his reliance on the organic model. For him, there needs
to be some definite way of distinguishing authentic development from corruption.
Newman is no longer prepared to stick to his organic metaphor, and makes it clear
that recognition of authentic development ultimately needs an unquestioned and
unquestionable authority, such as developed in the teaching office of the see of St
Peter (though there is a certain circularity in the argument here, as the
development of the teaching office of the pope is an example of development).
These three specific points are linked. The organic idea opens up the notion of
development, taking it beyond mere logical development; this is emphasized in
the second point, which makes a great deal (particularly in the examples Newman
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gives from church history) of the way in which these developments could hardly
have been predicted; which opens the way for Newman‘s final point, that an
infallible teaching authority is necessary to distinguish authentic development
from corruption. It is important to realize that this final point is essential for
Newman. Discussions of development, often forgetting that this was where his
argument was leading, simply recount the various tests he gave for distinguishing
authentic development from corruption—Preservation of Type or Idea, Continuity
of Principles, Power of Assimilation, Early Anticipation, Logical Sequence,
Preservative Additions, and Chronic Continuance (to use the terminology of the
first edition of the Essay). But these tests need to be applied, and Newman was
not prepared to leave their application to scholars and theologians. 714
Louth‘s charge is significant for a couple of reasons. For one, Louth is an astute
scholar of Newman. In an earlier work he wrote while still an Anglican—Discerning the
Mystery—he even celebrated Newman for his ―stress on performance, doing, act, [as]
central to the understanding of the notion of faith.‖715 This stress, as I pointed out in
Chapter Two, is central to Newman‘s and Florovsky‘s understanding of doctrinal
development. Thus, one cannot so easily chalk up Louth‘s perception of a necessary link
between doctrinal development and the particular Roman Catholic understanding of
authority to a failure to thoroughly engage with the works of Newman, as is perhaps the
case with other Orthodox authors. Louth has rightly recognized that ―To understand
Newman we must read lots, not just the great books, but sermons, essays, letters, and so
on.‖716
Two, Louth‘s charge goes beyond a mere hermeneutics of suspicion that
condemns doctrinal development because of guilt by association with the nineteenthcentury ultramontane climate of the Roman Catholic Church from which it emerged.
Undoubtedly that association is in the back of Louth‘s mind, as is perhaps his knowledge
714

Ibid., 51-52.
Louth, Discerning the Mystery, 137.
716
Louth, ―The Nature of Theological Understanding: Some Parallels between Newman and Gadamer,‖ in
Tradition Renewed: The Oxford Movement Conference Papers, ed. Geoffrey Rowell (London: Darton,
Longman, and Todd, 1986), 97.
715

217

that Soloviev‘s essay on dogmatic development was part of his larger volume—The
History and Future of Theocracy—which attempted to justify a Christian theocracy with
the pope as its head and center. Nevertheless, Louth confines himself to arguing that the
Roman Catholic understanding of the papacy is intrinsic to Newman‘s understanding of
doctrinal development; that a centralized, infallible authority who can label some
formulations of the Christian idea developments, and others perversions, is necessary if
the theory of doctrinal development is to exist as anything more than a theory.
Florovsky clearly did not see such a necessary link between doctrinal
development and the Roman Catholic understanding of authority. He notes the
connection in Ways, but it does not dissuade him from perceiving doctrinal development
as ―a method for dogmatic theology‖ that affirmed human persons‘ ascetical vocation to
witness to revelation in thought and life. 717 But, as I will show, Florovsky recognizes that
the issue of authority is indeed intrinsic to the idea of doctrinal development. At the
same time, he does not accept the Roman Catholic understanding of authority. Therefore,
an examination of Florovsky on the relation between doctrinal development and authority
provides an interesting counter to both Newman and Louth.
Much has been written on Newman and his views of authority and the papacy,
necessitating that I establish some parameters for my discussion in this chapter. I will
mostly deal with Newman‘s views on infallibility. More specifically, I will explain why
Newman believed an infallible authority was necessary to pronounce upon developments
of doctrine. In the first two chapters I attempted to clarify the theological principles
present in Newman‘s understanding of revelation and Tradition that relate to doctrinal
development. I will do the same in this chapter on Newman‘s understanding of authority.
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Accordingly, I will show that the role Newman assigns to authority in the process of
development conforms to his view of Christianity as an incarnational, historical, and
living reality that retains a place for both divine and human activity. In so doing, I hope
to offer a perspective on Newman‘s understanding of authority that differs from previous
historical surveys of his view of infallibility. 718
As I will demonstrate, Florovsky also shows a concern that his understanding of
authority conform to the Christocentric, or Chalcedonian, hermeneutic. He affirms that
the hierarchy has a visible, concrete role in the process of doctrinal development. Yet he
parts ways with Newman in holding that doctrinal developments require no further
―enfleshment‖ through formal guarantees of their truth provided by authorities invested
with infallibility. Instead, Florovsky holds that the very life intrinsic to the process of
doctrinal development constitutes the only such guarantee of the truth of developments
for each Christian person. In the Dialogue portion of this chapter, I will evaluate
Newman‘s and Florovsky‘s views of authority and doctrinal development by the same
Christological litmus test to which they subject themselves.

3.1: NEWMAN ON DOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENT AND AUTHORITY
A. DOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENT AND THE NEED FOR AN INFALLIBLE AUTHORITY
Newman maintained that all the members of the Church participate in the process
of doctrinal development. But he also maintained that there must be an authority that
assists them in distinguishing true developments from false ones. Thus, Chapter 2,
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Section 2 of his Essay on Development is entitled ―An Infallible Developing Authority to
be Expected.‖ Newman‘s language in this section is primarily apologetic, concerned
with arguing that a divinely-bestowed authority is a consequence of a divinely-given
revelation. Like the idea of doctrinal development, Newman‘s argument for the need of
such an authority temporarily served in the Essay as a ―hypothesis… required by the facts
of the case, and reconciling them with each other.‖719 However, Newman‘s theological
convictions undergird his apologetics. In the paragraphs below, I will try to further
clarify the theological themes that lead Newman to expect such an authority.
I established in Chapter One of this dissertation that Newman‘s theory of
doctrinal development followed from his particular understanding of the mode and
character of revelation. So also, Newman believes the need for an authority in the
process of development follows from the mode and character of revelation. He writes,
―…[S]ome authority there must be if there is a revelation given, and other authority there
is none but she. A revelation is not given, if there be no authority to decide what it is that
is given.‖720
According to Newman, if developments of doctrine are to be expected, so is an
authority that can guarantee that they are, in fact, developments. The admittance of
doctrinal developments, he writes, leads to ―the next question… What are they?‖ In order
to answer this question, Newman holds that ―some rule is necessary for arranging and
authenticating these various expressions and results of Christian doctrine.‖ This rule,
which he identifies with authority, is to have a dual function: one, it will serve to
discriminate true from false developments; two, it will serve to discriminate the greater
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from the less, since ―no one will maintain that all points of belief are of equal
importance.‖ In summary, Newman writes, ―If the developments… are to take place to
any great extent, and without them it is difficult to see how Christianity can exist at all…
surely an authority is necessary to impart decision to what is vague, and confidence to
what is empirical, to ratify the successive steps of so elaborate a process, and to secure
the validity of inferences which are to be made the premisses of more remote
investigations.‖721
Newman not only holds that there must there be an authority to ―ratify‖
developments of doctrine, but also that this authority must be infallible. He defines
infallibility as ―the power of deciding whether this, that, and a third, and any number of
theological or ethical statements are true.‖722 By an infallible authority, Newman writes,
―we mean no more than that what he says is always true, always to be believed, always to
be done.‖723 According to Newman, the infallible character of the authority is a corollary
of the infallible character of revelation. Just as revelation comes with ―a profession of
infallibility‖—inasmuch as it comes from the divinely-infallible authority of God—so
also it is probable that God would provide His Church with an infallible authority to
guarantee the truth of those doctrines that Newman deemed ―commensurate with
revelation.‖724
As is still the case today, the idea of infallibility was misunderstood and muchmaligned during Newman‘s time. In response, he further explicated the notion of
infallibility by clarifying what it was not, thereby illustrating some of the limits of
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infallibility. For instance, he distinguished the gift of infallibility from the inspiration
enjoyed by the biblical authors. Newman characterized inspiration as ―positive,‖ for it
refers to the fact ―that the Divine Inspirer… acted, not immediately on the books
themselves, but through the men who wrote them.‖725 He characterized infallibility, on
the other hand, as ―negative,‖ for it merely guarantees that the ―out come‖ (the definition)
of the process of doctrinal development was a true representation of revelation. ―[A]
definition,‖ he writes, ―may be absolute truth, though the grounds suggested for it in the
definition, the texts, the patristic authorities, the historical passages, are all mistakes.‖ 726
Moreover, Avery Dulles points out that Newman did not consider infallibility to be ―a
distinct charism or infused gift…‖ 727 Whereas inspiration was such a charism or gift,
enabling the inspired authors to faithfully communicate divine revelation in cooperation
with God‘s guiding hand, infallibility does not dwell within any of the Church‘s
members; it is an occasional, external assistance.
Newman also distinguished infallibility from certitude, since these two concepts
were often confused in religious controversy. ―A certitude,‖ according to Newman, ―is
directed to this or that particular proposition; it is not a faculty or gift, but a disposition of
mind relatively to a definite case which is before me.‖ It is an act of the mind that has
arrived at a state of ―peacefulness,‖ or, ―of security and of repose‖ in its assent toward the
truth of a proposition. Newman explains that this state of certitude follows a process of
reasoning, in which a person has investigated the truth of a proposition through real and
notional means. He famously referred to each person‘s process of reasoning as the
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―Illative Sense,‖ and held that it is the responsibility of each man and woman to cultivate
this process so that it reaches true certitudes. 728
Newman sees an analogy between certitude and conscience in men and women,
the former being the act of the ―intellectual sanction‖ and the latter being the act of the
―moral sanction.‖ Whereas one‘s mind arrives at certitude after engaging in
―examination and proof‖ about the truth of a particular proposition, one‘s conscience
arrives at a judgment of right conduct after examining what ―hic et nunc is to be done as
being good, or to be avoided as evil.‖ 729 According to Newman, ―[Conscience] is the
loud announcement of the principle of right in the details of conduct, as the sense of
certitude is the clear witness of what is true.‖730 He admits that the judgments of both
certitude and conscience may be based on faulty reasoning. Nevertheless, Newman holds
that one is bound to follow them as the supreme authorities in the realm of the particular.
―Infallibility, on the contrary, is just that which certitude is not; it is a faculty or
gift, and relates, not to some one truth in particular, but to all possible propositions in a
given subject-matter,‖ writes Newman.731 Whereas certitude is particular and directed to
definite propositions, infallibility is general and encompasses numerous propositions—
past, present, and future. Newman reasons that if persons are infallible, it means that
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whatever they pronounce on propositions within a given sphere—assuming certain
formal procedures are followed—will fall under the rubric of infallibility: ―An infallible
authority is certain in every particular case that may arise; but a man who is certain in
some one definite case, is not on that account infallible.‖732 According to Newman‘s
logic, if God has graced His Church with such an infallible authority, individual members
of the Church may have certitude about the truth of all propositions within the sphere of
dogma that the Church has proclaimed and will proclaim.
I have above generally sketched out why Newman believed that divine revelation
and doctrinal development required an infallible authority. He saw that the particular
mode and character of revelation required doctrinal development, but that not all of the
members of the Church can be certain about which developments are true representations
of revelation, nor can they be certain about the hierarchy of authentic developments.
Therefore, an authority is needed who can infallibly guarantee the truth of doctrinal
developments and their place within the larger system of Christian truth. But Newman‘s
argument raises questions: whence the need for such a guarantee? Why is it important
that the members of the Church have certitude about doctrinal developments? And why
is it necessary that an infallible authority supply this certitude through ratifying doctrinal
developments?
Some commentators on Newman‘s thought characterize the longing for certitude
as a phenomenon peculiar to post-Reformation history. In ―St. Augustine and the
Modern World,‖ Erich Przywara describes the pathos of Western thought since the
Reformation as a ―terrified longing for assurance‖: from Descartes‘ belief that men and
women can achieve subjective certitude in ―clear and distinct ideas,‖ to Hegel‘s
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pantheistic identification of human thought with divine thought, to Kierkegaard‘s
abandonment of the search for certitude in favor of a fearful resignation to God in His
absolute transcendence. 733 More recently, in Papal Infallibility: A Protestant Evaluation
of an Ecumenical Issue, Mark Powell has proposed that the Roman Catholic definition of
papal infallibility at Vatican I ―represents the culmination of the desire for religious
epistemic certainty that has characterized the West at least since the Reformation.‖734
Newman, however, understands men‘s and women‘s desire for certitude as a
function of human nature. He writes, ―It is the law of my mind to seal up the conclusions
to which ratiocination has brought me, by that formal assent which I have called
certitude.‖735 He locates the activities of reason and conscience in the order of nature
(not grace), and claims that reason is ordered toward a guarantee of the truth of its
assents, just as conscience is ordered toward the rightness of its judgments.736 Faith,
which for Newman is a function of reason, especially requires this certitude, since it is an
assent to the truth of the Object whose existence grounds the existence of all other
objects. ―The human mind wishes to be rid of doubt in religion,‖ writes Newman.
Indeed, a doubting faith is really an oxymoron for Newman. 737 He understood the
epistemological seal provided by certitude to be a condition of action, both in knowledge
and in life. What he writes of notional knowledge may be appropriately applied to
certitude: without it ―we should for ever pace round one small circle of knowledge…‖ in
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a state of skeptism. 738 Skepticism does not admit the possibility of certitude, and is thus,
for Newman, the enemy of action.739
Newman believes that men and women are capable of reaching authentic certitude
through their reason. However, he also believes that this ability has been considerably
compromised by sin, which makes fitting the assistance of an infallible authority. ―The
initial doctrine of the infallible teacher must be an emphatic protest against the existing
state of mankind,‖ writes Newman. He furthermore describes an infallible authority as
that ―suitable antagonist‖ that God has provided to combat ―the intensity of the evil
which has possession of mankind.‖ 740
Newman characterizes the particular evil of the human intellect as ―rationalism,‖
and holds that it is this ―giant evil‖ that an infallible authority in the Church was
appointed to ―master.‖741 His working definition of rationalism is at the same time both
broad and nuanced. He understands rationalism as the subjugation of truth to the
standards of human reason, so as to even circumscribe the Source of Truth by human
axioms and categories of thought. The one who subjugates all truth to human standards
has an inability to admit mystery, which Newman regarded as a necessary attitude when
the object of one‘s thought is God and His revelation.742 In Newman‘s understanding, the
Christian who makes reason his ultimate standard fails to reason from his ―real
apprehension‖ of Christ and revelation, i.e., from the experience of the Church. Newman
thus regards rationalism as a hermeneutical sin.
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Because Newman lived in the Age of Reason, one could argue that he felt the
effects of rationalism on the Church more so than past ages, which led him to offer an
apology for an infallible authority to combat it. Such is Mark Powell‘s aforementioned
contention. Newman himself admits that ―the absolute need of a spiritual supremacy is at
present the strongest of arguments in favour of the fact of its supply.‖ 743
But Newman viewed the entirety of Christian history as a battle against
rationalism, and the heretic as embodying a rationalist temper. His broad definition of
rationalism acts as an effective counter against those who might dismiss this view of
history as merely Newman‘s creative projection of post-Enlightenment rationalism onto
the past. Stephen Thomas points out that, ―In The Arians of the Fourth Century, for the
first time, there appears clearly enunciated, the analogy between heresy and the forces of
Newman‘s own time which he regarded as enemies of Church and Christianity.‖ With
the Fathers, Newman ―identifies rationalism as the intellectual origin of Arianism,‖ and
takes up their charge that Aristotle was the ―bishop‖ of the Arians. 744 The rationalism of
the Arians was most famously evidenced in their contention that, according to logical
principles, a Son could in no way be co-eternal with a Father: that ―there was a time when
[the Son] was not.‖ Newman also writes of the Arians that ―they did not admit into their
theology the notion of mystery.‖ 745
The rationalism of the Arians serves for Newman as a type of other heresies that
the Church has been forced to combat. Benjamin King gleans from Newman‘s
unpublished paper on the Apollinarian heresy that Apollinarius opposed Arianism ―with
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sophistry of his own, ignoring the Rule of Faith as much as any nineteenth-century
rationalist.‖746 In the Essay on Development, Newman writes of the Nestorian heresy that
―Its spirit was rationalizing, and had the qualities which go with rationalism.‖ 747
Similarly, the Monophysites displayed ―an allowance of abstract reasoning, in other
words, that is, maintenance of intellectually conceived first principles in a matter which
was purely of faith.‖748 Of the Eusebians Newman writes, ―In this at least, throughout
their changes, [they] are consistent—in their hatred of the Sacred Mystery.‖ 749
Newman portrays Protestants, too, as rationalists. I have already described his
charge, elaborated in Tract 73—―On the Introduction of Rationalistic Principles into
Revealed Religion‖—that Protestants such as Richard Whately and Thomas Erskine
arbitrarily made ethics the standard by which to judge the truth of doctrines (Chapter
One, 27-28). Newman also saw the Protestant principle of sola scriptura as an example
of rationalism, for it attempted to logically deduce doctrine from Scripture, thus using
Scripture for a purpose for which it was not intended. 750
In a footnote of his essay ―Newman and the Modern World,‖ Christopher Dawson
wrote that the last chapter of the Apologia ―is essential to the understanding of Newman‘s
doctrine of development and of his philosophy of history.‖751 The philosophy of history
that emerges from this chapter of the Apologia is one in which Christ has provided his
Church with an infallible authority that has repeatedly had to stem the tide of rationalism
in the Church‘s pursuit of knowledge and holiness. ―What have been [this authority‘s]
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great works?‖ Newman asks. ―All of them in the distinct province of theology:—to put
down Arianism, Eutychianism, Pelagianism, Manichaeism, Lutheranism, Jansenism.
Such is the broad result of its action in the past…‖752 An infallible authority within the
Church, according to Newman, is ―a supply for a need.‖ Newman primarily emphasizes
that this need is the result of original sin and the darkening of the human intellect.
However, Newman also seemed to regard an infallible authority as ―a supply for a
need‖ rooted in human finitude.753 His attitude toward historical investigations of
developments of doctrine serves as evidence of this position. He was an advocate for
such investigations; after all, they constitute the bulk of his Essay on Development. But at
the same time, Newman cautioned readers that they should not ―expect from History
more than History can furnish.‖ 754 He did not believe that historical investigation was the
normative path to doctrinal certitude for most men and women. Such investigation into
the historical veracity of doctrines may guide them in their search for certitude, but are
more often than not the ―instruments rather than warrants of right decisions,‖ and better
serve ―as answers to objections brought against the actual decisions of authority, than are
proofs of the correctness of those decisions.‖755
Furthermore, Newman believed that the historicity of human persons told against
their reaching unanimity in their historical investigations:
Considering that Christians, from the nature of the case, live under the bias of the
doctrines, and in the very midst of the facts, and during the process of the
controversies, which are to be the subject of criticism, since they are exposed to
the prejudices of birth, education, place, personal attachment, engagements, and
party, it can hardly be maintained that in matter of fact a true development carries
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with it always its own certainty even to the learned, or that history, past or
present, is secure from the possibility of a variety of interpretations.756
Thus, according to Newman, recognition of the role played by hermeneutics in
knowledge should lead one to acknowledge the need for an authority. Rationality, even
Christian rationality, is subject to the first principles of its human purveyors. Not all of
these first principles have their source in revelation; some are the products of each
individual Christian‘s circumstance. Even those first principles that claim revelation as
their source are differently interpreted by those men and women in whom they dwell, as
the history of Christianity illustrates.
The hermeneutical issue is further exacerbated by the Catholic Church‘s universal
call. ―[I]ts very badge,‖ writes Newman, ―[is] to be ever making converts all over the
earth, whereas other religions are more or less variable in their teaching, tolerant of each
other, and local, and professedly local, in their habitat and character.‖757 But the Church
encounters a difficulty when it attempts to fulfill this call, as its efforts to ―baptize the
nations‖ and unite them with the Body of Christ include negotiating the barriers of
language and culture. According to Newman, only an infallible authority can act as an
arbiter between the various interpretations that result from the different hermeneutical
influences on the members of the Church.
The lack of such an authority to mediate these hermeneutical differences indicates
a void within an ecclesial community. Newman writes, ―If Christianity is both social and
dogmatic, and intended for all ages, it must humanly speaking have an expounder. Else
you will secure unity of form at the loss of unity of doctrine, or unity of doctrine at the
loss of unity of form; you will have to choose between a comprehension of opinions and
756
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a resolution into parties, between latitudinarian and sectarian error.‖758 Unfortunately,
this statement is typically used only as a punctuation mark to treatments of Newman‘s
understanding of authority and infallibility, rather than being subjected to interpretation.
The stark either-or Newman here offers appears to be based upon his belief that only a
personal, infallible authority can act as a ―center of unity‖ who secures both form and
doctrine, and maintains a unified tension between them. Von Balthasar has rightly said
that ―Authority per se is never in question…. An established authority is only attacked
with troops that are in the service of some other authority.‖759 Without a personal center
of unity, a religion must exalt something else into a place of authority: either form or
doctrine. And whatever is exalted ultimately suffers from the weight of its new crown.
Thus, Newman writes that ―By the Church of England a hollow uniformity is preferred to
an infallible chair; and by the sects of England an interminable division.‖ According to
Newman, the Anglican Church chose form over doctrine: it retained certain external
characteristics such as its liturgy, its Prayer Book, and Apostolic succession, but these
externals did not prevent Anglicanism from lapsing into the divisions that have plagued
Protestantism since its inception. Protestantism, on the other hand, chose to secure unity
of doctrine over form. However, Protestantism accomplished this unity in doctrine
through reducing both the number and sources of doctrine. As a result, in Newman‘s
estimate, ―Germany and Geneva began with persecution, and have ended in
scepticism.‖760
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Christianity‘s character as a system, combined with the limits of the human
intellect, also impressed upon Newman the need for an infallible authority. ―A religion,‖
writes Newman, ―is not a proposition, but a system,‖ and a system represents a number of
propositions that imply ―various kinds of assents.‖ Assuming that the human intellect
desires certitude about truths, especially religious truths, and that certitude is usually
gained by investigation, how can a Christian possibly achieve certitude about the infinite
number of propositions implicit within the Christian system?
Newman‘s answer is that certitude about these individual propositions is included
in a Christian‘s certitude that ―the Church is the infallible oracle of truth,‖ which is why
Newman refers to the Church‘s infallibility as ―the fundamental dogma of the Catholic
religion.‖761 Newman claims that the statement ―‗I believe what the Church proposes to
be believed‘ is an act of real assent, including all particular assents, notional and
real…‖762 On the other hand, he reasons, one doubts a defined dogma of the Church
never gave his or her certitude to the infallibility of the Church, and thus, never had faith
in the Catholic Church, for ―to deny one [dogma] is to deny all.‖ 763 (Granted, Newman is
here speaking about the infallibility of the Church rather than an infallible authority
within the Church. But, as I will show in the next section, Newman held that an infallible
authority manifests the infallibility of the entire Church.)
Even if the propositions in the Christian system were few in number, the very act
of abstraction involved in formulating propositions presents difficulties in achieving
certitude. Newman acknowledges that the mind‘s attempts to make notionally explicit
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what it really and implicitly knows is a strained and tenuous process.764 He concedes that
some of the erroneous opinions found in the Fathers were merely the results of
deficiencies in language. 765 If the formulator has difficulties being certain about whether
or not his or her notions correspond to his or her own faith, one can imagine that the
difficulties are even more pronounced for those who attempt to reach this certitude
secondhand by recreating the reasonings of another. These ―dangers of abstraction,‖ as
Walgrave refers to them, must therefore be supplemented by an infallible authority who
can ratify them. 766
As an astute interpreter of Newman, Walgrave recognizes that the perennial issue
of nature versus grace is central to Newman‘s position that an authority who can ratify
doctrinal developments in the Church is necessary. He interprets Newman as follows:
The Spirit which guides the Church is active, in varying degrees, both in the
community of the faithful and in all orthodox theology, but not in such a way that
the collaboration of these two can be a sufficient guarantee of lasting unity of
faith in the entire Church alongside the fertile and varied expansion of tradition.
Here, as in other spheres, the grace of God acts in a secret and unobtrusive
manner. It may foster in a few souls a supernatural force and purity, together with
an almost infallible clearsightedness into the faith, but the rest of men remain far
below that level. In spite of the persistent working of grace, human nature is ever
hostile to supernatural light. Just as healing grace cannot at once remedy the evil
tendencies of the heart, so the illuminating grace of faith does not suddenly
remove the intellectual prejudices and bias of the ordinary man or the
theologian. Consequently, the natural course of historical development, however
purified and led by grace, is not the means God chose for keeping tradition
unchanged as it developed.767
Walgrave interprets Newman as holding that the human intellect desires certitude in all
its reasonings, but such certitude is not intrinsic to human nature. Walgrave here
emphasizes that ―human nature is ever hostile to supernatural light‖; in other words, that
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sin prevents even the redeemed men and women who comprise the Church from
achieving certitude without divine provision.
However, it seems that Newman may have believed that this divine provision was
necessary irrespective of original sin. One does not find in Newman much speculation
about the character of prelapsarian human rationality.768 If infallibility was only a
―supply for a need‖ of fallen men and women, one might think that Newman would
clarify that they could achieve certitude about truth through internal means before the
Fall. He indeed admits that ―certitude does not admit of an interior, immediate test,
sufficient to discriminate it from false certitude,‖ and lamented that his inability to
provide such a test was the chief weakness of his Grammar. 769 But he stopped short of
claiming that this lack of an interior test was solely a consequence of sin.
Newman seemed to subscribe to the view that the Incarnation would have taken
place even if there had been no original sin (see pg. 22). Behind this view is the
understanding that men and women were not born in a state of perfection, but needed to
grow into the likeness of God. The Incarnation was ultimately necessary for men and
women to achieve this likeness through their participation in the divine life. The original
sin and its effects perhaps impressed upon men and women the need for redemption, but
it was not necessarily the efficient cause of the Incarnation.
Similarly, sin impresses upon men and women the need for an authority who can
confirm truth, but sin was not necessarily the cause of God providing such an authority.
768
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Men and women are finite beings who were not created with perfect intellects. Their
intellects cannot perceive things as wholes, but must break them into parts and aspects in
order to grow in knowledge of them. Also, their intellects are subject to the vicissitudes
of time and circumstance, which condition their knowledge and make difficult the task of
arriving at unanimity, in spite of the unity of their nature and, for those in the Church,
their unity in Christ. These features of finitude persist even among the redeemed
members of the Church. Though human nature has been redeemed, and the healing of its
imago has been accomplished, men and women must struggle to grow further in the
likeness of God. Their intellects share in this process of transformation, and certitude is
an essential element of this process.
Thus, God, in His Divine Providence, has provided His Church with the gift of an
infallible authority so that its members may be one in both mind and heart. Indeed, the
character of Divine Providence is the starting point for Newman‘s argument for the
likelihood of an infallible authority in the Essay on Development. Inasmuch as
developments of divine revelation ―were of course contemplated and taken into account
by its Author,‖ so also, reasons Newman, must ―the Divine Scheme‖ secure these
developments ―from perversion and corruption.‖770 In this providential act of securing
the Church‘s doctrinal developments, God aids the members of the Church in stretching
toward that certitude that they desire by nature, but which they achieve by grace. The
grace of authority thus builds upon and elevates the nature of the human intellect.
I wish to once again return to Przywara‘s essay ―St. Augustine and the Modern
World.‖ At the end of the essay, Przywara attempts to portray Newman as ―Augustinus
redivivus‖ inasmuch as Newman, like Augustine, also accounted for the place of both
770
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interiority and exteriority in knowledge. According to Przywara, Newman‘s theory of
real and notional apprehension overcame both the subjectivity of Descartes and Hegel,
and the ―tragic agnosticism‖ of Kierkegaard and Pascal. But Przywara does not take into
account the fact that Newman was sympathetic to the ―terrified longing for assurance‖ of
Western thought since the Reformation; indeed, Newman viewed this longing as a natural
desire. Moreover, Newman overcomes Descartes and Hegel, Kierkegaard and Pascal, not
through his theory of the interdependence between real and notional apprehension, but
through his recognition that reason is right in longing for assurance, or certitude, while at
the same time knowing that it is not ultimately capable of sating that longing. For that,
one needs a divinely-appointed infallible authority. The longing for assurance only
becomes ―terrified‖ when one throws off this authority, as did the Reformers. 771
I also wish to again refer to Mark Powell‘s Papal Infallibility. Powell proposes
that Newman‘s emphasis on certitude and the need for an infallible authority, though
moderate, is indicative of ―a strong epistemic conception of the Christian faith and
ecclesial canons.‖ He relies on William Abraham‘s thesis that dogmas (or doctrinal
developments) ―properly belong in the field of soteriology, not epistemology,‖ as they are
―primarily means of grace that lead one to salvation.‖ Abraham maintains that dogmas
are not intended to serve as epistemological norms from which we derive or defend truth
claims; rather, they are intended to ―bring about the salvation and transformation of
individuals and communities.‖772
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However, Powell‘s and Abraham‘s distinction between soteriology and
epistemology represents a dichotomy incongruous with Newman‘s thought. As I argued
in Chapter Two, Newman had a holistic view of the human person, and viewed
knowledge of the faith as intimately connected with salvation. For Newman, certitude
and an infallible authority are not merely stopgaps in response to rationalism and
theological liberalism but, to use Powell‘s words, are also ―means of grace that lead one
to salvation.‖

B. THE INCARNATIONAL CHARACTER OF AUTHORITY
Having established Newman‘s belief that the Church requires an authority who
can provide certitude about doctrinal developments, I now turn to Newman‘s
understanding of the locus of this authority. In Chapters One and Two, I argued that the
incarnational character of Newman‘s theology manifested itself in his portrayals of both
revelation and doctrinal development as personal, free, living, and historical realities.
These same characteristics mark his descriptions of an infallible authority and its role in
the Church.773 Newman portrayed this infallible authority as a personal, concrete
guarantor of freedom and activity in the Church, and an emblem of a living and historical
773
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religion. He implies that this infallible authority gives further concreteness to doctrinal
developments through authoritative ratification of them.
Newman‘s tendency as both an Anglican and a Catholic was to emphasize the
infallibility of the entire Church. He affirmed that the Church‘s infallibility derives from
its identity as the Body of Christ indwelt by the Spirit, and that Christ and the Spirit are
the true sources of the Church‘s infallible authority.774 The ―mind of the Church,‖ or the
consensus fidelium, is made up of all those members who actively participate in the life
of these true authorities through their life in the Church. Through their participation in
the divine life, the members of the Church come to a fuller understanding of the truths of
revelation, and the objects of faith increasingly become as ―objects of sight.‖ 775 As I
discussed in Chapter Two, all these members have an active role in the process of
doctrinal development.
But Newman also came to recognize that the infallibility of the entire Church
needed representation in the form of a visible, personal, and living authority. The Church
as a whole is infallible, but its infallibility needs concrete manifestation in accordance
with the incarnational character of Christianity. For the reasons outlined in the previous
section, Newman maintained that each individual person cannot serve as his or her own
authority. Christ and the Spirit are indeed the ultimate authorities in the Church, but they
are invisible.776 In his Anglican sermon ―Submission to Church Authority,‖ Newman
defends the idea that the invisible authority of Christ and the Spirit is visibly represented
in particular persons within the Church. ―God distributes numberless benefits to all
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men,‖ writes Newman, ―but He does so through a few select instruments.‖777 Newman‘s
defense proceeds from the principle of mediation that God abides by in His dealings with
the world. It also proceeds from his Christocentric ecclesiology, which regards ―the
Church now‖ as ―what His material Body was when [Christ] was visible on earth.‖ 778
This Body is made up of various parts, some of which have the particular responsibility
of ―channel[ing] out to the many‖ the authority of Christ and the Spirit. 779
Newman regards the Magisterium, comprised of the pope and bishops, as the
―few select instruments‖ on whom Christ bestows, or by whom he communicates, his
authority both in and to the Church. Their particular and definite role in the process of
doctrinal development is the act of occasionally proclaiming an official definition of a
development, or less officially, discerning between true and false developments.
Newman uses a variety of terms in different writings to convey this function that is
particular to the Magisterium in the process of doctrinal development. In using these
terms, he also qualifies the roles played by the other members of the Body of Christ in
this process. What is more, he understands that the members of the Magisterium
participate in these roles, as well, while not denying their specific power of defining.
In ―Consulting the Faithful,‖ Newman employs the traditional distinction between
the ecclesia docens and the ecclesia discens in order to clarify the role of defining
specific to the bishops. Writes Newman, ―… the gift of discerning, discriminating,
defining, promulgating, and enforcing any portion of that tradition [of the Apostles,
committed to the whole Church] resides solely in the Ecclesia docens,‖ which is made up
of the bishops. In an important letter of 1875 to Isy Froude (daughter of William
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Froude), Newman refers to this same ―gift‖ as the ―active infallibility‖ of the Church, as
opposed to the ―passive infallibility‖ of the faithful.780 Lastly, in his Preface to the third
edition of the Via Media, Newman describes the Church according to the pattern of
Christ‘s threefold office as priest, prophet, and king. He implicitly locates the power of
defining and approving doctrinal developments in the ―Regal function (or office) of the
Church‖ when he notes that its ―special centre of action‖ is ―the Papacy and its Curia.‖ 781
As Dulles points out, Newman‘s use of the adjective ―passive‖ to describe the
infallibility of the faithful is misleading, for they are anything but passive in the process
of doctrinal development.782 In the Apologia, Newman writes that a definition of a
development is but a pronouncement on ―a decision, which has already been arrived at by
reason.‖783 The activity of the faithful continues in the aftermath of a definition through
the process that has come to be popularly known as ―reception.‖ Many largely credit
Yves Congar with giving the idea of reception greater prominence in modern theology.
But, as Dulles writes, ―In many respects Newman‘s doctrine concerning reception as a
criterion for the valid exercise of the infallible teaching office, and as a principle for the
interpretation of hierarchical teaching, anticipates the insights of contemporary
theologians such as Yves Congar.‖784
In the Preface to the Via Media, Newman designates the process of reception that
takes place before and after a definition as a function of the Prophetic, or Teaching,
Office of the Church, whose ―special centre of action‖ is the ―schola Theologorum.‖
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Indeed, one of the most remarkable and laudatory aspects of the Preface is that Newman
does not conflate the ruling and teaching offices of the Church, which was characteristic
of the ultramontanes of his own time. 785 This resistance to conflating the two was also
evidenced in ―Consulting the Faithful,‖ where Newman describes the process by which a
definition comes about as a ―pastorum ac fidelium conspiratio‖—a ―symphony of the
pastors and the faithful.‖ Samuel Femiano describes Newman as holding that ―The
bishops, by their particular title, were the judges of the faith, but by no means the
guardians in an absolute sense.‖ 786 Newman‘s principal purpose in distinguishing
between the active infallibility of the bishops and the passive infallibility of all the
faithful was not to diminish the theological role of the latter, but to specify the defining
role of the former. In the act of defining doctrinal developments, the bishops incarnate
the infallibility of the entire Church.
According to Newman, the Magisterium‘s exercise of their ―active infallibility‖
plays an important role in that it provides an aid to the faithful in attaining certitude about
the truth of doctrinal developments. Newman holds that the infallible guarantee attached
to the bishops‘ act of defining serves as a ―form‖ or a ―rule‖ in relation to the ―matter‖ or
revelation, giving further concreteness to revelation by ―arranging and authenticating
these various expressions and results of Christian doctrine.‖ 787 Its enactment of Christ‘s
promise to preserve his Church from error ―secures the object, while it gives definiteness
and force to the matter, of the Revelation.‖788 While Newman remains open to the
785

One might also regard the conflation of the ruling and teachings offices as characteristic of the twentieth
and twenty-first centuries. Advances in the forms of mass communication have seemingly increased the
temptation toward centralization in the dogmatic realm, as perhaps evidenced by the proliferation of official
Church documents produced by the Vatican in the last few decades.
786
Femiano, 120.
787
Dev., 77.
788
Dev., 91.

241

environs in which this active infallibility is exercised, he consistently held that its
―normal seat‖ was ―the Pope in Ecumenical Council.‖789
In guaranteeing the truth of doctrinal developments through their exercise of
active infallibility, Newman also emphasizes that the Magisterium preserves and
promotes the life of doctrine in the Church. In Chapter Two, I pointed out that Newman
saw the Church‘s growth in the understanding of revelation as a function of its organic
identity as the Body of Christ. But he understood that some pruning is necessary if one is
to preserve and promote the growth of a living thing. In his Letter to Pusey Newman
writes,
Life in this world is motion, and involves a continual process of change. Living
things grow into their perfection, into their decline, into their death. No rule of art
will suffice to stop the operation of this natural law, whether in the material world
or in the human mind. We can indeed encounter disorders, when they occur, by
external antagonism and remedies; but we cannot eradicate the process itself, out
of which they arise. Life has the same right to decay, as it has to wax strong.
This is specially the case with great ideas.‖ 790
Contrary to those who perceived an emphasis upon forms as indicative of a static faith,
Newman wrote that they ―are the very food of faith.‖ 791 He deems formal authority in
particular as ―the animating principle of a large scheme of doctrine.‖792 In Walgrave‘s
estimate of Newman, it is ―the fundamental principle controlling the growth of the life of
the faith,‖ which ―has to intervene to restrain rationalistic trends which are a constant
danger to the faith, the tares which are always mixed with the wheat in the fields of
God.‖793
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Newman also holds that this authority who protects the life of doctrine within the
Church must be living: ―A living, present authority, himself or another, is [a man‘s]
immediate guide in matters of a personal, social, or political character.‖794 Once again,
Newman sees the demand for a ―living, present authority‖ as dictated by needs
proceeding from both human sinfulness and finitude. He maintains that only a living
authority has the power to ―make a stand against the wild living intellect of man,‖ and not
―the dead letter of a treatise or a code.‖795 ―Heart speaks to heart,‖ and thus, Newman
considers a living authority to be ―the immediate motive in the mind of a Catholic for his
reception of doctrines.‖796 Newman wrote that he did not wish to be converted by a
―smart syllogism.‖ One could also safely claim that Newman did not wish his living faith
to be sustained by a non-living principle. He had witnessed in Protestantism and
Anglicanism ―the ineffectiveness of those norms of authority substituted by other
religions for the infallible living authority.‖ 797 For Newman, only the living Magisterium
of the Roman Catholic Church serves as a sufficient fulfillment of men‘s and women‘s
need for a living authority.
Some may claim that the pruning performed by an authority is stifling, and
threatens not only the life, but the freedom of the members of the Church. ―It will at first
sight be said,‖ supposes Newman, ―that the restless intellect of our common humanity is
utterly weighed down, to the repression of all independent effort and action
whatever…‖798 In response, Newman points out that ―infallibility does not interfere with
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moral probation; the two notions are absolutely distinct.‖799 Newman here means to
point out that there is a difference between the infallibility that attends divine revelation
and its commensurate doctrines, and the human reception of these realities. A doctrine
may be infallibly defined, but men and women are still free to interpret it, to inquire into
it, to doubt it. Therefore, the infallibility of the Magisterium as exercised in the
ratification of a doctrinal development presents no initial, ostensible threat to freedom.
On the contrary, Newman considers it a first principle that the Magisterium‘s
infallible authority is the very champion and guarantor of freedom. He insists that the
human intellect, the instrument of theology, must be given room to breathe. But given
that it ―tends to rationalism,‖ it is only free if it does not remain unbridled in its
reasonings.800 Just as it is no sign of a free conscience to ―dispense with conscience,‖ so
it is no sign of a free intellect to abandon itself to its ―suicidal excesses‖ by dispensing
with authority. According to Newman, ―[An infallible authority‘s] object is, and its
effect also, not to enfeeble the freedom or vigour of human thought in religious
speculation, but to resist and control its extravagance.‖ Given both human finitude and
original sin, Newman considers submission to authority necessary for the askesis of the
human reason: ―The energy of the human intellect ‗does from opposition grow;‘ it thrives
and is joyous, with a tough elastic strength, under the terrible blow of the divinelyfashioned weapon, and is never so much itself as when it has lately been overthrown.‖ 801
In Newman‘s view, Magisterial authority is therefore ordered toward perfecting the
reason of the Church‘s members, and thus, both preserves and promotes their free
activity.
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Newman further specifies the nature of the Magisterium‘s infallibility by
qualifying what it is not. Dulles accurately characterizes Newman‘s understanding of the
Ecclesia docens‘ power of defining when he writes, ―[Newman] viewed it not as a
distinct charism or infused gift, but as a set of providential dispositions by which God
brings about a determinate effect: the preservation of the truth of revelation in the
Church‘s definitive teaching.‖802 According to Newman, the bishops comprising the
Magisterium do not possess a special ability to tap into the mind of the Church by virtue
of their ordination. They have not been granted ―the gift of impeccability,‖ nor have they
been given ―an inward gift of infallibility [i.e., inspiration]…such as the Apostles had.‖803
Rather, they freely operate from their own knowledge informed by their faith in
discerning true and false developments, and their discernment (like the discernment of
the sensus fidelium) is bound by the Rule of Faith as held in the mind of the Church.
Indeed, Newman even hypothesizes in ―Consulting the Faithful‖ that ―there was a
temporary suspense of the functions of the ‗Ecclesia docens‘‖ at certain times in history,
such as during the Arian crisis following the Council of Nicaea, when ―the body of
Bishops failed in the confession of faith… [and] spoke variously, one against another…‖
Newman qualifies, ―I am not denying that the great body of the Bishops were in their
internal belief orthodox.‖804 What he does deny, however, is that the Ecclesia docens
actively exercised their proper function of concretely proclaiming true doctrine during the
Arian crisis.
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Newman thus refers to the Magisterium‘s power to guarantee the truth of
doctrinal developments as an ―external guardianship,‖ and of their authority as an
―external authority.‖805 Lash rightly points out that, by ―external,‖ Newman ―clearly
means ‗external‘ to the mind of the individual believer,‖ and not external to the Church.
Lash interprets Newman‘s use of the term ―external authority‖ in the Essay on
Development to refer to ―Episcopal Tradition‖—Newman‘s term in the Via Media for
those creedal teachings considered necessary to the individual believer‘s faith. Lash
maintains that this interpretation is borne out by Newman‘s Letter to Perrone, and
Newman‘s occasional identification of the term ―external‖ with ―objective.‖ 806 Contrary
to Lash, however, Perrone appears to support the idea that the ―external authority‖ is the
Spirit, ―in whom,‖ Newman writes, ―[the Church] is infallible.‖807 According to
Newman, the authority of the Magisterium is thus an instrumental authority. The bishops
are the ―organs‖ of the Spirit, who ―carry into effect the promise made by Christ to the
Church‖ in their pronouncements on doctrinal developments.808 Through their
pronouncements, they incarnate the infallibility of the entire Church, and also make
developments of doctrine concrete by guaranteeing their truth.

C. THE INCARNATIONAL CHARACTER OF PAPAL INFALLIBILITY
To repeat, Newman principally emphasized the infallibility of the entire Church
and the role of the entire Magisterium in ratifying doctrinal developments through
definition. But, as is well known, Newman also assented to the dogma of papal
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infallibility defined at Vatican I, which stated that the pope, when he speaks ex cathedra,
can infallibly define dogmas that are irreformable ―ex sese, non ex autem consensu
ecclesiae.‖809 Much literature has been devoted to qualifying that Newman‘s assent to
the definition of papal infallibility was not without its difficulties. He was critical of the
ultramontane spirit that had called for the definition, he did not think the definition
necessary, and he was concerned about the possible scandal it would create among the
faithful.
But, in Newman‘s own words, ―Ten thousand difficulties do not make one
doubt,‖ and he believed that his faith in the infallibility of the Church demanded
acceptance of the definition of papal infallibility if such a definition did emerge from the
council. 810 Moreover, Newman wrote, ―For myself, ever since I was a Catholic, I have
held the Pope's infallibility as a matter of theological opinion.‖811 Plus, in spite of his
previous reservations, once papal infallibility was officially defined, Newman expressed
relief at its moderation, aware that Pope Pius IX had wanted a much wider power than
that allowed by the definition.812
Newman accepted papal infallibility as an authentic development of doctrine
because he believed that it was a true fulfillment of Scripture testified to by the Tradition
of the Church. But what is more, I believe that papal infallibility accords with Newman‘s
incarnational principle. As J. Derek Holmes argues, ―[Newman‘s] assent to papal
infallibility as a Catholic was simply a logical development of his former Anglican
809
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position when he accepted the infallibility of the undivided Church.‖ 813 Assuredly,
Newman devoted more attention to providing a vigorous, positive defense of papal
primacy (or ―supremacy,‖ as he called it) than papal infallibility, for his context largely
dictated that his time was best spent nuancing the latter. However, he located both papal
primacy and the power to define within the ruling office of the Church, and I argue that
his defense of the pope‘s primacy in relation to the other bishops also serves as a defense
for the pope‘s primacy within the active infallibility of the Magisterium. Indeed,
Newman says as much in a footnote in the 1878 edition of the Essay on Development,
within the section entitled ―An Infallible Developing Authority to be Expected‖: ―Seven
years ago, it is scarcely necessary to say, the Vatican Council determined that the Pope,
ex cathedra, has the same infallibility as the Church. This does not affect the argument in
the text.‖814
In arguing the above, I am admittedly going beyond what Newman directly
maintained around the time of the council. At the beginning of this chapter, I quoted
Louth as pointing to ―a certain circularity‖ in Newman‘s argument that acceptance of
doctrinal development entailed acceptance of ―an unquestioned and unquestionable
authority, such as developed in the teaching office of the see of St. Peter.‖ The
circularity, according to Louth, is that ―the development of the teaching office of the pope
is an example of development.‖815 To call Newman‘s argument circular is unfair, since
Newman did not see acceptance of doctrinal development as hinging upon acceptance of
the pope‘s infallible authority. But it is ironic that Newman‘s theory was now being
―used against [him]‖ at the council to defend a definition to which he was resistant. One
813
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of the attendees of Vatican I, Bishop Moriarty, wrote to Newman, ―Strange to say, if ever
this definition comes you will have contributed much towards it. Your treatise on
development has given the key.‖ In his response to Moriarty, Newman writes, ―… nor do
I think with your friend that infallibility follows on Supremacy.‖ 816 I will attempt to
argue, however, that papal infallibility does indeed follow from the first principles that
are at the root of Newman‘s assent to papal supremacy (primacy).
Newman held that papal primacy is consistent with what he refers to as the
―antecedent probability of a monarchical principle in the Divine Scheme.‖ 817 According
to Newman, the nature of the Church and its mission requires there to be a monarchical
ruler who can preserve its unity. As an Anglican he interpreted the New Testament, and
Old Testament prophecies, to mean that Christ intended to found his Church as a
kingdom, and a visible kingdom at that, and for the rest of his life he maintained what
Paul Misner has referred to as a ―kingdom-ecclesiology.‖818 In Newman‘s
understanding, a visible kingdom involves ―a political influence‖ and ―a complex
organization….819 He writes, ―A kingdom is an organized body… It is as unmeaning to
speak of an invisible kingdom on earth, as of invisible chariots and horsemen, invisible
swords and spears, invisible palaces: to be a kingdom at all it must be visible, if the word
has any true meaning.‖820 Moreover, Newman interpreted Christ‘s mandate to ―baptize
all nations‖ as implying that the Church was to be not only a kingdom, but an ―imperial
power‖ having universal jurisdiction. ―By an imperial state, or an empire,‖ writes
816
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Newman, ―is meant a power which has wide extent over the earth, and that beyond its
limits,‖ and which has ―extended dominion, and that not only over its immediate subjects,
but over the kings of other kingdoms…‖ 821
Newman reasons that if the Church is truly a kingdom and an empire, then it must
be ruled over by a monarch: ―If the whole of Christendom is to form one Kingdom, one
head is essential.‖822 In his sermon ―The Christian Church an Imperial Power,‖ he asserts
that the ultimate kingship over the Church belongs to Christ: ―[Christ] truly is the only
One, properly speaking, who sits on the throne of the kingdom; He is the sole Ruler in
His empire…‖ But Newman qualifies that Christ is the invisible king of his Church, and
affirming that Christ intended his Church to be a visible kingdom and society requires
one to affirm the existence of a visible king, namely, the pope. As with all authorities on
earth, the pope‘s rule is ―given from above‖ (Jn 19:11). He is a representative of Christ;
a ―regent‖ or ―viceroy‖ whose rule ultimately derives from, and is sustained by, Christ. 823
According to Newman, it is only the visible kingship of the pope that can preserve
the unity of the visible kingdom of the Church: ―We know of no other way of preserving
the Sacramentum Unitatis, but a centre of unity… It must be so; no Church can do
without its Pope.‖824 Misner believes that Newman‘s reference to the sacramentum
unitatis is a reference not to the Eucharist, but to ―one very particular theology of church
unity, that of St. Cyprian and of his Anglican upholders.‖ According to Misner, ―it was
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Cyprian who came closest to the episcopal theory of church unity, he who pleaded
passionately for unity while at the same time rejecting the pretensions of the pope to be
its special protector, and it was he who used the phrase sacramentum unitatis.‖825
There is not much textual evidence to support Misner‘s position that Newman‘s
theology of the papacy involved an ongoing battle against a perceived abuse of Cyprian‘s
ecclesiology, though Newman does note that ―St Cyprian is claimed by Protestants as
denying the Pope‘s Supremacy…‖ 826 However, Misner is surely right that Newman
believes episcopal collegiality alone an insufficient means of preserving the unity of the
Church in the midst of a sinful world that tended toward disbelief. A brief reflection on
human nature as actually manifested in history suffices for Newman to reject the idea that
the Church needs no papacy: ―there would be a legion of ecclesiastics, each bishop with
his following, each independent of the others, each with his own views, each with
extraordinary powers, each with the risk of misusing them, all over Christendom. It
would be the Anglican theory, made real. It would be an ecclesiastical communism…‖ 827
But Newman believes that history also yields a positive justification for the development
of the Church‘s understanding of papal primacy. The growth of the Church naturally
resulted in the need for a greater system of Church government centralized in the See of
St. Peter: ―As the Church grew into form, so did the power of the Pope develope [sic].‖ 828
Thus, Newman implies that the Sacramentum Unitatis can only be preserved by what one
might call a ―sacramentum auctoritatis.‖
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In the Preface to the third edition of the Via Media, Newman locates papal
primacy within the context of his corporate, Christocentric ecclesiology. The Church is
―the Body of Christ,‖ he writes, ―and the sovereign pontiff… the visible head of that
Body…‖829 The implication here and elsewhere in Newman‘s writings is that Christ
remains active as the invisible head of the Church, but it follows from the sacramental
and incarnational principles that Christ‘s invisible headship requires visible
manifestation. 830 Newman also qualifies that the pope is the head of the Body of the
Church only inasmuch as he ―belong[s] to it,‖ meaning that in no way can the term
―external authority‖ discussed above be applied to the pope; his headship is within the
Body.
Returning once again to the application of Christ‘s threefold office to the
Church—the distinguishing mark of this Preface—Newman principally locates the
activity of the pope within the ruling, or kingly, office. The pope, Newman holds, is the
representative of the ruling office. Even more strongly, Newman asserts that ―the Pope,
as the Vicar of Christ, inherits these [three] offices and acts for the Church in them.‖ In
Newman‘s mind, then, the pope acts as a sort of microcosm for the entire Church as ―the
chief part of the body.‖ Yet, Newman had earlier stated that the entire Church is ―His
representative… ‗His very self below,‘‖ and that the pope‘s ―special centre of action‖ is
the ruling office of Church. It is within this office that the pope most particularly acts as
representative for the whole (office).
One may claim, as does Misner, that this reasoning makes Newman ―an
ultramontane sui generis.‖ But Newman‘s claim that the pope is the special
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representative of the ruling office also simply follows from his incarnational principle
and its corollary principles. It follows from his consistent affirmation that the invisible
visibly manifests itself, and that abstract truths such as ―rule‖ and ―power‖ need concrete
representation. It is a fulfillment of Newman‘s ―method of personation,‖ which affirms
that the representation of truths in persons is part of the divine pedagogy. For Newman,
expediency demands, and history testifies to, the need for a universal Church to have a
universal ruler in the pope.
This need also extends to the issue of papal infallibility, which Newman locates
within the purview of the ruling office. The Magisterium, whose special charge it is to
exercise their active infallibility in defining a doctrinal development, must also have their
concrete representative who can speak for them, who has a real power of ―universal
jurisdiction.‖831 The pope acts as a personal manifestation of Christ‘s continuing
authority over his Church, and when necessary, voices the decisions of the Magisterium
through the infallibility with which Christ has endowed his office. A function of the
ruling office is to make judgments on doctrinal matters, and the mark of the rightness of
such judgments is not always to be found in the majority, of which the Arian crisis
affords an instance. According to Newman, the hierarchical constitution of the Church
requires that the Magisterium, too, needs its pope. The pope provides what Newman
refers to as a ―negative assistance,‖ an ultimum aimed merely at ensuring that ―the gates
of hell shall not prevail against [the Church]‖ (Mt 16:18).832 Positively, Newman holds
that the pope‘s occasional, official judgments provide a personal, living incarnation of not
only the Magisterium‘s judgments, but of the infallibility of the entire Church and the
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Holy Spirit‘s continuing presence in the Church. They serve as a concrete manifestation
of the Church‘s grasp of revelation, a faithful mirror that the members of the Church can
consult in order to assist their certitude about the truth of revelation and the developments
in the understanding of that revelation.

3.2: FLOROVSKY ON DOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENT AND AUTHORITY
In the previous section, I explained why Newman believed that the theory of
doctrinal development necessitated an infallible authority who could confirm the truth of
these developments. I first showed that Newman believed that the human intellect was
ordered toward certitude about the truth of developments that it cannot provide for itself.
I then showed that his ascription of the power to pronounce on developments to the
Magisterium and the pope was consistent with his incarnational theology.
My treatment of Florovsky on the question of authority in relation to dogmatic
development will follow an inverse pattern. I will first outline his concern that an
orthodox understanding of ecclesiastical authority should conform to the standard of the
Incarnation as especially represented by Chalcedon. Florovsky‘s Chalcedonian
understanding of authority includes a belief that it is the proper role of the bishops to act
as the ―mouthpiece‖ of the Church‘s understanding of revelation as formulated in
dogmas. However, he did not believe that this episcopal role served as an aid to the
members of the Church in achieving certitude about the truth of revelation, or, the truth
of dogmatic developments. Instead, as I will explain, Florovsky believed that the
Church‘s members can only achieve such certitude through their free, ascetical living out
of the truths of the Christian faith. He thus implied that the Church‘s dogmatic
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developments do not need further ―enfleshment‖ through formal guarantees of their truth
supposedly provided by infallible authorities.

A. FLOROVSKY’S CHALCEDONIAN UNDERSTANDING OF CHURCH AUTHORITY
Florovsky clearly evidences a concern to present a properly Chalcedonian
ecclesiology in his writings. The Chalcedonian hermeneutic is operative in his
acknowledgement that the Church is both a ―visible‖ and ―invisible‖ reality. He writes,
―The teachings about the Church as visible and invisible at one and the same time, about
the greatness and historically given, and sacred, i.e. divine, is a direct continuation and
revelation of the Christological dogma in the spirit and meaning of the Chalcedonian
dogma.‖833 Elsewhere Florovsky refers to the ―double condition‖ of the Church, which is
at the same time the ―Church militant‖ and the ultimate ―Church triumphant,‖ and writes
that ―this crucial mystery can be adequately conceived only in the categories of the
Chalcedonian dogma.‖ Though Florovsky admitted an ―asymmetry‖ in the Chalcedonian
definition (inasmuch as there was no human hypostasis in Christ) he does not apply this
asymmetry to his Chalcedonian hermeneutic, and trumpets Orthodox ecclesiology for its
―Chalcedonian balance.‖834 He furthermore opposes the Chalcedonian balance of
Orthodox ecclesiology to the ―hyper-historicism‖ of a Roman Catholic ecclesiology that
places too much emphasis upon visibility, and the ―hyper-eschatologism‖ of a Protestant
ecclesiology that has ―dismissed‖ the historic and the visible. 835
Florovsky seems to evidence a desire that his treatments of Church authority
conform to the hermeneutic of Chalcedonian balance between the antinomies of visibility
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and invisibility, the concrete and abstract, and the historical and eschatological.
According to Florovsky, it has been the consistent emphasis of Orthodox theology that
Christ remains the invisible head of his Body, the Church. In his 1933 essay ―The
Problematic of Christian Reunion,‖ Florovsky locates this emphasis in Orthodoxy‘s
particular interpretation of Christ‘s Ascension, which maintains that ―through his
Ascension into heaven Christ truly and directly (albeit invisibly) abides and governs in
the ‗historical‘ and earthly Church…‖ 836 It is interesting that Florovsky here uses the
prepositional phrase ―through his Ascension‖ rather than writing ―in spite of his
Ascension.‖ His purposeful use of the word ―through‖ is further clarified by a statement
he made in a letter to Archimandrite Sophrony in 1958, in which he wrote, ―Christ in his
ascension is no less man than ‗in his days with us,‘ and perhaps more.‖ 837 In Florovsky‘s
understanding, Christ‘s Ascension did not constitute an exodus from history; rather, it
was the means by which Christ became even more fully present in history, in parallel
with his becoming more fully human through the anthropological transformation and
fulfillment effected through his Resurrection and Ascension. Through his Ascension,
Christ continues to function as the ultimate authority of both his earthly and heavenly
Church.
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In ―The Problematic of Christian Reunion,‖ Florovsky contends that this
particular understanding of the Ascension ―has not been completely fortified and
expressed‖ in Roman Catholic consciousness. He writes, ―It is as if, in the [Roman
Catholic interpretation of the] Ascension, [Christ] left and exited from history until the
Second Coming… as if history had been abandoned… Hence the need for and possibility
of Christ‘s well-known replacement in history—the idea of a ‗deputy,‘‖ i.e., the pope.
However, Florovsky qualifies that ―it is impossible to reduce all the diversity and fullness
of mystical and theological life in Roman Christianity to one particular ‗idea‘‖ such as
their interpretation of the Ascension. 838 He did not wish to be lumped in with Lev
Karsavin (1882-1952) and Vladimir Lossky, who exhibited ―the dangers of excessive
constructivism‖ in their attempts ―to derive the entire system of Roman Catholicism,
directly and one-sidedly, from one particular doctrine, the doctrine of Filioque.‖839 This
constructivism is an example of the logical form of dogmatic development Florovsky
rejected. But because Florovsky regards revelation and Tradition as originating and
rooted in divine events, it is fair to say that he believes the Roman Catholic tendency to
perceive the pope as a substitute for Christ‘s authority indicates a deficient understanding
of that event (the Ascension) that particularly testifies to Christ‘s continuing authority in
his Church.
Florovsky‘s emphasis on Christ‘s continuing, invisible headship over his Church
is also related to his organic ecclesiology. ―Christ the Lord is the only Head and the only
Master of the Church,‖ writes Florovsky, and does not have a visible analogue in the
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earthly Church. 840 As pointed out above, Florovsky regarded ecclesiology as ―an integral
part of Christology,‖ and frequently invoked Augustine‘s ―doctrine of the Whole Christ—
totus Christus, caput et corpus‖ as emblematic of his organic ecclesiology. What is
more, he saw this doctrine of the totus Christus confirmed by the Chalcedonian dogma. 841
Chalcedon affirmed an intimate relation, without confusion, between the divine and
human natures in Christ‘s person. So also, Florovsky affirmed an intimate relation
between Christ as Head and Christ‘s Body (the Church) while at the same time affirming
their distinction. It seems plausible that he thought the idea of an earthly head of the
Church constituted a confusion between the proper identities of the Head and the Body.
But Florovsky balances this emphasis upon Christ‘s invisible headship by
maintaining that the bishops serve as visible representatives of Christ‘s authority in the
Church, even if they do not visibly represent Christ‘s headship. He shirks conventional
Orthodox avoidance of perceptibly Western categories by unflinchingly asserting that
bishops act ―in persona Christi,‖ though it is noteworthy that he nowhere asserted that
the bishops act ―in persona Christi capitis.‖ He variously describes the members of the
episcopate as ―‗representatives‘ of Christ Himself,‖ as ―stewards of His mysteries,‖ and
as ―standing for Him, before the community.‖842
According to Florovsky, the bishops‘ authority is primarily a ―sacramental
authority,‖ and they principally represent Christ‘s authority through their place in the
Church‘s sacramental matrix. 843 Florovsky‘s focus on the sacramental nature of the
bishops‘ visible representation of Christ follows from his position that ―the ultimate
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identity of the Church is grounded in her sacramental structure…‖ 844 The bishops are
initiated into their proper place in the Church‘s sacramental structure through
ordination. 845 In their celebration of the Eucharist—which Florovsky refers to as ―the
mystery of the whole Christ‖—the bishops image ―the Heavenly Bishop,‖ and help bring
about the completion of the Body of Christ.846 Inasmuch as the performance of the
sacraments constitutes the primary identity of the bishops, and inasmuch as the
sacraments are the primary means by which Christ abides in the Church, Florovsky
invokes his oft-repeated principle that ―ministry (or ‗hierarchy‘) itself is primarily a
charismatic principle… and not only a canonical commission…‖847
In spite of the central place Florovsky accords the Eucharist in the life of the
hierarchy, he avoids a eucharistic ecclesiology (such as that promoted by Nikolai
Afanasiev) that fails to integrate the eucharist into the dogmatic and canonical functions
of hierarchy. 848 This avoidance is signaled by Florovsky‘s affirmation that ―there is
another and higher office: to secure the universal and catholic unity of the whole Church
in space and time. This is the episcopal office and function.‖849 Through his sacramental
power to ordain—the power that precisely distinguishes bishops from priests, according
to Florovsky—―the bishop has his own particular duty in the building up of Church
unity,‖ and serves to make Pentecost ―universal and continuous.‖ Florovsky qualifies
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that the Apostolic Succession is more than merely the ―canonical skeleton of the
Church.‖850 But nevertheless, he affirms that this ―skeleton‖ does serve as a visible
manifestation of the mystical unity of the Body of Christ with the Head.
Florovsky regards the Roman Catholic teachings on the papacy, on the other
hand, as ―a false dogma of Church unity.‖ 851 He implies that the Apostolic Succession is
a sufficient visible sign of the invisible unity and identity of the Church as the Body of
Christ. And, of course, he firmly reiterates that the unity of the Church must be based in
dogmatic unity. The falsity of papal primacy and infallibility as defined in the nineteenth
century, according to Florovsky, stems from Rome‘s pathological striving for unity
―above all else‖ throughout history. Rome‘s perceived need for the pope to secure the
Church‘s unity demonstrates a lack of trust in God and a ―weak[ness] in love.‖ 852 It
shows their failure to recognize that, in addition to the Apostolic Succession, ―this unity
must be maintained and strengthened by ‗the bond of peace,‘ by an ever-increasing effort
of faith and charity‖ on the part of all the members of the Church. 853 In other words,
Florovsky believes that Rome creates an imbalance on the Chalcedonian scale of Church
authority by striving after further, visible, concrete guarantees of Church unity.
Florovsky maintains that ―True ‗sacramentalism‘ in the Church ultimately
depends upon a ‗doctrinal‘ orientation of devotional life… In fact, sacraments are a part
and an article of dogma.‖ 854 As such, Florovsky also holds that bishops have a concrete,
visible role in regard to dogmatic definitions. Florovsky emphasized that theology, and
doctrinal development, constitutes the vocation of all the members of the Church, and
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that all have a role in the coming to be of a dogmatic definition. In addition, all the
members actively receive this definition, testing it by the same Christian experience out
of which it supposedly sprang. But it is the province of the bishops alone, Florovsky
maintains, to act as ―the mouthpiece of the Church,‖ ―to speak in a Catholic way… to
witness on behalf of the Church… to teach.‖ Through their teaching, the bishops speak
―in personae ecclesiae,‖ and make visible the experience of the Church and the authority
of Christ.855
Louis Bouyer, drawing upon Yves-Noël Lelouvier‘s book on Florovsky‘s
ecclesiology, saw in Florovsky‘s ascription of a concrete teaching function to the
hierarchy a ―double criticism of Khomyakov and his emulators.‖ Bouyer writes,
[Florovsky] says they confuse—in the letter of the patriarchs on which they rely,
as in all the other significant documents of Orthodoxy—the function that is proper
to bishops, judging what the authentic truth is or is not, with the function that is
indeed common to the whole people of God, in all its members: witnessing to the
truth. Behind this primary error, and fully agreeing with Moehler, Florovsky
brings out the primary error of an ecclesiology that wishes to be exclusively
pneumatic and not christological, which would end fatally by misconstruing the
essential attachment of the work of the Spirit in us with the historical work of
Christ.856
Thus, according to Bouyer, Florovsky implied that the Slavophile failure to recognize the
bishops‘ role of making visible, or incarnating, the Church‘s interpretation of Christian
experience through their authoritative judgments followed from an insufficiently
Christocentric, or Chalcedonian, ecclesiology.
But Bouyer makes an unfounded and erroneous leap in the above quotation.
Nowhere does Florovsky claim that the bishops‘ role of authoritatively voicing the
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Church‘s teaching is the equivalent of them ―judging‖ the truth of this teaching. In fact,
as I will show in the paragraphs below, the absence of this claim in Florovsky actually
demonstrates his affinities with the Slavophile position on authority and dogma. What is
more, I will show that these affinities are rooted in the tenets of Florovsky‘s anthropology
and epistemology. In the Dialogue section of this chapter, I will discuss whether or not
Florovsky‘s position on authority in relation to dogma threatens the balance of his
otherwise Chalcedonian ecclesiology.

B. SLAVOPHILE INFLUENCES ON FLOROVSKY’S VIEW OF AUTHORITY
One finds Florovsky‘s lengthiest direct consideration of Slavophile ecclesiology
in Ways. There, he classifies Slavophilism as a Romantic reaction against both the
Reformation and Idealism; against the isolationist anthropology of Protestantism and the
Idealist exaltation of reason. As a fruit of the Romantic milieu, Florovsky recognizes
some of the excesses of Romanticism in Slavophilism—excesses that he perennially
rejected as being at odds with a properly Christocentric, and Chalcedonian, Christianity.
Thus, Florovsky noted that among the Slavophile thinkers one finds ―the spirit of dreamy
withdrawal from and rejection of the ‗formal‘ or ‗external‘ in Christianity….‖ 857 In a
related vein, Florovsky criticizes the Slavophile tendency to ―escape or even retreat from
history,‖ and for a philosophy of history that relies too much upon ―a one-sided or
exclusively ‗organic‘ point of view.‖ 858 In regard to this latter characteristic of
Slavophilism, Florovsky cautions, ―Society and the Church are not commensurate.‖859
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Florovsky maintained that ―the failure of the Slavophiles to articulate [the
incommensurability of Church and society] did not hurt their theology or their actual
teaching on the Church as much as did their philosophy of history, or, more precisely,
their philosophy of society.‖860 However, he did offer some criticisms of their
ecclesiology. Bouyer (via Lelouvier) rightly pointed out that Florovsky critiqued
Khomiakov and Slavophile ecclesiology for their ―tendency to over-emphasize the
Pneumatological aspect of the doctrine of the Church.‖ (Bouyer fails to recognize that
Florovsky leveled this same critique at Möhler‘s Die Einheit in der Kirche, too, though
Florovsky admitted that ―the balance [between Christology and Pnematology] was
restored in Möhler‘s later writings, and already in his Symbolik.‖861) Florovsky also
admits that in Khomiakov—the ―Knight of Orthodoxy,‖ as he terms him—―the selfsufficiency of the Church is presented with such resigned obviousness that its historical
reality remains as if in a shadow.‖862
However, Florovsky did not translate any of these criticisms of Slavophile
historiography and ecclesiology to the Slavophile understanding of authority‘s role in
relation to dogma. In spite of his reservations expressed in Ways and elsewhere,
Florovsky qualified that ―Slavophilism is not exhausted by ‗romanticism,‘‖ and held that
the Slavophile ecclesiology was ―completely true to fundamental and ancient patristic
tradition.‖863 His estimate seems to apply to Slavophile ecclesiology on the issue of
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dogmatic authority, which, interestingly, Florovsky implies is closely related to the idea
of dogmatic development. As I pointed out in Chapter Two, Florovsky especially lauded
Khomiakov in Ways for ―his understanding and estimation of the historical disclosure and
self-realization of apostolic tradition (usually denoted in the West by the imprecise term
‗dogmatic development‘)…‖864 Yet, both Khomiakov and Florovsky rejected the idea
that the truth of these developments could be guaranteed, or certified, by an ―external
authority.‖
In order to understand Khomiakov‘s opposition to the idea of an ―external
authority‖ that judges the truth of dogmatic developments, one must start with a brief
explanation of that most distinctive and enduring emphasis of Slavophile ecclesiology:
sobornost. Khomiakov used the Slavic term sobornost (which Florovsky, contra today‘s
theological consensus, maintains is accurately translated by the English term
―catholicity‖) to characterize the essence of the life of the Church. According to
Khomiakov, the Church was above all a unity of life in divine grace to which men and
women submit in ―free communion and in love.‖ 865 It was also a life of dogmatic
development: ―the legacy of an inner life [inherited from the blessed apostles], a legacy
of thought, inexpressible yet constantly yearning to express itself.‖ 866 He held that the
unity of the Church, including the unity of its doctrine, is maintained and developed

864

V6, 49.
V6, 44. Writes Florovsky, ―Accordingly, this Russian term [sobornost] does not mean more than
catholicity. There was no need to borrow it and use it in English as if there was a peculiar ‗Russian‘
conception of the Church which could be denoted by a foreign neologism… Instead of borrowing a foreign
term, it would be more helpful to recover the ancient conception of internal catholicity, which can be
adequately denoted by traditional words‖ (V14, 34).
866
V6, 51. Florovsky is here quoting Khomiakov‘s response to the dissertation of Yuri Samarin (18191876), a disciple of Khomiakov, but also of Hegel. Samarin‘s dissertation was entitled Stefan Iavorskii I
Feofan Prokopovich, and the footnote in Ways cites its location as volume 5 in Samarin‘s Sochineniia
(Moscow, 1880).
865

264

―through the mutual love of Christians, and has no other guardian except this love.‖ 867 In
particular, as Florovsky notes, Khomiakov describes the freedom that marks the life of
the Church and its members as opposed to an ―external authority,‖ or, ―the formal
compulsion of external proofs.‖ 868
For Khomiakov, the phrase ―external authority‖ is a tautology, as he explains that
―an authority is something external.‖ 869 Though he applies it to the Roman Catholic
understanding of the hierarchy, Khomiakov more generally understands ―external
authority‖ as any extra-ecclesial principle or rationality that would stand in judgment
over the Church and its dogmas. Florovsky recognizes this rejection of ―external
authority‖ in another Slavophile thinker, Ivan Kireevskii, as well: ―For Kireevskii the
entire meaning of western falseness is revealed in the triumph of formal reason or
rationality over faith and tradition, by the elevation of the [sic] deduction over
tradition.‖870
This Slavophile polemic against external authority, especially in Khomiakov,
proceeds from an understanding of the Church as a self-sufficient, incommensurable, and
organic whole whose truth can only be discerned within. It is also a Romantic reaction
against rationalism and its manifestation in Idealism. Florovsky describes Khomiakov as
holding that ―As an organism of love the Church is not and cannot be subjected to the
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judgment of reason.‖871 Thus, dogmatic truth cannot be determined according to external
authorities such as logic and ―demonstrative exposition,‖ but only by the inner experience
of the Church.872 Its determination comes from ―not knowledge alone, but knowledge
and life at the same time.‖ It ―is based on the holiness of the mutual love of Christians in
Jesus Christ.‖873 The supposition that knowledge of dogmatic truth is not dependent on
life is, for Khomiakov, the essence of rationalism.
Florovsky strove in his writings to protect the freedom that he saw affirmed in the
doctrine of creatio ex nihilo and the distinctive Christian understanding of personality. In
fact, freedom is really the underlying theme of all the sporadic treatments of the relation
between authority and dogma in his writings. Florovsky saw in Khomiakov‘s reflections
on authority and dogma a companion in the vigorous defense of Christian freedom.
Florovsky wrote at the end of Ways that ―Freedom lies neither in rootlessness nor in
having roots, but in truth, in the truthfulness of life, in the illumination that comes from
the Holy Spirit.‖874 If one were to reverse the terms of this formula to read ―truth lies in
freedom, in the freedom of life,‖ one would have a fitting summary of how Florovsky
believed Christians were able to come to certitude about dogma.
Florovsky endorsed this Romantic polemic against the ―external authority‖ of
extra-ecclesial rationality in his writings of the 1920s and 30s, and it conditions his later
views of how the Church determines the truth of dogmatic developments. His 1921 essay
―The Cunning of Reason‖ presents the ―crisis of European culture‖ as one of
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rationalism. 875 There he characterizes rationalism as ―the idea of the general accessibility
of cognition‖ that holds that ―Truth must be nothing other than a system of reason…
accessible to all and not… dependent on the spiritual anointment of the individual.‖ 876 In
opposition to rationalist claims, Florovsky emphasized that the Church‘s dogmas can
only be understood within the Church and its experience of faith. Similarly, Florovsky
holds that one within the Church cannot be convicted of the truth of these dogmas
through an ―outward authority‖ such as logical verification, or ―historical inquiry,‖ or
even a ―consensus patrum.‖877
Both Khomiakov and Florovsky emphasize that the truth of dogma, including
dogmatic developments, can only be perceived through the free activity of the Church‘s
members: through their askesis, or, their lived rationality. ―For a person living in the
Church,‖ Florovsky writes, ―tradition is completely realized and self-verified…‖; ―Right
life [is] the only efficient test of right beliefs,‖ not ―formal subjection to outward
authority.‖878 At the heart of Florovsky‘s call for a ―Neo-patristic synthesis‖ was his call
for the retrieval of the ―existential theology‖ of the Church Fathers, who perceived, and
witnessed to, the mutual coinherence and interdependence of dogmatics and asceticism.
One might also say that Florovsky advocated an existential understanding of Church
authority in relation to dogma that placed the onus (like Khomiakov) on each Christian‘s
―responsibility‖ to come to a more perfect conviction of the ―tradition of truth‖ through
an ascetical life, while not denying the teaching role specific to the hierarchy. 879
According to Florovsky, ―The Church treasury of total truth is revealed to each in the
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measure of his spiritual growth.‖880 In affirming that guarantees about dogmatic truth
come only through askesis, Florovsky holds, ―the painful duality and tension between
freedom and authority is solved.‖881
With their emphasis upon a lived rationality, both Khomiakov and Florovsky
seem to be operating with what one might call a participatory understanding of
rationality, or, an ontology of rationality. In his ―Human Wisdom and the Great Wisdom
of God,‖ Florovsky quotes approvingly Vladimir Ern‘s statement that ―Truth can be
achieved by man only because in man is the place of Truth, i.e. he is the image of God,
and to him is accessible endless and continual growth in the realization of the eternal idea
of his being.‖882 Florovsky himself grounded men‘s and women‘s ability to perceive
truth in their creation in the imago Dei.883 He grounds their ability to grow in the
comprehension of truth in their free askesis: ―To know the truth means to become true,
i.e., to realize one‘s ideal, to realize the Divine purpose…‖884 Now, Florovsky holds,
―knowledge of God has become possible through that renewal of human nature which
Christ accomplished in his death and resurrection,‖ as men‘s and women‘s askesis in
reason becomes ―a rebirth or transformation, indeed a theosis [θέωσις].‖ More
specifically, ―the knowledge of God has become possible in the Church, in the Body of
Christ as the unity of the life of grace.‖ 885 Thus, according to Florovsky, men‘s and
women‘s convictions about the truth of dogmatic developments are proportional to their
participation in the divine life through and in the Church.
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Florovsky applies the concept of ―external authority‖ to Roman Catholic
conceptions of the role of the hierarchy in a twofold sense. In the first sense, he rejects
the idea that bishops, or the pope, can somehow stand external to, or outside the mind of
the Church, in their authoritative pronouncements. ―The hierarchy teaches as an organ of
the Church. Therefore it is limited by the ‗consent of the Church‘ [e consensu
ecclesiae],‖ writes Florovsky, in obvious opposition to the formula of Pastor Aeternus.886
It is in this sense that Florovsky critiques Roman Catholicism for ―an exaggeration of the
notion of hieratical charism… a kind of canonical ‗Montanism‘‖ indicated by the attitude
that the pope possesses a special power of discernment by virtue of his office. 887
The second sense relates to the concept of lived rationality as it applies to both the
bishops and the faithful. In regard to the bishops, Florovsky affirms that they are indeed
the ones who rightfully ―anoint the truth‖ through acting as the Church‘s mouthpiece. 888
But Florovsky clarifies that in order to perform this function, ―the bishop must embrace
his Church within himself; he must make manifest its experience and its faith.‖889 In
other words, a bishop only functions as a mouthpiece of the Church‘s teaching inasmuch
as he himself lives an ascetical life. In regard to the faithful, Florovsky holds that the
authoritative pronouncements of the hierarchy ―cannot be a source of spiritual life‖ for
them. ―Loyalty to tradition does not mean loyalty to bygone times and to outward
authority; it is a living connexion with the fulness of Church experience.‖ 890 Just as the
hierarchy‘s pronouncements on dogmatic developments are ―unclear, unconvincing‖ to
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those outside the Church, so also, Florovsky holds, will they fail to convince those
faithful who do not have the ―inner evidence of spiritual life.‖ 891 For the faithful, on the
other hand, ―they give secure direction in the intellectual investigation of the faith.‖ 892
Florovsky‘s belief that dogmatic definitions become authoritative for Christian
persons only through their free, existential appropriation of these definitions is intimately
connected with the centrality of creatio ex nihilo in his thought. As such, his critique of
the Roman Catholic understanding of authority in relation to dogma touches upon the
particular emphases he sees affirmed in the Christian understanding of creation.
According to Florovsky, the ―radical contingency‖ of the created world and its otherness
entails that human formulations of the truth have a similar contingency. 893 Though
Florovsky claims that dogmas have a ―perennial significance,‖ he at the same time
qualifies that they are not identifiable with the divine substance. They are symbols for
experience, ―the result of a creative imagination applied to facts—once again, the ‗free
creations of the human soul.‘‖ Thus, dogmatic definitions are not ―necessary,‖ and
cannot have a certitude attached to them that is external to the experience that gives rise
to them. 894
According to Florovsky, the Roman Catholic belief that the pope and the
hierarchy are infallible dogmatic authorities who make guaranteed pronouncements
represents an attempt to improperly attach necessity to dogmatic definitions. It is a form
of epistemological ―utopianism‖ that Florovsky sees as ―a continual and inescapable
temptation of human thought, its negative pole, charged with great, although poisonous,
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energy.‖895 ―Utopians,‖ writes Florovsky, ―seek logical justification for these ideals not
in concrete, living experience, but in uniform norms of ‗reason‘ or ‗nature,‘ in ‗natural
law.‘‖ In the case of papal infallibility, the Roman Catholic Church seeks justification
for dogmatic truths in the satisfaction of certain canonical norms, such as when the pope
speaks ex cathedra on issues of faith and morals. 896 But, as Florovsky holds, certainty
about dogmatic developments cannot simply be imposed from above, nor can it be a
passive acquiescence to a belief in necessary and final words. Certainty, as a function of
cognition, can only be achieved by Christian persons through ―heroic acts.‖ 897 And
certainty about dogmatic developments—like the theosis to which they are inseparably
tied—is an epektasis: an infinite ―stretching forth‖ that does not come to a term before
the eschaton.
Florovsky‘s rejection of guarantees of dogmatic truth detached from free askesis
also manifests itself in an allergy to form as related to authority and dogma. As I
discussed in Chapter One, one of the characteristics of Hellenist and Idealist philosophies
of history that Florovsky opposed was an overemphasis upon form, which ―remains [in
these systems] always the final and highest value.‖898 These philosophies conceived of
history as unfolding according to a certain preexistent outline or scheme irrespective of
the free actions of human persons. Applying these concerns to the issue of authority and
dogma, Florovsky believed that formal guarantees of dogmatic truth imply that such truth
can be perceived and agreed upon if the obligations of certain forms, or structures, are
fulfilled. He thought such a formal circumscription of dogmatic truth represented a threat
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to the freedom of the members of the Church belonging to them by virtue of their status
as persons.
In particular, Florovsky was apprehensive about attaching canonical status to
ecumenical councils as forums for official dogmatic definitions. He frequently reiterated
that the authority to determine the truth of dogmatic statements was a ―charismatic‖ and
not a ―canonical‖ authority. This distinction reappears throughout his oeuvre, and it is
best illuminated in his 1967 essay ―The Authority of Ancient Councils.‖ By this
distinction, Florovsky means that the truth espoused within councils is a matter to be
determined retrospectively; that the Church attempts to discern whether or not the council
has ―under the guidance of the Holy Spirit… witnessed to the Truth, in conformity with
the Scripture as handed down in Apostolic Tradition.‖ It was thus a matter of reception.
In disavowing any formal status to councils, he labeled them as ―occasional charismatic
events‖ as opposed to ―a canonical institution,‖ and used the language of ―spontaneous‖
and ―occasional‖ to describe these events in order to accentuate their origins in free
activity rather than structural conformity. 899
Interestingly, Florovsky seems to endorse a view promoted by both Vasily
Bolotov and Hans Küng, namely, that we should conceive of the entire life of the Church
as a great Council, and ecumenical councils as ―representations‖ (perhaps
―microcosms‖?) of this great Council that is the Church. Such a view appears consistent
with Florovsky‘s position that ―the Council is not above the Church,‖ but is an event
within the life of the Church—the growth of the Body of Christ in history. The attempt
to accord formal character to ecumenical councils would be a-temporal and thus ahistorical, inasmuch as it implies that councils are somehow able to stand outside the
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normal flux of the life of the Church that is Tradition. Such an attempt—which implies
for Florovsky that God provides a special, external assistance when certain formal criteria
are met—also seems to ignore the fact that ―the Church… is indeed a ‗Divine
institution,‘‖ and therefore has ―the ability to discern the truth in faith.‖ 900 Its
discernment of the truth is ongoing in history, and is perhaps ongoing even in the
eschatological state, making it an infinite askesis.
On the contrary, an insistence on ―formal guarantees in doctrinal matters‖ makes
the Church revert back to the ―cyclophoria‖ of Hellenism. It implies that the Church‘s
existence in history is marked by a continuous circle of falling away from the faith until
God‘s external assistance descends upon the Church in the form of an ecumenical
council. The insistence on formal guarantees is, for Florovsky, a denial of the Church‘s
true status as the Body of Christ. It is a denial of the fact that Christ truly dwells within
each one of us, through his Spirit, and through this indwelling effects the transformation
of our entire selves, including our reason. It is a denial of not only our ability to discern
truth, but of the fact that we become truth through our life in Christ.
In the search for formal certitudes disconnected from askesis, Florovsky sees not
only ―a continual and inescapable temptation of human thought,‖ but indeed, its original
sin. Florovsky adopts the view of original sin formulated by the Russian theologian
Viktor Nesmelov (1863-1920), whom Florovsky lauds for ―his brilliant interpretation of
the Biblical story of the Fall.‖ Florovsky summarizes Nesmelov as deeming that ―the
‗fall‘ consisted in the fact that people desired to attain [the cognition of good and evil] not
through a creative act, through free searching, vital God-serving, but rather by a magical
route, mechanically…‖ Both Nesmelov and Florovsky link themselves with ―the early
900
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Slavophiles, along with the West-European Romantics‖ in calling this original sin by the
name of ―rationalism.‖901
Florovsky implies that the Roman Catholic understanding of authority is a form of
rationalism, as it attempts to guarantee the certainty of dogmatic definitions apart from
the creative activities of thought and life. Such was also the position of Khomiakov, who
held that ―rationalism is more apparent in papism than in Protestantism.‖ 902 To
paraphrase the words of Maximus the Confessor (whose understanding of the Fall has
affinities with Nesmelov‘s), the Roman Catholic Church seeks to provide the faithful
with certitude about dogmatic developments ―without God, before God, and not in
accordance with God.‖903 Infallible statements thus attempt to provide ―external
illumination‖ irrespective of ―transfiguration.‖ 904 But, as Florovsky recognizes, ―sin and
evil come not from an external impurity, but from an internal failure, from the perversion
of the will,‖ and can be ―overcome only by inner conversion and change…‖ 905 So also,
the conviction that dogmatic developments accord with the truth of inner experience can
only be arrived at through askesis.
Relatedly, Florovsky also maintains that the Roman Catholic Church‘s
understanding of authority reveals that ―the Resurrection, the victory over decay and
death, is insufficiently felt‖ by them. 906 The purpose of the Resurrection was not merely
an external satisfaction of sins, but ―to unite man with God for ever... a lifting up of
901
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human nature into an everlasting communion with the Divine Life…‖ Such a liftingup—―the ‗deification‘ of human nature, the ‗theosis‘‖—included a transformation of
human reason so that knowledge of God is once again possible. 907 In asserting that men‘s
and women‘s certitude about dogmatic truth is only attainable through this truth‘s
conformity to predetermined forms, Florovsky holds that Roman Catholic theology
denies the character of the new, free life in the Spirit, and remains enslaved to the law.
Indeed, this law-spirit dichotomy, characteristic of the Slavophile movement, underlies
all of Florovsky‘s treatments of the issue of authority and dogma.

C. FLOROVSKY’S TEMPERING OF HIS SLAVOPHILE DEPENDENCE
Although Florovsky made clear that it was the prerogative of the bishops alone to
give authoritative voice to the Church‘s teaching, he did not believe that this action came
with an infallible guarantee of the truth of the teaching. To put it within the
Chalcedonian framework, Florovsky affirmed that the bishops‘ role was to incarnate the
Church‘s dogmatic developments in their witness on behalf of the Church, but that these
developments did not need to be further incarnated through canonical assurances. Rather,
like Khomiakov, Florovsky held that the faithful can only obtain such assurances through
their free askesis within the Church, or, through their fuller incorporation into the Body
of Christ.
But it is a testament to the Chalcedonian balance of Florovsky‘s thought that this
position was not without qualification. Though Florovsky was clearly indebted to
Slavophile ecclesiology, its Christological shortcomings meant that it could never
exhaust Florovsky‘s own thought on ecclesiology, including his thoughts on
907

V3, 31, 95, 97.

275

ecclesiastical authority and its role in dogmatic definition. One could rightly describe
him as having an existential, or ascetical, understanding of Church authority, but he
significantly nuanced his thought so as to perhaps separate himself from the purely
voluntarist understanding of reason and authority others perceived in Khomiakov. 908
Florovsky‘s turn to the Fathers appeared to balance the Slavophile influence of his
understanding of authority. If one were to look for a patristic figure who best represents
Florovsky‘s own thinking on authority, it would be St. John Chrysostom, ―the prophet of
charity.‖ In his analyses of Chrysostom, one finds, in germ, the principles underlying
Florovsky‘s own understanding of authority. Florovsky finds in Chrysostom‘s writings
the successful integration of the poles of freedom and authority, of dogma and life.
According to Florovsky, ―Chrysostom understood pastoral work primarily as a service of
teaching and persuading. A pastor is an authority, but his jurisdiction is realized through
words which attempt to convince, and this is the basic difference between spiritual power
and secular power.‖909 The recognition of this ―basic difference between spiritual power
and secular power‖ is, of course, one of the principal tenets of Slavophilism, as well. So
also was Chrysostom‘s characterization of the Church as primarily a life of freedom and
charity.
Florovsky never rejects Chrysostom‘s, or Slavophilism‘s, characterization of the
Church and its particular understanding of authority. But the historical work he performs
in his patrologies demonstrates his growing appreciation for the need to hold this
characterization in tension with the fact that the Church still dwells in the world. He
recognizes that ―the situation [of the Church] changed with the conversion of the
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[Roman] Empire,‖ which ―made the universality of the Church more visible than ever
before.‖910 This increased universality meant that the earlier means of maintaining
communion between the churches needed to be supplemented by increased organization,
which included the occasional calling of ecumenical councils. In the title of a 1957
essay, Florovsky expressed the tension of the Church‘s existence in the world, but not of
the world, as a tension between ―Empire and Desert.‖ In this essay, he portrays the
Church‘s attempt to navigate this tension in history as an ascetic struggle and a lock for
which ―there is no earthly or historical key… but [only] an eschatological key, the true
‗Key of David.‘‖911 As such, Florovsky does not attempt to offer any solutions to this
tension, but his very act of wrestling with the tension perhaps helped move him away
from the Romantic notions of authority that marked Slavophilism.
Florovsky‘s increased recognition of the need for organizations and institutions
within the Church manifested itself in qualifications of earlier, polarizing statements that
touched upon issues pertinent to authority. For instance, though Florovsky displayed an
allergy toward circumscribing the discernment of truth by any formal criteria, he at the
same time affirmed the place of form in the life of the Church. He acknowledges that
form is an integral part of a historical Church, and that ―there are… permanent structures,
both in doctrine, ritual and institution, which belong to the very esse of the Church, and
constitute her perennial ‗form.‘‖ 912 I have already discussed his stance that the verbal
forms of defined dogmas have an ―eternal, irreplaceable‖ character that serve as a guide
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for the faithful. 913 ―[Christian worship],‖ he wrote, ―is and must be determined in form
and content by certain ‗credal‘ assumptions.‖ 914 One should also note that his famous
diagnosis of the ―pseudomorphosis‖ of Russian theological thought via Western
categories implies a recognition of ―the truth that form shapes substance…‖ 915
Relatedly, Florovsky also saw in the canonical forms a confirmation of the
historical reality of the Church, and one of the visible manifestations of her theology. He
reiterated in numerous essays that the current canonical division between different groups
of Christians is indicative of a real schism. 916 Against Bulgakov and others who
advocated limited intercommunion on the supposition that a true, mystical unity existed
among certain Christians visibly separated by schism, Florovsky said, ―A ‗catholic‘
cannot divorce order from faith; a very definite Church order is for a ‗catholic‘ an article
of his integral Christian faith or dogma.‖ 917 And in spite of his trope that ecumenical
councils are not so much canonical institutions as charismatic events, at the end of his
essay ―The Authority of the Ancient Councils‖ he adds in passing that ―canonical
strictures or sanctions may be appended to conciliar decisions on matters of faith.‖ 918 In
other words, Florovsky allows that canonical status may be attached to councils as a
result of the active reception of the faithful. Finally, though Florovsky repeatedly
maintained that there was no ―rigid theory‖ about ecumenical councils in the early
Church, he also grants that ―the highest authority in the Church was a Council.‖ 919
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Ultimately, one sees in these qualifications of the canonical realm that Florovsky wished
to protect the concept of freedom so dear to Khomiakov, while at the same time avoiding
Khomiakov‘s seeming denial of the role of form and order in the life of the Church.
In later years Florovsky also tempered his criticisms of Roman Catholicism,
including its understanding of authority, though it would be hasty to view this tempering
as a repudiation of the positions he espoused in his philosophical and theological essays
from the 1920s and 30s. This change appears to be in part the result of Florovsky‘s
increased engagement with Roman Catholic theologians, especially those belonging to
the Nouvelle Théologie school. It was also perhaps the result of his involvement with
Protestant groups in the ecumenical movement, whose ―problem of manifold
denominationalism‖ he perceived to be a result of ―the rupture of Church authority‖ that
came about with the Reformation. 920
Florovsky‘s patrologies illustrate a much more balanced estimate of the Roman
Catholic claims about the papal office. Throughout his examinations of the patristic age,
which attempt to combine Geschicthe and Dogmengeschicthe, Florovsky consistently has
no trouble in recognizing that ―It is merely a fact that from the very beginning—see Pope
Clement‘s early letter to the Church at Corinth—there was a certain recognized primacy
of the Roman Church,‖ and that ―other churches and individuals were constantly
appealing to Rome.‖ At the same time, he cautions that ―this does not establish in any
sense the later doctrine of papal infallibility nor does it imply that Rome was always
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correct.‖921 In regard to papal primacy, Florovsky provides a rather neutral account of
how Pope Gelasius I (492-496) attached greater canonical significance to the office of the
pope. His only negative commentary was a lament that Gelasius‘ actions ―managed to
deepen the rift between Constantinople and Rome, though Florovsky attributes the
deepening of this rift to ―Gelasius‘ contemptuous attitude to the patriarchal throne of
Constantinople,‖ and not to Gelasius‘ primatial claims per se.922
Florovsky‘s more balanced view of Roman Catholic authority is also evident in
his 1959 essay ―On the Upcoming Council of the Roman Catholic Church,‖ written on
the eve of the Second Vatican Council. In this essay, Florovsky demonstrates a
remarkably patient attitude toward the First Vatican Council and its definitions of papal
primacy and infallibility. He acknowledges the contextual difficulties surrounding the
adoption of the ―Vatican Dogma‖: that the Council had ―disbanded without completing
its program‖; that the definition ―had been rather awkwardly removed from its general
context,‖ namely, a dogmatic constitution on the Church; and that the ―‗theological
climate‘ has changed significantly—in the Roman Catholic Church and in the entire
Christian world—since the times of Pius the Ninth.‖
At the same time, Florovsky does not believe these contextual issues constitute
grounds for hoping that the ―Vatican Dogma‖ will eventually be regarded as mere
historical and theological folly. He admits that ―Papal primacy and infallibility is now
not only historical and canonical fact, but an ‗article of faith‘ in the Roman Church.‖
Nevertheless, his tone is hopeful. Rather than alleging that Vatican I‘s definition
represented the dogmatization of Rome‘s Christological deficiencies, Florovsky points
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the way forward by suggesting that the Vatican Dogma needs to be more clearly and
distinctly formulated within the ―dogma of the Church.‖ He thought such a balancing
would help ―render an authentic interpretation of the ‗Vatican Dogma,‘‖ and restore
―theological equilibrium.‖ While not glossing over the differences in the doctrine of the
Church that Orthodox and Catholics must still overcome, Florovsky allows that there is
room for ―discovery and development.‖923 He even seems to imply that the definitions of
papal primacy and infallibility may one day be able to be synthesized within an orthodox,
Chalcedonian hermeneutic.

D. CONCLUSION
An initial glance at Florovsky‘s direct mentions of dogmatic development might
lead one to think that he does not connect it with the concept of authority. As I
established in Chapter Two, Florovsky sees in the idea of dogmatic development an
affirmation of the place of both reason and life in the growth of the Body of Christ. But
for Florovsky, the idea of authority is implied in this affirmation, as dogmatic
developments become more authoritative for Christian persons through their life, or,
through their incorporation into Christ. This incorporation constitutes, for Florovsky, the
concretization, or incarnation, of dogmatic developments, rather than any hierarchical fiat
or other supposed formal guarantee of their truth. Such was also the Slavophile position
of Khomiakov, though Florovsky parts ways with Khomiakov in affirming the bishops‘
concrete role of giving voice to the Church‘s teaching, or, her dogmatic developments.
But in solidarity with Khomiakov, Florovsky never held that magisterial pronouncements
constituted a beacon for the faithful‘s certitude about the truth of these developments.
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3.3: DIALOGUE
I have argued that the language Newman used to justify the Roman Catholic
understanding of authority in general, and the papacy and Magisterium in particular,
flowed from the incarnational principle that characterized his thinking about Christianity.
Florovsky, too, works out his version of an orthodox Christian understanding of authority
through the lens of the dogma of the Incarnation as mediated through Chalcedon.
Newman and Florovsky thus coincide in using the Incarnation as a referent point for their
respective understandings of authority in relation to doctrinal development, though they
differ on the application of this principle. In this Dialogue section of Chapter Three, I
will further examine Newman‘s and Florovsky‘s application of the incarnational
principle, though such an examination involves the unenviable task of engaging in what
Heidegger referred to as a ―hermeneutics of hermeneutics.‖
As I argued, the theme of certitude is at the heart of the strong connection
Newman makes between doctrinal development and authority. His argument that ―An
Infallible Development Authority [is] to be Expected‖ hinges upon his position that the
Church‘s members have a natural desire for certitude about revelation and its human
exposition in word and deed, and that they are not capable of achieving such certitude, in
all cases, through their own efforts. An underlying assumption of his position is that
certitude about revelation as a whole is intrinsic to Christian faith. 924
Moreover, Newman held that certitude about the whole of revelation, as
traditioned by the Church, is also a prerequisite of Christian growth, lest one forever spin
around the circle of skepticism. The idea that it was the responsibility of each Christian
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to achieve certitude about every doctrine and development of doctrine on his or her own
was ludicrous to Newman. According to Newman, the usual (and proper) pattern of
Christian life was to accept such developments based upon one‘s prior certitude in
Magisterial authority, and to grow in one‘s understanding of these developments over the
course of time and in a manner proper to each person‘s particular vocation. (Newman
believed that Catholics‘ certitude in Magisterial authority also obliges them to
respectfully regard the less official statements of the Magisterium with an attitude that he
referred to as the ―pietas fidei.‖)925 The Magisterium‘s acts of defining doctrinal
developments aid the certitude, and thus the growth, of the faithful, inasmuch as the gift
of infallibility protects and guarantees the truth of their definitions. This guarantee serves
to make developments more concrete for the faithful, and makes concrete the promise of
Christ to his Church that ―the gates of the netherworld shall not prevail against it‖ (Mt
16:18).
Newman regarded the Roman Catholic understanding of authority as a fulfillment
of Scripture, and thus, an authentic development of doctrine. But for the most part,
Newman‘s account of authority is, as he freely admits, more apologetic than theological.
Yet in this sense it is incarnational, as it professes to take human beings and history as
they are, and argues that the Magisterium and the papacy are effective supplies for
humanity‘s natural and historical needs. Newman‘s conversion to Roman Catholicism
was based on his arrival at the conclusion that its system, which includes its
understanding of authority, was more congruent with his first principles than those other
systems that claimed to be Christian. These first principles were formed based on his
real, concrete experience of revelation, history, and a multitude of other things. Thus,
925

Diff., 2: 345-346.

283

Newman‘s account of authority proceeds from concrete experience, and attempts to show
that the Roman Catholic understanding of authority accords with this experience.
Like Newman, Florovsky indeed acknowledges that the Magisterium has been
granted the power to define dogmatic developments, or, to make concrete and visible the
verbal witness of the Church. But he nowhere claims that the bishops‘ act of defining is
protected by the infallibility that belongs to the entire Church. Thus, Florovsky denies
that Magisterial definitions in and of themselves provide any sort of guarantee of their
truth. This denial is especially signaled by his rejection of any formal, canonical bounds
by which the members of the Church may identify what is, and is not, a true dogmatic
witness to the experience of faith. As Florovsky reminds us, history shows that the
actions of a pope may very well be condemned, ―a large ‗general‘ council may prove
itself to be a ‗council of robbers,‘‖ and a ―numerus episcoporum does not solve the
question.‖926
In solidarity with Khomiakov and Slavophilism, Florovsky holds that guarantees
about the truth of doctrinal developments can only come about for each of the Church‘s
members through their personal askesis. According to Florovsky, the truth of dogma
further impresses itself upon the ―symphony of personalities‖ in the Church in proportion
to their increased participation in the Truth, namely, Jesus Christ. As they become fuller
members of the Body of Christ, they come to more and more think with the ―mind of the
Church.‖ It is only in the process of this synergetic relationship between the believer and
926
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Christ that doctrinal developments become more authoritative and more certain for the
former. Such certitude does not originate from supposed infallible guarantees provided
by the Magisterium. To repeat Florovsky‘s words, ―Authority (understood here as
referring to officially designated authorities within the Church) cannot be a source of
spiritual life.‖927
One could very well argue that Florovsky‘s more ascetical understanding of
authority is incarnational in that it testifies to the essential unity of faith and life.
According to Florovsky‘s reasoning, doctrinal developments become more certain for a
believer the more he or she ―puts on Christ.‖ However, Florovsky‘s dependence on a
Slavophile understanding of authority perhaps also make for chinks in the otherwise
formidable armor of his Chalcedonian theology. His primary critique of Slavophilism in
Ways was directed toward its ―philosophy of history,‖ which seemed to represent an
―escape or even retreat from history.‖928 Florovsky‘s patrologies contain some analysis
of the problem of authority in the first millennium when, Newman maintains, the
Church‘s understanding of authority was still very much nascent. However, Florovsky
hardly wrestles with the issues of authority that punctuated the historical path of the
Church since the Great Schism of 1054. An exception is his 1960 essay ―St. Gregory
Palamas and the Tradition of the Fathers,‖ where he critiques the restrictive periodization
of the ―age of the Fathers‖ to the Seven Ecumenical Councils by remarking, ―Then, St.
Symeon the New Theologian and St. Gregory Palamas are simply left out, and the great
Hesychast Councils of the fourteenth century are ignored and forgotten. What is their
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position and authority in the Church?‖ 929 But Florovsky‘s answer to this question does
not include a role for the official authorities within the Church, the bishops. Nor does
Florovsky anywhere provide contemporary examples of the bishops‘ exercise of
dogmatic authority within the Church. By implication, Florovsky seems to regard the
history of the Church‘s understanding of authority as a history of decline.
More importantly, Florovsky seems to ignore the possibility that authority might
provide any kind of assistance to Christians in their personal askesis. Like Khomiakov,
he rejects the idea that the Magisterium‘s giving of form to Christian witness through
authoritative pronouncement serves as an aid to the faith of the members of the Body of
Christ. Florovsky claims that his ascetical understanding of authority solves ―the painful
duality between freedom and authority.‖930 But really, he does not go beyond
Khomiakov‘s opposition between freedom and authority. 931 Ironically, Khomiakov‘s and
Florovsky‘s rejection of ―external authority‖ turns back upon them, as they end up
characterizing the dogmatic role of Magisterial authority as completely external to
Christian askesis.
Lewis Shaw hints that this failure to attribute any discernible role to the bishops‘
power of defining within the Christian life threatens the incarnational character of
Florovsky‘s understanding of authority. According to Shaw, ―[Florovsky‘s] ecclesiology
was one of sustained metaphor and image, rather than one which concentrated on
delineating the locus or the matrix of the Church‘s authority.‖ 932 More apropos to the
issue of doctrinal development, Shaw writes,
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Florovsky found it difficult to bring any critical standard to bear on his idealized
Church. He did speak of a ‗charismatic,‘ as opposed to ‗canonical,‘ Church, but
he never elucidated the distinction. He believed that kerygma and dogma were
mutually elaborative, correlative, and definitive statements of the eternal meaning
of the Christian faith, and that kerygma could serve as a critical principle for
interpreting any later developments within Christianity.‖ 933
Thus, as Shaw implies, Florovsky never provided any canonical criteria by which the
members of the Church could distinguish true from false developments of doctrine.
Because of this lacuna, Shaw appears to characterize Florovsky‘s view of ecclesiastical
authority as Romantic—a quality he also attributes to Slavophile ecclesiology which, he
writes, portrays ―love-held-in-common, ‗the depository and the guardian of faith,‘ [as]
the Church‘s guarantor of truth—not the Bible, not a single bishop acting in the name of
the whole Church, nor a council.‖ 934 Aidan Nichols, who is admittedly indebted to
Shaw‘s reading of Florovsky, also remarks that ―Florovsky‘s marked preference for the
inner, over against the outer, in matters of catholicity is not, however, in keeping with the
character of Christianity as an incarnational religion.‖ 935
As I mentioned above, Florovsky admits that the Church may eventually grant
canonical status to councils and their doctrinal statements as a matter of reception, which
is but another descriptor for the askesis of the members of the Church. Zizioulas has also
adopted this position, and in a statement bearing striking similarity to Florovsky‘s own
position writes, ―[A] true council becomes such only a posteriori; it is not an institution
but an event in which the entire community participates and which shows whether or not
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its bishop has acted according to his charisma veritatis.‖936 However, while granting that
councils must be received (a position Newman holds, as well), it seems that a council
must have some a priori authority if the Church is to have something to receive. In his
dissertation on Florovsky, Shaw made the interesting point that ―Florovsky never
addresses the philosophical question of givenness; that is, do givens become so because
they are grounded in revelation, or do we treat events as revelation because they function
as givens in our thought?‖937 In the parallel case of Magisterial statements produced by
councils, one may well ask: are these statements received because they already have an
authoritative status in the ―mind of the Church,‖ or do they solely become authoritative
through the act of the Church‘s reception of them? Florovsky does not provide an
answer.
Shaw‘s evaluations of Florovsky‘s understanding of authority indirectly raise the
question: is the role of defining doctrinal developments that Florovsky locates in the
Magisterium merely an abstract role, having no real, concrete function in the growth of
the Body of Christ? While giving credence to the Slavophile understanding of authority
endorsed by Florovsky, John Meyendorff unwittingly goes beyond it in estimating that
―If Orthodox theology has any contribution to make to the present ecumenical dialogue, it
will consist in stressing and showing the auxiliary character of authority.‖ 938 According
an auxiliary character to authority in the dogmatic realm seems to imply attributing some
real, canonical power to it. Newman, as I pointed out, located the Magisterium‘s power
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of infallibly defining doctrinal developments within their role in the ruling office of the
Church. He held that the Magisterium has a special responsibility, by virtue of
ordination, to not only occasionally define doctrinal developments, but to judge and
proclaim the Christian truth for the faithful when the need arises. This responsibility of
the Church‘s ruling office served, in Newman‘s understanding, to protect the unity of the
Church and promote its growth.
Florovsky‘s writings, on the other hand, contain almost no reflection on the
kingly, or ruling, office of the Church and how it functions within Christian life. The
linguistic omission is probably due to the limited Orthodox recourse to the model of
Christ‘s threefold office, which was made popular by Calvin‘s Institutes. The conceptual
omission, however, appears related to Florovsky‘s opposition between freedom and
authority. Florovsky primarily characterizes the authority of Christ, like the authority of
those deemed Fathers of the Church, as a teaching authority. In the Synoptic Gospels,
writes Florovsky, ―Jesus is portrayed as having an authority—ὡς ἐξουσίαν ἔχων—
hitherto not known, an authority of teaching which astounds the people…‖ 939 When
Florovsky does refer to Christ‘s ―kingly rule‖ in his essay on the ―Redemption,‖ he
speaks of it in terms of regeneration, and clarifies that ―No one, so far as nature is
concerned, can escape Christ‘s kingly rule, can alienate himself from the invincible
power of the resurrection. But the will of man cannot be cured in the same invincible
manner; for the whole meaning of the healing of the will is in its free conversion.‖940
Florovsky then goes on to emphasize the Christian‘s union with Christ in Baptism as
involving the path of free renunciation. Indeed, the typical modern Orthodox
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interpretation of Christ‘s kingly rule is that it is appropriated by each Christian inasmuch
as he or she exercises ―rule‖ over his or her passions. While not denying the truth of this
interpretation, which has support in Tradition, it seems that the question of whether or not
Christ‘s kingly office applies to the episcopate in any specific sense is worth further intraOrthodox reflection.941
Unlike Newman, Florovsky does not see the bishop‘s role of defining as serving
to protect the unity of the Church in a visible manner. Rather, he holds that the visible
unity of the Church is manifested in the Apostolic Succession, which he regards as
primarily a function of the sacramental, or priestly, office of the Church. Florovsky
seems to implicitly adopt Constantine‘s sharp distinction between the imperial authority
of the secular rule and the sacerdotal authority that resides in the episcopacy. 942 He
affirms an intimate connection between unity in the sacraments and unity in faith.
However, he does not claim that the bishops have a specific role, by virtue of their
ordination, in preserving unity through their power of defining. He never maintained that
the bishops‘ definitions necessarily served as authoritative judgments of the mind of the
Church, nor that their definitions indicated the ongoing triumph of truth. And he ascribes
no canonical or institutional power to the bishop‘s dogmatic role.
Florovsky‘s failure to attribute a concrete ruling power to bishops in regard to
dogma once again raises the issue of the philosophy of history. I established in Chapter
Two that Newman and Florovsky both affirm, with qualifications, an organic
941
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interpretation of history. They both view history as the growth of the Body of Christ, and
both consider that the Church‘s growth in the knowledge of dogma is an indispensable
part of its overall growth. But they differ as to how this growth in the knowledge of
dogma is preserved and promoted. Newman believes that it is the prerogative of the
ruling office of the Church to tend to this growth, pruning when necessary, through their
power of defining and authoritatively pronouncing on dogmatic matters. Florovsky, on
the other hand, does not claim that the bishops‘ power of defining ensures that the
Church‘s witness to the experience of faith remains faithful. Shaw alludes to a problem
that arises with Florovsky‘s position: ―Strangely, his obsession with free will never
obtrudes upon, nor arises within, the context of Church-cum-υρόνημα; e.g., could the
Church have chosen Arianism, or does the Spirit dictate her choices?‖ 943 Florovsky does
not seem to regard the Church‘s perseverance in faith as a completely open-ended
contingency, and thus, one would assume he believes this perseverance involves a
synergy between human action and Divine Providence exercised through the Spirit of
Christ‘s presence in the Church. But he certainly differs from Newman inasmuch as he
does not acknowledge that God providentially guides His Church‘s adherence to the truth
through any of its visible structures.
As a function of his understanding of the ruling office of the Church, Newman
furthermore affirms the dogma defined by Vatican I that regards the papacy as endowed
with the ability to infallibly define dogmas without the explicit consent of the rest of the
Magisterium and Church. As I argued, Newman‘s acceptance of papal infallibility was
congruent with his belief that there was a need for a ―center of unity‖ in the Church. For
him, the dogma of papal infallibility was but an extension of the claims of papal primacy
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into a clearer role in the dogmatic realm. Von Balthasar, who studied under Newman
scholar Erich Przywara, takes up a similar line of thinking as Newman in his work Der
Antirömische Affekt. He describes the pope as the ―‗head‘ within the collegium and the
communio as the element instituted by Christ to represent and (what is more) to
determine unity… [who] must be able to exercise his legal authority throughout the
whole of the united body without being limited by the rights of his fellow bishops.‖ He
furthermore writes that papal infallibility ―is not an obstacle to [the pilgrim Church] but
the indispensable prerequisite if she is to be communio in the Spirit of Christ here on
earth.‖944
Von Balthasar then goes on to expand on the idea that only a Church with a pope
can guarantee the freedom of its members, and has recourse to the thought of Newman
and Soloviev. Quoting Soloviev‘s Russia and the Universal Church, von Balthasar
points out that Soloviev opposed the ―idle daydreams‖ of the Slavophiles, who proposed
that there existed a unity in faith among the members of the Orthodox Church in spite of
visible divisions among them. Because this supposed ―unity in faith… is not expressed
by any living acts,‖ Soloviev referred to it as ―an abstract formula that produces nothing
and has no binding power.‖ According to Soloviev, it is only the pope, protected by
infallibility, who can concretely secure the unity of the Church in truth and freedom. 945
Florovsky was aware of Soloviev‘s line of argument in Russia and the Universal
Church. In Ways, Florovsky had dismissed Soloviev as ―[knowing] little more about the
West than unionistic ultramontanism and German idealism,‖ and regarded his theocratic
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hopes as ―utopian.‖946 Florovsky seems to adopt a more nuanced criticism of Soloviev in
later years, and notes in ―Reason and Faith in the Philosophy of Solov‘ëv‖ (1955) that
―The theocratic conception of [Soloviev‘s] ‗Romanizing‘ years has not been properly
studied up to now.‖ Florovsky also acknowledges that ―in [Soloviev‘s] interpretation, it
was precisely ‗authority‘ of the divine truth, mediated through the hierarchical
stewardship of the Church, that could secure true freedom,‖ but Florovsky does not
comment further on this contention. 947 Undoubtedly, Florovsky never wavered in his
position that Soloviev‘s theocratic proposals exhibited a failure to effectively maintain
the tension between ―empire and desert.‖ But he also never wavered in his adulation for
Soloviev‘s recognition of the unity of faith and reason, which was exemplified in
Soloviev‘s acceptance of the idea of dogmatic development. Soloviev came to perceive
the need for a concrete authority to ensure unity in the Church and the freedom of its
members to develop their understanding of dogma. It is unfortunate that Florovsky never
examined this corollary of Soloviev‘s promotion of dogmatic development, or whether
the tension between ―empire and desert‖ is applicable in the dogmatic realm.
Florovsky‘s evaluation of Soloviev in ―Reason and Faith‖ contains the indirect
critique that Soloviev‘s understanding of authority lacked an emphasis on askesis. 948 It is
important to keep in mind that Florovsky‘s anthropology is behind the ascetical character
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described by its concepts‖ (―Neo-Patristic Synthesis and Russian Philosophy,‖ SVTQ 44 [2000]: 314).
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that marks his understanding of authority. To summarize some themes touched upon
earlier in Chapter Two, Florovsky believes that Christ‘s redemption accomplished the
renewal of human reason, and that the Christian person is thus capable of knowing the
truth through his or her growth in union with Christ through his body, the Church.
Florovsky balances his acknowledgement of the ultimately apophatic character of
theology with the affirmation that men and women can really know the truth. As I
pointed out, Florovsky‘s 1933 essay ―The Problematic of Christian Reunion‖ contains the
charge that the Roman Catholic understanding of authority reveals a failure to feel ―the
Resurrection, the victory over decay and death.‖949 This charge is part of a larger
Orthodox polemic against a Western theology of the cross that fails to adequately
integrate the crucifixion within the entirety of the Paschal Mystery. Though Florovsky
was less negative in tone toward Roman Catholic theology in later years, his charge is
still worth examination. As Florovsky pointed out at the end of Ways, ―Return is possible
only through ‗crisis,‘ for the path to Christian recovery is critical, not irenical,‖ though he
qualified that this ―crisis‖ must involve not tired polemics, but ―a historiosophical
exegesis of the western religious tragedy.‖ 950
Newman indeed emphasized that the Church still needs a clear authority with the
power to act infallibly due to the sin that ever threatens the Church until the eschaton. I
pointed out that there is evidence that Newman thought such authority would have been
needed regardless of sin, as a result of human finitude, but it is certainly not an emphasis
of his. Though Newman‘s retrieval of the salvific model of deification is commendable,
he does not give a positive account of how the divine indwelling contributes to the
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character of Christian knowledge. Such is also a general trend with the Roman Catholic
theology of authority in general. Florovsky‘s charge should give Roman Catholics pause,
for it points to a need to account for the redeemed character of human knowledge within
their understanding of authority and its function in the Church.
Nevertheless, Newman‘s account of authority is not devoid of an ascetical
component. Newman located the act of defining in the Ecclesia docens, as does
Florovsky, but this episcopal act is not intended as a substitute for the active assent of the
faithful. Certitude about doctrinal developments cannot be forced upon the men and
women of the Church, even if they do have the supposed infallible guarantee provided by
the Magisterium. Indeed, in the aftermath of the definition of papal infallibility, Newman
famously wrote, ―We cannot force things. The Council cannot force things—the voice of
the Schola Theologorum, of the whole Church diffusive, will in time make itself heard,
and Catholics instincts and ideas will assimilate and harmonize into the credenda of
Christendom, and the living tradition of the faithful…‖ 951 According to Newman, the
formal guarantees provided by infallible authorities constitute ―external evidence‖ of the
truth of the Church, but they still require the ―internal [evidence]… supplied by the moral
sense‖ of the faithful. 952 Newman portrays the faithful‘s reception of defined doctrines as
still very much an ascetical act. Through their active reception, the faithful help further
draw out the meaning of what has been defined, which sometimes requires a ―legitimate
minimizing‖ that serves to ―trim the boat‖ of a definition. 953 Finally, in Consulting,
Newman approvingly quotes a passage from a letter of Bishop Ullathorne (Newman‘s
ordinary), published after the proclamation of the dogma of the Immaculate Conception,
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which makes the claim that those faithful who live truly ascetical lives are the best
mirrors of the Church‘s faith: ―And it is the devout who have the surest instinct in
discerning the mysteries of which the Holy Spirit breathes the grace through the Church,
and who, with as sure a tact, reject what is alien from her teaching.‖ 954
But there is a difference in Newman‘s and Florovsky‘s models of ascetical
reception. Newman portrays the process of Tradition as a dialogue between the ruling
and prophetical offices of the Church, between authority and theology, mediated by the
Holy Spirit, who serves as the unifying principle. Edward Miller aptly describes
Newman‘s understanding of this process:
The dialectical movement between the magisterium and the baptized faithful
[including the schola theologorum] occurs, of course, at the level of grace, and
the process can be described in terms of the original unity that is the Holy Spirit.
All dialectical movement attempts to recapture the original unity from which it
arose. The faith is externalized into words (i.e., Newman‘s principle of dogma),
and the words are assimilated, under the action of the Holy Spirit, so that there is
proper understanding (internalization) of what had been externalized. The faith of
the church returns to itself in more articulated form but not as a stranger. 955
Newman assuredly believes that the priestly office also has a role in this dialectical
process, but he did not elaborate on this role in any of his works. He also acknowledges
that each member of the Church possesses all of these offices in some mode.
Florovsky, on the other hand, like Khomiakov, does not portray the Christian
person‘s askesis in truth as a dialogue between different groups within the Church. He
views the person‘s activity within Tradition as a dialogue, but it is a dialogue with other
past and present persons within the Body of Christ, who is the ―personal centre‖ of the
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Church. 956 The personal emphasis of Florovsky‘s model of the Christian‘s askesis in
truth is, of course, not opposed to Newman‘s, since Newman regards the various offices
of the Church as made up of persons, and claims that each of these offices belong in some
way to each baptized Christian. But Florovsky‘s emphasis indicates a phenomenon that
marks his understanding of authority. Florovsky‘s ecclesiology was an ecclesiology of
persons, but he did not always emphasize the functional identity of certain persons within
the Church except in the sacramental realm. Accordingly, his model of the Christian‘s
development in the understanding of doctrine was not the hierarchical schema of the
Church, but monasticism, which in the East ―cut across the basic distinction between
clergy and laity in the Church.‖ Florovsky acknowledges that ―Monasticism could never
become a common way of life.‖ 957 But he never quite incorporated this insight into his
understanding of authority, which is characterized by the otherness of the monastic way
of life.
In a 1933 essay, Florovsky accused Roman Catholic understandings of authority
as evidencing an insufficient feeling of the Resurrection. However, one might very well
accuse his understanding of authority at this time as not sufficiently feeling the effects of
sin that remain in the Church after the Redemption. Florovsky‘s reticence in regard to
the continued existence of sin in the Church is perhaps a sign of the ―voluntaristic flavor‖
that Rowan Williams perceives in some of Florovsky‘s writings. 958 Shaw, who also sees
this voluntarism in Florovsky, notes that the consequence of Florovsky‘s emphasis on
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―creative freedom… lays him open to the serious charge of undervaluing the role of grace
in his salvation history.‖ 959
Though Shaw is rightly cautious about making this charge, it does seem that
Florovsky failed to consider whether authority could be a form of grace for Christians in
their growth in the understanding of Christian experience. According to Newman and the
Roman Catholic tradition, the effects of sin continue to thwart the askesis of the members
of the Church in their knowledge of, and participation in, God, and authority serves as a
divinely-provided aid to keep these members on the right path. Some of Florovsky‘s
later works admit the continued obstacle of sin in the Church‘s growth in knowledge,
thus blunting the voluntarism that characterizes some of his earlier essays. For instance,
in ―Religion and Theological Tensions‖ (1955), Florovsky writes, ―Of course, we have to
distinguish the inevitable and healthy ‗tensions‘ of search, physiological tensions, as it
were, and the pathological ones, which are implied in our sin, which is remitted and yet
not exterminated to the full extent. In our actual practice, the healthy dialectics of search
is still dangerously contaminated by the dialectics of error. We still belong to a fallen
world; it is already redeemed, but not yet transfigured.‖960 But he does not here take the
further step of asserting that the fallen nature of the world necessitates the guidance of
infallible authority within the Church.
Aside from the above reference to ―physiological tensions,‖ Florovsky for the
most part fails to account for finitude and contingency in the Christian‘s askesis in truth.
Though Florovsky consistently emphasized the limitations and contingencies of human
knowledge, he did not seem to acknowledge that these limitations and contingencies
959

Shaw, ―Introduction,‖ 189.
V13, 11-12. The editor of Florovsky‘s Collected Works, Richard Haugh retitled this essay ―Theological
Tensions among Christians.‖ The original essay appeared in The Bostonian (April 1955): 3-6.
960

298

could represent obstacles to Christian men and women in their growth in knowledge. He
is right in affirming that Christians, in their redeemed state, can indeed know the truth,
and know it with certainty. But their knowledge and their certitude still remain subject to
the contingencies of created existence, and thus, it can falter, as has been historically
indicated by the many heresies that have beset the Church. The Incarnation and
Redemption indeed brought about the ―newness‖ of created existence, and the members
of the Church are members of the new creation who participate in the divine life. But in
this participation, which is a true participation, God still remains other. Authority may
not be external to the Church, but finite human knowledge still needs an authority that is
externally manifested within the Church in order to aid its members in their askesis.
I began this chapter by quoting Andrew Louth‘s contention that Newman‘s theory
of doctrinal development is inextricably bound up with the particular Roman Catholic
understanding of authority. Florovsky‘s carefully nuanced acceptance of doctrinal
development demonstrates that Louth‘s contention is a bit of overstatement. Mutatis
mutandis, however, Louth is right in perceiving that the idea of doctrinal development, or
Tradition, is inextricably bound up with the question of authority. Both Newman and
Florovsky share Louth‘s perception, though each has a different answer to where the
proper locus of doctrinal authority in the Church lies.
I had written in the beginning of this section that judging the Chalcedonian
fidelity of Newman‘s or Florovsky‘s respective understanding of authority involves
engaging in a ―hermeneutics of hermeneutics.‖ Both Newman and Florovsky show a
concern with affirming certain categories they see as represented by the poles of the
human and divine in the hypostatic union—the visible and invisible, the concrete and
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abstract, the historical and eschatological—but these categories are differently applied by
them to the issue of the role of Church authority in doctrinal development. Newman sees
the infallibility of the entire Church as needing visible and concrete manifestation in the
authoritative doctrinal pronouncements of the hierarchy, which guarantee the truth of
doctrinal developments and thus aid the certitude of the faithful. Florovsky grants that
the hierarchy has the power to visibly represent the teaching of the Church by defining
doctrines, but denies that this power serves to aid the faithful in their conviction of the
truth of doctrinal developments. Instead, he holds that the truth becomes more concrete
for the members of the Church solely through their askesis, and neglects to assign the
bishops a clearly defined role in this askesis.
Furthermore, Newman believes that history testifies to the need for an infallible
authority in the process of doctrinal development, and that history has revealed the chaos
that ensues without such an authority. Florovsky, on the other hand, interprets history as
demonstrating that the Church does not need canonical strictures in order to ensure the
continuity of its faithful witness to revelation. How is one to determine which of these
accounts of the dogmatic role of Church authority is more faithful to Chalcedon? The
answer is tied up with the question.
Though a definitive answer to this question is impossible right now, this
examination of authority‘s role in the process of doctrinal development nevertheless has
the potential to bear fruit. Both Newman and Florovsky recognized the place of first
principles in knowledge at the individual and ecclesial levels. Roman Catholics and
Orthodox agree that the papacy is the greatest obstacle to reunion, but there are principles
underlying the affirmation or rejection of the papacy. Newman‘s and Florovsky‘s
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understandings of the dogmatic role of the papacy in particular, and Church authority in
general, reveal some of these principles. As I have attempted to show, their respective
answers to the question of the role of authority in doctrinal development are conditioned
by their positions on the fundamental issues of nature and grace, freedom and
personhood, faith and reason, the cross and the redemption. And, the incarnational
character of their theologies means their position on these issues is bound up with their
respective answers to Christ‘s question to Peter: ―Who do you say that I am?‖
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CONCLUSION

The catalyst for my dissertation was some modern Orthodox authors‘ perception
that doctrinal development was not, as Andrew Louth puts it, ―a valid category for
Orthodox theology.‖ I stated in the introduction that one purpose of this dissertation was
to respond to this Orthodox rejection of doctrinal development, whose most recognized
exponent is John Henry Newman. Newman‘s theory of development has come to be
representative of Roman Catholic thinking on the topic. The Orthodox rejection of
doctrinal development is in part attributable to the lack of attention they have directed at
this theological category. Orthodox authors have engaged in neither a thorough reception
of doctrinal development in general, nor of Newman in particular. My response
consisted of putting Newman in dialogue with one of modern Orthodoxy‘s most
representative thinkers—Georges Florovsky—on the question of doctrinal development.
In so doing, I hoped to highlight areas of agreement between Newman and Florovsky on
the issues of revelation and Tradition that are fundamental to the idea of doctrinal
development. I also hoped to frame some of the Orthodox objections to doctrinal
development, and at the same time, reveal some of their shortcomings.
The assumed premise of my first chapter was that the way one views the mode
and character of divine revelation affects one‘s attitude toward doctrinal development,
i.e., the Church‘s reception of revelation. I showed that both Newman and Florovsky
portray divine revelation as a series of personal, and thus free, acts of the living God in
history for the sake of men and women‘s deification. Significant for doctrinal
development, Newman and Florovsky both imply that God‘s act of revealing serves as a
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pattern for human persons‘ act of receiving this revelation. The initial reception of God‘s
revelation—which Newman terms ―impression,‖ and Florovsky terms ―experience‖—
involves cognitive and creative activity on the part of the human person. What is more,
Newman and Florovsky claim that this active reception of revelation takes place not only
on the individual level, but on the ecclesial level of the Church‘s ―mind,‖ as well. This
active reception of revelation marks the life of the Church in history, and constitutes its
mandate.
In Chapter Two I took up the subject of Newman‘s and Florovsky‘s
understandings of Tradition, which represents the Church‘s active reception of revelation
in history, and which I identified with the development of doctrine. Newman and
Florovsky regard Scripture and dogma as two principal manifestations of the reception of
revelation, though they also regard the entire life of the Church as manifesting this
reception. According to both authors, the dogmatic definitions that are the fruits of
development serve a positive function in the Church: for Newman, they are the explicit
concretizations of the ―idea‖ of revelation as it exists in the Church‘s mind; for
Florovsky, they are the Church‘s witness to the ―experience‖ of revelation. Furthermore,
both claim that the Church‘s development of doctrine is ordered toward systematization,
and that it is appropriate to employ the organic metaphor in describing this development.
In the Dialogue section of Chapter Two, I attempted to clarify the apparently
contradictory statements Florovsky made about the idea of doctrinal development.
Florovsky rejected organismic accounts of doctrinal development that portrayed the
Church‘s growth in the understanding of revelation as the unfolding of an idea
irrespective of human action. Relatedly, most of his rejections of doctrinal development
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manifest a rejection of logical theories of development. These theories claimed that
growth in understanding of revelation comes about through a syllogistic process
independent of experience. In other words, they implied for Florovsky a disjunction
between faith and reason. On the other hand, Florovsky saw the unity of faith and reason
affirmed in Soloviev‘s understanding of doctrinal development, which he commended for
―establish[ing] a method for dogmatic theology.‖ And Newman‘s theory of development
was neither organismic nor logical, which explains why Florovsky never specifically
rejected it, and perhaps even endorsed it in his 1960 encyclopedia article on ―Tradition.‖
In Chapter Three I examined Newman‘s and Florovsky‘s understandings of the
role of authority in the process of doctrinal development. I demonstrated that Newman
and Florovsky both believe that the issue of authority is intrinsic to doctrinal
development. However, my focus in this chapter (versus Chapters One and Two) shifted
from trying to establish harmony between Newman and Florovsky on this point, to more
clearly explicating a theme in the theory of doctrinal development that too often remains
unexamined. Newman believed that acceptance of the theory of development
necessitated acceptance of an infallible authority who could give certitude to the faithful
about the truth of developments through definitions. He held that the entire Church is
infallible because it is indwelt by the Holy Spirit. But he also held that this infallibility is
actively exercised in the official decisions of the Magisterium of the Church, whose head
is the pope. Florovsky, too, believed the power to define the teaching of the Church
belonged to the bishops alone, but he did not believe this power was protected with
infallibility. According to Florovsky, the members of the Church could only become
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convicted of the truth of doctrinal definitions through their personal, ecclesial askesis,
rather than the act of defining itself.
My dissertation‘s second goal was to demonstrate that an evaluation of Newman‘s
theory of development according to Eastern categories of thought, via Florovsky, would
lead to that theory‘s own development. In Chapter One, I defended Newman against the
charge that his theory promotes new revelation. At the same time, dialogue with
Florovsky showed that Newman‘s recourse to the formula that revelation ended with the
―death of the last Apostle‖ is reconcilable with a dynamic understanding of revelation
that affirms that the human response is itself included in that revelation. The fact that
both Newman and Florovsky hold that revelation is received by the ―mind of the Church‖
provided an opportunity for examining this term‘s place in Newman‘s theory. I showed
that both authors believe the experience of revelation dwells in the members of the
Church, but is not reducible to a collective consciousness of the members alone. I then
argued that both authors regard it as a participatory concept, and that the members‘
development of doctrine depends upon their union with Christ and his Spirit who dwells
in the Church.
Chapter Two included several points on which Florovsky‘s theology could
potentially contribute to the development of Newman‘s theory. Florovsky better
emphasized the positive character of dogmatic formulation than Newman, an affirmation
that he rooted in men‘s and women‘s creation in the imago Dei and the redemption of
their reason through Christ‘s assumption of a human intellect. In addition, Florovsky
offers a potential corrective to Newman‘s assertion that the idea of revelation, like other
ideas, organically develops of its own innate power in conjunction with the innate power

305

of reason. Florovsky allows for the propriety of organic metaphors for Christian
theology, but he clarifies that doctrine develops as a result of the synergistic divine and
human activity of the Body of Christ. This clarification is consonant with the
significance of human activity and corporate ecclesiology in Newman‘s thought. Lastly,
Florovsky stressed the inseparability and mutual coinherence of growth in knowledge and
growth in holiness, and maintained that this growth constituted the vocation of not only
each Christian person, but the Body of Christ as a whole. One finds in the system of
Florovsky, as he wrote of Maximus‘ system, ―dogmatics and asceticism…organically and
inseparably brought together.‖ He provides a patristically-grounded rationale for
claiming that the Church‘s development of doctrine corresponds with its growth in
holiness, which is a claim Newman scholars have typically balked at making.
Because Orthodoxy has not reflected on the question of authority as extensively
as Roman Catholicism, Chapter Three yielded more potential areas in which Newman
could contribute to some of the ideas present in Florovsky rather than vice versa.
Florovsky never quite freed himself from the abstractions and oppositions typical of the
Slavophile understanding of authority. Unlike Newman, Florovsky fails to consider that
authority‘s act of defining may play some role in the faithful‘s askesis in truth, though he
absolutely believes that dogmatic definitions themselves have an authority that directs
this askesis. And though one must conclude that Florovsky did not ultimately oppose the
canonical and the charismatic realms, his descriptions of authority remained more in the
latter than the former.
In spite of its shortcomings, Florovsky‘s reflections on authority offer possible
contributions to Newman‘s theory. Florovsky‘s more ascetical understanding of
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authority points toward a need to further account for the theological role of the faithful in
the process of development. In addition, Florovsky‘s insistence that Christ‘s redemption
included the redemption of human knowledge deserves consideration given Newman‘s
emphasis upon the necessity of a clear and distinct infallible authority to compensate for
human fallenness and finitude. The more negative statements about Roman Catholic
understandings of authority found in several of Florovsky‘s earlier essays are also worthy
of consideration, for opposition is a stimulant of development.
I believe that the third goal of this dissertation represents the most important
development of Newman‘s theory: the illustration of its Christocentric character.
Newman and Florovsky‘s theologies share an incarnational, or Christocentric,
orientation, which is most likely attributable to their common reliance on the patristic
witness. Newman held that the Incarnation was ―the central truth of the gospel, and the
source whence we are to draw out its principles.‖ Florovsky more explicitly and
unabashedly sought refuge in a vigorously Christocentric theology, and affirmed that
―one can evolve the whole body of Orthodox belief out of the Dogma of Chalcedon.‖
His Christocentrism is marked by a focus on the hypostatic union as defined by
Chalcedon, and the emphases he sees affirmed by this union: personhood, freedom, and
the significance of both divine and human action, the concrete and the abstract, reason
and faith, the historical and the eschatological.
While Newman‘s Christocentrism is not as explicit as Florovsky‘s, one finds
these realities similarly affirmed in Newman‘s works, and particularly in his theory of
doctrinal development. As such, I have attempted to show that doctrinal development is
something more than ―an hypothesis to account for a difficulty.‖ Rather, it testifies to a
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God whose free and active revelation of His person in history beckons men and women
to actively respond with their whole beings—in thought, word, and deed. This response
characterizes their history in these ―last days,‖ and contributes to the completion of the
Body of Christ. ―Development of doctrine‖ is thus a descriptor of a Christian theology of
history.
Christocentrism also provides the lens with which one should view objections to
doctrinal development leveled by certain Orthodox authors. Florovsky held that Christ‘s
assumption of human nature represented a mandate to affirm both divine and human
activity in the life of the Church. He also emphasized that Christ redeemed the totus
homo, and that both reason and faith, or, theology and life, contribute to the progressive
deification of the Body of Christ and its members. He perceived this same emphasis
affirmed in both Khomiakov‘s and Soloviev‘s understandings of doctrinal development.
I have argued that Newman‘s theory also affirms this emphasis, which he makes more
explicit in the unity he posits between real and notional knowledge in his Grammar of
Assent.
I have instanced Lossky‘s and Louth‘s objections to doctrinal development as
threats to the maintenance of this unity between faith and reason. They both ascribe a
role to theology in relation to the believer‘s experience of faith. But seemingly in
deference to the priority they grant to apophaticism, they deny that theology contributes
to a growth in one‘s understanding of this experience and, by implication, fail to accord a
place to reason in one‘s mystical ascent. Concomitantly, Lossky ends up promoting a
species of logical development, which Florovsky vehemently opposed for its implied
separation of theology and life. Also, Lossky and Louth echo the commonly-held view
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that doctrinal definitions are necessary only when heresy threatens the faith. Florovsky
believed that such a position indicates not only a negative view of reason, but a negative
view of history.
My primary reason in distinguishing between Florovsky and those Orthodox who
reject the idea of development is not to erect new walls within modern Orthodox
theology, but to call forth further reflection on the category of doctrinal development. As
I have argued, this category acts as a nexus for a number of themes of fundamental
theology: revelation, Tradition, the role of dogmatic language, the place of reason and
faith in the growth of the Body of Christ, and the role of authority in this growth. Greater
Orthodox reflection on doctrinal development must entail what Florovsky advocated as a
combination and correlation of Geschichte and Dogmengeschichte of the entirety of the
Church‘s Tradition. But it should also entail further reception of the thought of Newman,
whose entire thought, and not just his Essay on Development, represents the locus
classicus for the question of doctrinal development.
Newman has had a tremendous impact on Roman Catholic thought in the
twentieth century, and thus, greater Orthodox reflection on doctrinal development has
ecumenical implications. Thus far, the Orthodox-Catholic dialogue (at the official levels)
has focused on differences surrounding particular dogmas and doctrines, such as the
Filioque clause and the Vatican I definitions of papal primacy and infallibility. But, as
Florovsky has argued, these differences were preceded by the progressive ―disintegration
of the Christian mind.‖ There are thus hermeneutical differences that are operative in,
though not entirely determinative of, these differences at the dogmatic level. Florovsky
wrote that ecumenism ―will require the development of Church doctrines, in all their
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entirety and complexity.‖ This development will involve not only a retrieval of the
―common mind‖ of the first millennium, but also a creative appropriation of that mind
through engaging with the questions and concerns of today. Ultimately, reunion can only
come about through askesis, but it must be an askesis of the totus homo and the totus
Christus that ascribes a role to both reason and life. Such a holistic askesis is the path of
―Neo-patristic synthesis,‖ and the path of the development of doctrine.
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